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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores three themes: (i) the relationship between income inequality and 
economic growth across democracies and non-democracies; (ii) the effect of financial 
development on poverty reduction; (iii) the differential impact of the main factors 
underling CO2 and SO2 emissions across political regimes. 
 
Chapter One gives the overall introduction, including the literature review, the gaps in 
the literature and my contributions to the literature. 
 
Chapter Two examines the relationship between inequality and growth across 
democracies and non-democracies using data covering the period from 1970 to 2005. 
The analysis provides evidence that income inequality has a significant and negative 
impact on growth irrespective of the kind of political regime. However, the results show 
the existence of non-linearities, where the impact of income inequality turns negative to 
positive as a country’s level of income increases.  Finally, the elasticity estimates 
suggest that income inequality has an economically stronger impact on growth under 
non-democracies than under democracies. 
 
Chapter Three assesses the impact of financial development on poverty for the period 
spanning 1985-2008. The analysis provides evidence that financial development has a 
beneficial impact in terms of lowering the headcount index and poverty gap based on 
the $2 and $1.25 a day poverty lines. This effect holds only for some of the measures 
used to proxy financial development. On the other hand, the effect of financial 
development on relative poverty, as measured by the income share of the poorest 20% 
of the population, is statistically insignificant, regardless of the index of financial 
development.  
 
Chapter Four quantifies the impact of the main driving forces underling CO2 and SO2 
emissions across political regimes. Depending on the air pollutant and the political 
regime, the relationship between per capita GDP and emissions levels is either linear or 
inverted-U shaped. The estimates display that the adverse impact of increasing levels of 
population on air quality is generally less strong under non-democracies than under 
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democracies. Conversely, the adverse impact of greater trade openness is stronger under 
non-democracies than under democracies. Finally, the impact of youth on SO2 
emissions turns out to be statistically significant for democracies only.   
 
Chapter Five provides the overall conclusion, discusses the findings, limitations of the 
analysis and potential areas for future research. 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
 
It is a common practice to look at the increase in per capita Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) to assess countries’ relative economic performance. Countries with a faster 
growth of per capita GDP are thought to perform better than countries with relatively 
low growth rate. Alongside economic growth there has been an increased focus on other 
issues, specifically the distribution of wealth, alleviation of poverty and the preservation 
of the environment. The following quotation taken from the website of the Earth 
Summit held in Johannesburg in 2002 gives an idea of the emphasis placed on such 
issues: “The Summit reaffirmed sustainable development as a central element of the 
international agenda and gave new impetus to global action to fight poverty and protect 
the environment. The understanding of sustainable development was broadened and 
strengthened as a result of the Summit, particularly the important linkages between 
poverty, the environment and the use of natural resources” 
(www.johannesburgsummit.org). Such a statement expounds the multi-dimensional 
nature which nowadays characterizes the notion of development: when assessing a 
country’s overall performance one has to focus on a variety of aspects, including the 
economic growth rate, poverty alleviation and environmental sustainability.    
 
An enormous body of theoretical and empirical work has accumulated over the last few 
decades in an attempt to pinpoint the factors which underlie countries’ economic and 
environmental performance.  Within this body of literature there are an ever increasing 
number of studies that have emphasized the importance of institutions (e.g. North and 
Thomas, 1973; North, 1990; Rodrik, 2002; Acemoglu, 2004). According to this strand 
of literature, the ultimate factor underlying the incentives of the economic actors lies 
within the institutional framework. In North’s words “Institutions are the rules of the 
game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction” (1990, p. 3). In the next passage North adds “they [the institutions] 
structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic” (p. 3). 
Thus, in this tradition the study of institutions is a matter of the utmost importance for a 
clear understanding of how to start and maintain a process of sustained development. 
The current thesis belongs to this strand of literature. Specifically, I empirically 
investigate the role of a specific set of institutions, namely the political regime and 
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financial sector, in shaping countries’ economic growth, poverty reduction and 
environmental quality. The thesis is structures as follows: (i) Chapter Two assesses 
whether and how a country’s political regime affects the relationship between economic 
growth and inequality; (ii) Chapter Three explores the impact of the development of a 
country’s financial sector on poverty alleviation; (iii) Chapter Four explores the role 
played by the type of political regime in shaping the impact of the factors commonly 
viewed as the main forces underlying CO2 and SO2 emissions.  
 
What makes this analysis interesting are the peculiarities which characterize the 
institutions under investigation. Specifically, a liberal political regime as well as an 
efficient financial sector might be seen as aims to be achieved in themselves because of 
aspects of equity and/or efficiency that they enhance. As regards political regime, 
democracy has enjoyed a surge of interest in the academic community due to its form of 
government which is the most likely to respect human rights and promote political 
freedoms. In light of such intrinsic merits, assessing the economic and environmental 
performance of democracy relative to non-democratic political regimes is clearly a topic 
of primary importance. If authoritarian regimes turn to be more capable of promoting a 
given dimension of development, for example economic growth, then one has to bear in 
mind that political freedoms, notwithstanding their desirability, entail some opportunity 
costs.1 This is exactly the kind of argument which underlies Bhagwati’s thesis whereby 
“the political economy of development poses a cruel choice between rapid expansion 
and democratic processes” (1966, p. 203-204). On the other hand, if democracies 
perform relatively better than non-democracies, then one can happily conclude that 
political freedoms not only are inherently desirable, but also 
economically/environmentally valuable. A third result might be a kind of “neutrality” of 
political regime, in which case political freedoms would entail no costs in terms of the 
designed economic/environmental output, nor they would provide comparative 
advantages over autocratic form of government.  
 
With regards to the financial sector, a large body of literature has shown that a system 
which effectively provides financial services, such as risk amelioration, saving 
mobilization and capital allocation, is crucial for the process of economic growth (e.g. 
                                                            
1
 The terms non-democracy, dictatorship and autocracy are used interchangeably in this study. 
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King and Levine, 1993; Beck et al., 2000; Beck and Levine, 2004). Thus, there is a 
large consensus that the process of financial development provides valuable real 
services which boost the overall efficiency of the economic system. On the other hand, 
the relationship between financial development and poverty is far less documented than 
the growth-financial development nexus. Theoretically, if a mechanism of trickle-down 
is at work, it is reasonable to expect that financial development will benefit the poor 
indirectly, by increasing the growth rate of an economy. In addition, financial 
development could relieve poverty directly by expanding the access to credit toward 
poor households. Then, financial development would promote not only efficiency (more 
growth) but also equity (less poverty). However, as it will be explained below, there are 
theoretical reasons which cast doubts on whether financial development could really 
have a beneficial impact on poverty alleviation. In fact, it turns out that the nature of this 
impact depends on the definition of poverty. Specifically, it might be the case that 
financial development helps a number of poor households to move out a given threshold 
of absolute poverty (less “absolute” poverty). However, this does not necessary implies 
that financial development will increase the share of the “pie” joined by the poorest 
portion of the population (less “relative” poverty).  
 
Admittedly, the study of the economic and environmental impact of the institutions 
under analysis is not new and indeed, a large strand of empirical literature has focused 
on this topic. However, as it will be explained below, I believe that further research on 
these issues is needed because of the limitations that beset previous analyses. The main 
contribution of this thesis is to readdress such issues while overcoming some of the 
theoretical and methodological difficulties which characterize prior literature.  In the 
rest of the introduction, I briefly outline the research questions, illustrate the relevant 
strands of literature along with limitations, and highlight the specific contributions of 
Chapters Two, Three and Four. In addition I illustrate the methodology used throughout 
the study, namely the system GMM panel method. Key findings, limitations, policy 
insights and potential extensions are illustrated in Chapter Five. 
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Chapter 2: The Impact of Income Inequality on Growth: A Sensitiveness Analysis 
across Different Political Regimes 
 
In late 18th-century and early 19th-century political theorists such as David Ricardo, 
J.S. Mill, Thomas Macaulay and Daniel Webster were all sceptical about the 
compatibility of widespread political freedom with a process of fast growth. 
Specifically, they shared the feeling that a widespread franchise trades off the security 
of private property necessary for investment and economic growth. A combination of 
unequal distribution of income and universal suffrage would have lead “exploitation of 
the rich by the poor”, with negative repercussions on the overall economic performance. 
This implies that democracy hampers the growth of the economy.  
 
More recently, the literature has incorporated such thinking in the median voter 
framework which formalizes the determination of tax rates based on majority rule. For 
instance, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) extend the 
endogenous fiscal model of Meltzer and Richard (1981) to a dynamic context based on 
overlapping generation framework. According to their models, higher levels of income 
inequality worsen conflicts over distributional issues. Under majority rule, such fiscal 
pressure eventually leads the effective tax rate to rise above some threshold level which 
maximizes investment and growth. As a result of excessive taxation, higher inequality 
would lower the country’s rate of economic growth. There are two mechanisms at work 
here: a political mechanism by which fiscal pressure ends up with redistributive 
policies; and an economic mechanism whereby redistribution harms growth as a result 
of the distortions that taxes cause to the economy. Such framework relating inequality 
and growth via taxation policy have been quoted as “fiscal policy approach” (Perotti, 
1996) or “political-economic model” (Barro, 2000).  
 
On the other hand, a similar relationship is not predicted for undemocratic regimes 
because the linkage between income inequality and fiscal policy here is ambiguous. 
Persson and Tabellini point out that “in a society where distributional conflict is more 
important, political decisions are likely to result in policies that allow less private 
appropriation and therefore less accumulation and less growth. But the growth rate also 
depends on political institutions; for it is through the political process that conflicting 
interests ultimately are aggregated into public-policy decisions” (Persson and Tabellini, 
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1994, p. 600). Since policy makers in undemocratic countries are not elected on the 
basis of majority-rule, the “median” voter no longer plays a pivotal role. As a result of 
this, fiscal policies implemented in undemocratic regimes could be disconnected from 
the distribution of wealth. From a theoretical side, the extension of the franchise to a 
larger fraction of the population decreases the income of the “decisive” voter, thereby 
strengthening the support for redistributive policies. Therefore, such line of reasoning 
predicts a harmful impact of income inequality on growth in democracies while the 
adverse effect of inequality is thought to be weaker or absent in dictatorial countries.  
 
One weakness underlying the political-economic model is the omission of credit 
rationing. To understand the implications of this assumption, suppose a simple economy 
where production is proportional to an asset, named “capital”, whose productivity 
exhibits diminishing marginal returns.2 One important consequence of this technology is 
that transferring one unit of capital from an individual with an abundant capital 
endowment (rich) to an individual who lacks capital (poor) leads to an increase in the 
aggregate level of production. If capital markets work perfectly, those who need capital 
borrow from those who are in excess. Thus, the rate of capital return at the margin is 
equal for all individuals and the economic system operates at its maximum capacity. In 
such circumstances, a non-lump sum redistribution of capital necessarily entails a loss 
in efficiency because it reduces the return on capital, therefore the accumulation rate of 
capital.  
 
On the other hand, the growth-effect of redistribution might be quite different if some 
agents are prevented from obtaining credit due to the presence of credit market 
imperfections. Under such circumstances, the return of capital is not equated at the 
margin across all the individuals, and the economy works below its maximum capacity.3 
Hence redistribution could work as a remedy to a market failure. Specifically, a 
redistribution of capital toward the individuals whose investment projects offer the 
highest return on capital, namely the “poor”, can raise the overall efficiency of the 
economy, notwithstanding the adverse impact of taxation on the incentives to save and 
invest by the rich.  
                                                            
2
 The individuals’ endowment can be physical as well as human capital.  
3
 The argument based on credit market imperfections is shared by several works which point an adverse 
effect of inequality on growth (e.g. Galor and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Aghion and 
Bolton, 1997).   
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On the empirical front, there are a number of studies which have investigated the 
relative strength of the relationship between inequality and growth across democracies 
and dictatorships. Persson and Tabellini (1994) show that the negative impact of 
inequality on growth holds for a sample of democratic countries while it turns 
statistically insignificant for non-democracies. On the other hand, using a different 
inequality dataset and classification of political regimes, Deininger and Squire (1998) 
find the reverse, namely that inequality is harmful to growth for dictatorships but not for 
democracies. Other studies, such as Alesina and Rodrick (1994), Clarke (1995) and 
Perotti (1996), reveal that the effects of inequality on economic growth are negative and 
statistically significant regardless of the kind of political regime. 
   
Overall, the evidence of a differential impact of inequality on growth across 
democracies and dictatorships is, at best, mixed. One possible reason for such variety in 
these results is concerned with the measurement error problem. As shown by Weed 
(1997) and Knack and Keefer (1997), the empirical results found by Persson and 
Tabellini are an artefact of their data on income distribution and political regime 
classification. However, I believe that poor quality data of income distribution is 
unlikely to be confined to this study. Specifically, the income inequality dataset used by 
Deininger and Squire (1998) does improve over the data used by previous studies, yet it 
still suffers from serious problems which might invalidate comparability across 
countries (Atkisnon and Brandolini, 2001).  
 
Additional important reasons for the contrasting findings are methodological and 
econometric limitations. The afore-mentioned studies employ standard cross-country 
regressions which assess the impact of initial levels of inequality on subsequent growth 
spanning 20 years or more. However, cross-country regressions do not control for 
unobserved country-level effects. In the presence of correlation between these effects 
and the explanatory variables, which is quite likely in large sample of countries, the 
coefficient estimates are biased. Moreover, pure cross-sectional analyses fail to exploit 
any piece of information available in the time-series dimension of the data. Finally, all 
these studies have tested the relationship between inequality and growth using a 
standard linear growth model. However, as shown by later analyses, such as Barro 
(2000), Lin et al. (2009) and Castelló (2010), the assumption of linearity might not be 
well-grounded. Specifically, these studies find that the effect of inequality on growth is 
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negative in poor countries while it is statistically insignificant or even positive in richer 
countries. I believe that such non-linearity might play a relevant role in shaping the 
relative strength of the growth effect of inequality across political regimes. Specifically, 
if redistribution works as a substitute for credit market imperfections, democratic 
institutions should mitigate the negative effect of inequality precisely in economies with 
serious credit imperfections, namely poor countries – given that democracies are 
(generally) more sensitive to distributional issues than dictatorships. On the other hand, 
the differential effect of inequality on growth across political regimes is more 
ambiguous where problems of asymmetric information are mitigated by the working of 
a well-developed financial sector, namely high-income economies.   
 
This chapter contributes to yield a better grasp of the relationship between inequality 
and growth by attempting to overcome some of the problems reported in the previous 
empirical literature. First, it uses the newly assembled data on inequality developed by 
the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP). This dataset is constructed by 
combining the information for pay inequality in the manufacturing sector provided by 
the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the information 
in the “high quality” subset of the Deininger and Squire data set. Unlike the previous 
dataset, the measure of income inequality provided by UTIP is comparable and 
consistent across both years and countries. Secondly, it uses a longitudinal approach and 
dynamic panel techniques which overcomes the problem of omitted variable bias due to 
the presence of unobserved country-level effects. Along with the cross dimension of the 
data, such an approach makes use of additional pieces of information from variation 
over time. Finally, to allow for non-linearity between inequality and growth, it includes 
in the set of regressors an interaction term between the level of income and the 
inequality variable. This can be viewed as a pioneering work using a panel technique 
and non-linear model to assess the comparative strength of the relationship between 
inequality and growth across democracies and non-democracies.     
 
Chapter 3: Absolute Poverty, Relative Poverty and Financial Development  
 
In recent years an increasing body of literature has focused on whether and how the 
development of the financial system affects the standard of living for the poor. Some 
important theoretical models argue that poor families are likely to remain so due to the 
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presence of credit market imperfections (e.g, Galor and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and 
Newman, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997). Rather than channelling the funds toward 
those with the most profitable investments, financial markets lend funds to those with 
large endowments of assets. As a result, poor families forgo (human or physical) 
investments because they are unable to collect the necessary funds to finance 
themselves. One potential way of alleviating poverty is to undertake public policies 
which redistribute resources from the wealthy to the poor. However, such a policy 
approach entails some costs because of the adverse effect it has on the incentives, to 
save and invest, for those who carry the burden of taxation.4 On the other hand, if 
financial development is pro-poor, the policy maker could use an alternative approach 
to tackle poverty which does not share the same incentive problem associated with 
redistributive policies. Specifically, policies which lead to financial development would 
promote both equity and efficiency with no distortions on investments.  
  
On the theoretical side, financial development could reduce poverty by increasing the 
level of credit available to the poor. Specifically, advances in the financial system which 
ameliorate credit market imperfections could expand the set of economic opportunities 
of the poor but talented individuals who were previously unable to borrow (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine, 2009, and the references therein). On the other hand, the benefits 
associated with increasing availability of credit might principally accrue to the insider, 
in which case a deepening in the financial system does not widen the access to credit to 
a larger proportion of the population (Claessens and Perotti, 2007). Even worse, a 
greater financial depth could narrow the access to credit if resources are being shifted 
from the informal to the formal sector – given that the poor obtain funds primarily from 
the informal sector (Arestis and Caner, 2009). In addition, if accompanied by a feeling 
of euphoria, expansions of the financial sector might increase financial fragility (Arestis 
and Caner, 2009). In such climate, banks are more likely to lend indiscriminately and 
firms to downplay the risks associated with investment projects. If the ensuing 
economic scenario does not match the expectations, a financial crisis is likely to occur. 
This scenario is particularly detrimental for those who pay the highest price of financial 
crisis, namely the poor. 
                                                            
4
 As explained above, redistributive policies still lead to an overall gain in efficiency if the ‘incentive 
effect’ to invest on the transfer recipients outweighs the disincentive effect to invest on the taxpayer. In 
fact, in a Keynesian context, a progressive redistribution might enhance not only poor’s incentive to 
invest, but also the rich’s incentives because of the increase in the aggregate demand driven by the poor’s 
relative high propensity of consumption (the “acceleration principle”, see e.g. Samuelson, 1939).   
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Financial development could mitigate poverty beyond its effect on the availability of 
financial services to the poor. Several studies have successfully established a positive 
impact of financial development on economic growth (e.g. King and Levine, 1993; 
Levine and Zervos, 1998; Beck et al., 2000; Fink et al., 2003; Beck and Levine, 2004). 
If a trickle- down effect is at work then the poor can benefit from financial development 
through the growth channel (Arestis and Caner, 2009). In addition, an increase in the 
rate of economic growth expands the resources on which redistributive policies can 
draw on. Financial development could also affect the income share of labour, which is 
the main source of income for the poor. Specifically, the poor could reap further 
benefits from financial development if the increase in the growth rate translates into a 
higher demand for low-skilled labour. On the other hand, if the expansion of economic 
activity involves primarily high skilled workers, the poor will remain untouched by the 
higher labour demand (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009).   
 
Using one or more proxies of financial development several empirical works, based on 
large sample of countries, suggest that financial development alleviates the absolute 
incidence of poverty - the most common measure of absolute poverty used being the 
headcount index, which gives the percentage of population living below a specified 
poverty line (Honohan, 2004; Beck et al., 2007; Akter et al., 2010; Perez-Moreno, 
2011; Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011). Some work has also been done to assess the  
impact of financial development on  relative poverty, which is commonly measured as 
the income of the poorest 20 % of population relative to the national income (Jalilian 
and Kirkpatrick, 2005; Beck et al., 2007; and Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011). The 
empirical evidence found by these studies is in favour of a positive impact of financial 
development on the income share of the poorest quintile. Taken together, such findings 
suggest that financial development has decreased not only the number of people below 
the poverty line, but it has also increased the share of the income accruing to the lowest 
quintile. 
 
Overall, the theoretical ambiguity concerning the effect of financial development on 
poverty alleviation seems to have been settled empirically. However, the afore-
mentioned studies suffer from serious methodological difficulties. For example, both 
Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2005) and Beck et al. (2007) test the impact of financial 
development on poverty using a sample which includes developed as well as developing 
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countries. If richer countries have higher level of financial development as well as lower 
relative poverty, then running a pooled sample might produce misleading results. Both 
studies use an interaction term between the proxy of financial development and a 
dummy for poor countries or the level of GDP to account for a differential effect of 
financial development on poverty across different income levels. However, they do not 
use similar interaction terms for other explanatory variables, neither do they mention 
any check for testing whether the coefficients are equal across poor and rich countries. 
Honohan (2004) uses cross-sectional analysis to assess whether financial development 
leads to poverty reduction for a sample of 70 poor countries. However, cross-sectional 
regressions do not control for unobserved country-specific effects and discard any 
available information in the time-series dimension of the data. Jeanneney and Kpodar 
(2011) overcome these difficulties by using a system GMM estimator for a sample of 75 
developing countries; however, they fail to include the lagged dependent variable in 
their set of explanatory variables, therefore, their empirical model potentially still 
suffers from omitted variable bias.  
 
Honohan (2004), Akter et al., (2010) and Perez-Moreno (2011) use the headcount index 
based on the absolute poverty line as the only proxy for poverty. One problem with this 
approach is that absolute levels of poverty are not always too high, particularly in 
middle income economies, yet the distribution of wealth in developing countries is 
generally strongly uneven, with the bottom quintile of the population sharing only a 
very small fraction of the national income (e.g., Brazil, Argentina and Peru). Thus, the 
complementary information provided by measures of relative poverty is important for a 
proper assessment of the impact of financial development on the poor. 
 
This study contributes to the literature on the nexus between financial development-
poverty by focusing on two different dimensions of poverty, namely absolute and 
relative poverty, while overcoming some of the methodological problems encountered 
in previous studies. I believe that such distinction is important because the measurement 
of the pro-poor effect of financial development probably depend on the definition of 
poverty on which the researcher is focusing. Financial development might well help the 
poor to get out of a specific poverty line (for example, $2 a day). However, a reduction 
of absolute poverty does not necessarily imply a drop in relative poverty. In fact, the 
income share of the poorest X % of the population (for example the lowest quintile), 
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might even decrease if financial development favour disproportionately the richer 
fractions of the population. In other words, there is no reason to believe that a drop in 
absolute poverty might not be accompanied by an increase in relative poverty.  
  
To assess empirically the impact of financial development on poverty I structure the 
analysis in the following way. First, I focus on a sample of developing countries only. 
As the structure of the financial sector could differ strongly across poor and rich 
countries, focusing on developing economies avoids an important source of 
heterogeneity from using pooled sample of both rich and poor countries. The exclusion 
of the sample of rich countries is even more important when studying the headcount 
index because the absolute levels of poverty for these countries, at the World Banks’ 
stated poverty lines, are virtually zero. Second, the empirical estimation employ a 
longitudinal approach based on the system generalized methods of moments panel 
estimator (system GMM). This estimation technique effectively addresses the dynamics 
and controls for country-specific effects. Third, the analysis employs a large array of 
measures of financial development drawn from the literature on the financial 
development-poverty nexus. Specifically, to proxy for financial development I use the 
value of liquid liabilities, the total amount of credit granted to the private sector by 
financial intermediaries and the stock market capitalization (all expressed as a share of 
GDP), which are measures of the size of the financial sector. The other two indices, 
namely the ratio of commercial to central bank assets and the stock market turnover 
ratio, reflect mainly the efficiency and the degree of liquidity of the financial sector. 
Using these indices allows us to assess the effect on poverty of two different dimension 
of financial development, i.e. the financial deepening and the efficiency/liquidity with 
which the financial sector perform its functions. 
 
Chapter 4: Determinants of CO2 and SO2 Emissions: Empirical Evidence for 
Different Political Regimes 
 
Emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and sulphur dioxide (SO2) are among the main 
factors that are known to affect the natural environment and human health. Notably, 
high atmospheric concentrations of CO2 are principally responsible for climate change. 
Likewise, SO2 causes acid rain and several respiratory problems, such as 
bronchoconstriction and asthma symptoms. An ever increasing body of the literature 
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has focused on the anthropogenic factors underlying CO2 and SO2 emissions, such as 
economic growth, trade openness, technologies and population size (Grossman and 
Krueger, 1995; Dietz and Rosa, 1997; Heil and Selden, 2001; York et al., 2003; Cole 
and Neumayer, 2004; Fan et al,. 2006; Auci and Becchetti, 2006; Managi et al., 2009; 
Naryan and Naryan, 2010).5 Within such literature, a large number of studies have 
analysed whether countries with democratic institutions are more concerned with 
environmental issues as compared to non-democratic countries.  
 
Theoretically, there are several reasons to believe that democracies are relatively more 
capable of achieving higher environmental standards as compared to non-democratic 
countries. Some authors (McGuire and Olson, 1996; Lake and Baum, 2001; Bueno de 
Mesquita et al., 2003) have argued that the level of public goods provided by the state is 
higher under democracies than under non-democratic regimes. Since the characteristics 
of environmental quality, such as clean air and preservation of forest, are those of a 
public good, one would expect that environmental performance of democracy is 
superior to that of autocracy. Payne (1995) holds that environmental-interest groups are 
more successful in promoting environmental legislation where political and civil rights 
are protected.  An additional argument revolves on the tendency of democracy to favour 
multilateral environmental cooperation (Neumayer, 2002). This propensity is especially 
important for addressing environmental problems which are global in character.  
 
On the other hand, several scholars question the ability of democracy to provide 
effective solutions to environmental problems. Some influential writers, such as Hardin 
(1968) and Heilbronner (1974), invoke some kinds of constraint on freedoms as a 
remedy to the increasing scarcity of resources and individuals’ propensity to over 
exploit the common good. This type of task might be more easily achieved in non-
democracies because of the greater degree of autonomy that the policy maker enjoys as 
compared to democratic forms of government. In a similar vein, Desai (1998) is 
sceptical about whether political freedoms could positively affect environmental quality 
because of the democracies’ dependency on economic growth – given a general adverse 
impact of growth on the environment. Furthermore, to the extent that the costs from 
                                                            
5
 Carbon and sulphur emissions on the atmosphere have a natural as well as an anthropogenic component. 
Examples of natural sources are volcano eruptions and respiration process by living organism. The 
anthropogenic component comes from man-made sources, especially the combustion of fossil fuels for 
generating power. 
22 
 
environmental degradation manifest in the long run, myopic electors will not fully 
appreciate the importance of environmental policies. In such case, electoral 
accountability would be more of a hindrance than a stimulus to environmental 
preservation. As long as the ruling elite expect to remain in power for a long period of 
time, a dictatorship might turn to be environmental responsible precisely because it does 
not face frequent re-elections (Bernaeur and Koubi, 2009).   
 
Looking at the empirical evidence, with the partial exceptions of Shafik and 
Bandyopadhyay (1992) and Midlarsky (1998), I find that prior studies have documented 
a beneficial impact of democracy on environment quality. Li and Reuveny (2006) and 
Winslow (2005), using the Polity score of democracy (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995), reveal 
that more democratic countries produce lower levels of CO2 and SO2 emissions per 
capita than less democratic countries. Bernauer and Koubi (2009) provide similar 
evidence using Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) measure of degree of democracy. 
Specifically, they find that a higher degree of democracy is conducive to lower levels of 
SO2. Other studies such as Dutt (2009), Barret and Graddy (2000) and Scruggs (1998), 
have used the indices constructed by Freedom House as a proxy for the level of 
democracy (Gastil, 1987 and later issues). Their findings show that there is a negative 
impact of democracy on emission levels. 
 
All the afore-mentioned studies are based on a reduced-form model which examines the 
direct effect of democracy on environmental outcome. However, as explained above, 
the level of emissions depends primarily on other factors such as population, the level of 
production and technologies. In practice, if democracies deliver better environmental 
outcomes than non-democracies, they should do so by successfully mitigating the 
adverse impacts of the driving forces underlying environmental degradation. This 
means that the effect of these driving forces might be conditional on the political 
regime. To give an example, let us consider the level of CO2 and SO2 emissions as a 
function of the size of population. It is reasonable to assume that the higher the 
population, the higher the emission levels, other conditions being equal. However, if 
institutional features, such as free flow of information, independence of the media and 
civil liberties, raise public consciousness of the problems associated with pollution, then 
it is possible that the environmental impact of increasing levels of population varies 
across different kinds of political regime. Specifically, individuals living in a democracy 
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are assumed to be more aware of the environmental consequence of their action as 
compared to their counterparts in dictatorships. Therefore, democratic institutions will 
encourage the adoption of conducts and technologies which minimize the adverse 
impact of rising demographical pressures. As a result of these institutional features, the 
emissions levels for a given level of population might be lower under democracies than 
under dictatorships.  
 
This investigation proceeds in three steps. First, I quantify the impact of the level of 
income (proxied by per capita GDP), population size, the share of population aged less 
than 15 and trade openness, on CO2 and SO2 for a large sample of countries. These 
variables are widely thought to be among the main driving forces underlying CO2 and 
SO2 emissions. This model can be considered as the baseline specification. Second, 
after assessing the effects of these variables, I explore the differences in the 
environmental impact of the driving forces across democracies and dictatorships. I thus 
use a set of interaction terms between the explanatory variables and dummies for 
democracy and non-democracy. Third, I assess the differential impact across political 
regimes using a flexible functional form which allows the effects to vary depending on 
the stage of development. I do so by including the interactions between the explanatory 
variables (population, youth and openness) and the income variable (per capita GDP) 
into the specification. Finally, to gauge the sensitivity of emissions I compute the 
elasticity of emissions with respect to a specific underlying variable at different 
percentiles of the other variables in the model.      
 
The main reason underlying the selection of CO2 and SO2 emissions as indices of 
environmental quality (degradation) is concerned with data availability. As the 
environment quality is a multidimensional concept it would have been preferable to use 
a composite index, such as the Environmental Performance Index, which is based on a 
large number of variables ranging from the percentage of population with access to 
drinking water to the emissions of carbon dioxide produced by the industrial sector 
(Esty et al. 2008). However, poor data coverage makes it difficult to use panel data 
methodology. Similarly, the availability of indices concerning other forms of 
environmental degradation, such as COD and BOD (measures of water quality), land 
degradation and deforestation, is restricted to small numbers of countries and/or time 
periods. On the other hand, the levels of emissions of carbon and sulphur dioxide are 
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available for a relative large sample of countries and time periods. In addition, CO2 and 
SO2 emissions can be seen as among the most important indices of air quality. I chose to 
focus on emissions instead of concentration of CO2 and SO2 because the emission levels 
are more closely concerned with economic activity than the concentration levels (see 
e.g. Cavlovic et al. 2000).  
 
My work contributes to the existing empirical studies mainly in three key ways: (i) I 
assess the role played by political regime by looking at difference in the strength of the 
relationship between main anthropogenic factors and emissions across different types of 
political regimes; (ii) I use a categorical index of political regime from Alvarez et al. 
(1996) and later extended by Cheibub et al. (2010) which is based on a minimalist 
definition of democracy. Unlike continuous indices which focus on the degree of 
democracy, a dichotomous variable allows us to make a sharp contrast between 
different kinds of political regimes, namely democracy vis-à-vis dictatorships. In 
addition, such an index is not subject to the conceptual and methodological problems 
which underlie the operationalization of maximalist conceptions of democracy, such as 
the Polity IV and Freedom House measures (Cheibub et al. 2010); (iii) I estimate the 
empirical model in a dynamic framework using a system Generalized Method of 
Moment (GMM) approach, which allows us to overcome the dynamic bias problem 
from including the lagged dependent variable in the set of controls. Further, this 
methodology is also effective in controlling for unobserved country-specific time-
invariant effects. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first work which uses the two-
step system GMM estimator within the literature on the environmental performance of 
political regimes.  
 
Methodology 
 
My study employs a longitudinal approach which combines time series and cross-
section dimension of the data. Specifically, the empirical estimations rely on a dynamic 
model as follows: 
 
'
1it it it i ity y X vα β µ−= + + +                                                                                               [1] 
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Where ity is the dependent variable (e.g. growth rate of per capita GDP in Chapter 
Two), itX is a set of explanatory variable which includes the main variable(s) of interest 
(e.g. income inequality in Chapter Two), iµ is a country-specific effect and itv is a 
idiosyncratic shocks. α and β denote the parameters to be estimated. As it can be seen, 
the set of regressors also includes the lagged dependent variable, 1ity − . This variable is 
precisely the main feature which characterizes a dynamic model. Such a specification 
allows the dependent variable to depend on its past realization which means that a 
change in ix  at time t will influence iy also after that period. Such a dynamic pattern is 
a typical feature of factors which change slowly over time, as is indeed the case for the 
level of per capita GDP, the rate of poverty and the level of CO2 and SO2 emissions.6   
 
The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable on the right hand side causes a “dynamic 
panel bias” which neither the OLS estimator nor static panel techniques are capable of 
addressing (Baltagi, 2008; Greene, 2008). Specifically, both OLS and random effects 
are inconsistent because the country-specific effects are by definition correlated with the 
(lagged) dependent variable. The within estimator is also inconsistent because of the 
correlation between the (within-transformed) lagged variable and the (within-
transformed) error term (Nickell, 1981). Dynamic panel techniques overcome the 
dynamic panel bias because, under some conditions which are explained below, they 
allow IV estimation of the endogenous variable 1ity − using 2ity −  and other past lags as 
instruments (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover; 1995). In addition, 
dynamic panel techniques allows for endogeneity in all the explanatory variables 
included in itX because the lagged values of each of the right hand side variables can 
also be used as additional IV instruments (Beck et al. 2000). 
 
Once the superiority of dynamic panel techniques over alternative estimators has been 
ascertained, the researcher still has a choice between two alternative dynamic 
estimators, namely first-difference GMM and system GMM estimators. The main 
advantages of the latter over the former estimators can be summarized as follows: 
                                                            
6
 The reader can object that economic growth (the dependent variable in Chapter Two) is not the same as 
the level of GDP. In fact, the growth rate is nothing more than the first differences between two 
consecutive levels (in time) of GDP. When growth is written in first difference, it is easy to rewrite the 
regression with the level of per capita GDP as the dependent variable. This is explained in more detail in 
footnote 9 of Chapter Two.  
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1) First-differencing drops any variation across country, thereby discarding an 
important source of information.  
2) Differencing intensifies the bias from measurement errors (Griliches and Hausman, 
1986). 
3) The difference GMM estimator suffers from “weak” instruments problem when the 
variables are persistent over time (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
4) Differencing magnifies the gaps in panel data (Roodman, 2006). 
5) System GMM has better finite-sample properties than difference GMM (Baltagi, 
2008). 
 
Given the nature of the variables and the unbalanced structure of the panels under 
analysis I prefer system GMM to first-difference GMM. This technique had been first 
elaborated by Arellano and Bover (1995) and then fully developed by Blundell and 
Bond (1998). Specifically, the system Generalized Method of Moment approach 
estimates the equation [1] in levels jointly with the equation in first-difference: 
 
'
1it it it ity y X vα β−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆                                                                                             [2] 
 
The estimator uses lagged values of the explanatory variables, in levels as well as in 
first-differences, as IV instruments for the respective equations (“internal” instruments). 
Unlike system GMM estimator, the first-difference GMM estimator is based exclusively 
on the equation [2] in first-difference. In order to use the system GMM an additional 
assumption is required. Specifically, the first-differences of the explanatory variables 
have to be uncorrelated with the fixed effect (Bond et al. 2001). If this assumption 
holds, then first-differences can be used as IV instruments for the additional equation in 
levels [1]. This assumption is testable with the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions, as discussed below. 
 
The GMM estimates have been obtained by using the user written “xtabond2” 
command in Stata (version 11). Two critical assumptions have to hold for the system 
GMM to be a valid estimator. First, it is required that the error term exhibits no serial 
correlation higher than order one. Second, the set of instruments have to be statistically 
independent from the disturbance process (orthogonality condition). The first 
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assumption can be tested with the Arellano and Bond test. The second assumption can 
be assessed in an over-identified context by the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions. If both tests fail to reject their respective null hypotheses, then one can be 
reasonably confident that the system GMM is delivering valid estimates. To relax the 
assumption of homoskedasticity in the error terms I have relied on the two-step variant 
of the GMM estimator with the “Windmeijer finite-sample correction” (Windmeijer, 
2006) (the “xtabond2” command followed by the “twostep” and “robust” options in 
Stata).7    
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
7
 See Roodman (2006) for more details on system GMM and its implementation with Stata.   
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Chapter 2 : The Impact of Income Inequality on Growth: A 
Sensitiveness Analysis across Different Political Regimes  
 
2.1.     Introduction 
  
The inequality-growth relationship is at the core of an intense debate on the 
compatibility between a steady process of economic growth and an even distribution of 
wealth (see, for example, Galbraith, 2012). An equally important issue is whether the 
association between income inequality and growth is the same across democracies and 
dictatorships, or whether in fact the effect of inequality on growth is conditional on the 
political regime.  
 
According to the “political-economic model”, income inequality has a significant role to 
play in shaping economic growth in democratic regimes, whereas such a relation is less 
obvious for non-democratic regimes. The negative effects of income inequality on 
growth for a democracy can be explained as follows. Since the median income is lower 
than the average in general, democratic regimes carry fiscal policies aimed at income 
redistribution by imposing higher taxes (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Higher taxation 
discourages investment and hence reduces the growth rate of the economy (Bertola, 
1993; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Alesina and Rodrick, 1994). On the other hand, a 
similar relationship is not predicted for undemocratic regimes because the linkage 
between income inequality and fiscal policy is ambiguous. In fact, since the median 
voter no longer plays a pivotal role, the adverse effect of inequality on growth should be 
weaker or absent in dictatorships.  
 
On the empirical ground, there are a number of studies which have investigated whether 
income inequality affects economic growth differently across democracies and 
dictatorships. Persson and Tabellini (1994) analyse the effects of income inequality on 
growth for a sample of about 49 countries between 1960 and 1985. They find that the 
negative impact of inequality is statistically significant for the sample of democratic 
countries while it turns out to be insignificant for non-democracies. On the other hand, 
using a different inequality dataset and classification of political regime, Deininger and 
Squire (1998) provide evidence that inequality is harmful to growth only for 
dictatorships. Some other studies, such as Alesina and Rodrick (1994) and Clarke 
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(1995), find that the effects of inequality on economic growth are negative and 
statistically significant for democracies as well as for dictatorships.1   
 
Overall, the evidence of a systematic difference in the relationship between inequality 
and growth across different kinds of regimes is, at best, mixed. One reason for such 
variation in these studies is concerned with measurement error problems. As shown by 
Weed (1997) and Knack and Keefer (1997), the differential impact of inequality across 
political regimes found by Persson and Tabellini is entirely driven by measurement 
error of income distribution and political regime classification. However, poor quality 
data of income distribution is unlikely to be confined to this study. The income 
inequality dataset used by Deininger and Squire (1998), which is an improvement over 
the data used by Alesina and Rodrick (1994) and Clarke (1995), still suffers from 
serious problems of comparability across countries (Atkisnon and Brandolini, 2001).  
 
Further important reasons for such variety in empirical findings are methodological and 
econometric difficulties. First, cross-country regressions do not control for unobserved 
country-level effects. If such effects are correlated with explanatory variables, as is 
likely in large sample of countries, the coefficient estimates are biased. Second, pure 
cross-sectional analyses are unable to exploit any piece of information available in the 
time-series dimension of the data. Third, all these studies have tested the relationship 
between inequality and growth using a standard linear growth model. However, some 
later researchers, such as Barro (2000; 2008), Lin et al. (2009) and Castelló (2010), find 
that income inequality is harmful for growth in poorer countries and insignificant, or 
even beneficial, in richer countries. In light of such evidence, failing to allow for 
asymmetric effects of income inequality across different levels of income might yield 
misleading results.    
 
This study overcomes some of the problems reported in the previous empirical literature 
in three ways. First, I use data on inequality from the University of Texas Inequality 
Project (UTIP). Unlike the Deininger and Squire (1996) dataset, the measure of income 
inequality provided by UTIP is comparable and consistent across both years and 
countries. Its coverage of countries is wide and it has a substantially greater number of 
                                                            
1
 It should be noted that the main focus of Deininger and Squire (1998) is inequality in land distribution. 
However, they include income inequality in their set of explanatory variables.  
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year-observations than in any prior dataset. Second, I estimate a growth regression 
using a two-step system GMM estimator, which allows one to address the dynamics 
associated with panel data. This methodology also effectively controls for country-
specific time-invariant effects. Finally, in the spirit of Barro (2000; 2008) I use an 
interaction term between the level of income and the inequality variable to allow for a 
differential impact of inequality on growth depending on income levels. To classify 
political regime I use the index developed by Cheibub et al. (2010), which is 
constructed based on well-defined classification rules and operational definitions.  
 
The findings of this chapter can be summarized as follows. The results show that the 
effects of income inequality on growth are negative and statistically significant 
regardless of the type of political regime.  When the level of income is interacted with 
inequality, the results show that while the overall impact of inequality on growth is 
negative for relatively low levels of income, it turns out to be positive at higher levels of 
income. Further, I observe that such a differential effect of inequality on growth across 
different levels of income is not the same across political regimes. Specifically, the 
elasticity estimates suggest that income inequality has an economically stronger impact 
on growth under dictatorships than under democracies. 
 
Admittedly, as this study uses five-year frequency data rather than relying on pure 
cross-sectional observations, my results cannot be compared directly to those reported 
in previous analyses on the comparative strength of the inequality-growth relationship 
across different political regimes.2 I preferred a longitudinal approach to a cross-section 
analysis for the methodological reasons which have been explained above. Still, I 
believe that this chapter provides some relevant insights into the debate over the relative 
economic performance of different political regimes by reassessing whether the effect 
of inequality vary across democracy and dictatorships in the light of new and more 
reliable data, a dynamic model, and sophisticated panel techniques. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the theoretical 
reasons underlying the impact of inequality on growth as well as the empirical studies 
                                                            
2
 Standard cross-country regression estimates a long-run relationship by assessing the impact of initial 
levels of inequality on subsequent growth spanning 20 years or more.  On the other hand, as my analysis 
is based on five-year intervals, the estimated coefficients reflect a medium-run relationship. 
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of the relative strength of the impact across democracies and dictatorships. Section 3 
deals with the model and Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 displays the empirical 
findings of the analysis. Finally, section 6 presents some concluding remarks on the 
debate over the relative economic performance of alternative political regimes.  
    
2.2.     Literature Review 
 
In this section I discuss alternative views regarding the relationship between income 
inequality and economic growth and present the summary of prior empirical evidence.  
It turns out that there are several potential mechanisms, such as the level of saving and 
the state of social unrest, through which income inequality may affect the rate of growth 
of the economy, at least during a transition toward the new steady state.  
 
2.2.1. Positive effects of income inequality on economic growth 
 
Several theoretical studies have posited that there is a positive relationship between 
income inequality and economic growth. Such a relationship is based mainly on three 
arguments: differences in saving propensity between rich and poor, trade-off between 
equity and efficiency and incentive mechanisms to work effort and innovation.  
 
Theory 1 
 
According to the adherents of the classical view, the marginal propensity to save is 
higher for wealthy individuals as compared to individuals belonging to lower income 
classes (Lewis, 1954; Kaldor, 1957). If all savings turn into physical investment, an 
unequal distribution of wealth is conducive to intensive accumulation of capital, which 
sequentially accelerates the process of economic growth. In such scenario, any 
redistribution of wealth from high to low-saving propensity agents would lower capital 
accumulation, hence the rate of economic growth. Bourguignon (1981) establishes a 
formal theoretical base of this approach in a neo-classical growth framework. He shows 
that under the assumption of convex savings function the overall level of output is 
conditioned by the initial distribution of wealth and that an increase in inequality would 
lead the economy toward a higher steady-state level. A model combining a convex 
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saving function with an AK production function predicts that less equalitarian societies 
will have higher growth rate (Aghion et al. 1999).   
 
Theory 2 
 
A positive impact of income inequality on economic growth can also be explained 
through the trade-off between equity and efficiency (Okun, 1975). According to the 
second theorem of welfare theory, any Pareto-efficient allocation of resources can be 
achieved through a suitable lump-sum transfer. If such type of transfer were feasible, 
distribution of wealth and growth would be independent with each other.  However, as 
lump-sum taxation is unfeasible in the real world, any redistribution necessarily entails 
a loss in efficiency because it modifies the price system generated by the market. 
Specifically, by lowering the extent to which an individual can appropriate the return of 
her investment, higher taxation lessens the incentive to accumulate capital. Thus, if the 
social outcome generated by markets is viewed as “unfair”, the policy maker is faced 
with a trade-off between a more equitable income distribution and faster growth. As 
pointed by Okun, the equity/efficiency trade off “plagues us in dozens of dimensions of 
social policy” (Okun, 1975, p. 2).  
 
Theory 3 
 
An additional reason why income-equalizing transfers lower growth refers to the 
instrumental role played by inequality in promoting important factors, such as 
entrepreneurship, innovation and work effort (Siebert, 1998). For example, in a 
principal-agent setting it is reasonable to assume that the productivity depend on an 
unobservable workers’ effort. Levelling wages differentials regardless of the observable 
level of output is likely to discourage the worker from making any effort (Bell and 
Freeman, 2001). Another example for the positive relationship between inequality and 
growth is based on incentive to invest in an economy made by individuals who differ in 
their inner abilities (Galor and Tsiddon, 1997; Hassler and Rodríguez-Mora, 2000). In 
this scenario technological innovations raise the return to inner skills relatively to the 
return to parental background, thereby increasing intergenerational mobility. However, 
the ensuing concentration of high-skilled workers in the advanced sector concentration 
might widen the income disparities within each generation.  
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2.2.2. Negative effect of income inequality on economic growth 
 
Several theoretical works have challenged the existence of a positive relationship 
between income inequality and economic growth. According to such literature equality 
in wealth distribution is an important factor for the economy to embark on a sustained 
growth path. There are at least three mechanisms which accounts for a negative impact 
of inequality on growth.  
 
Theory 1 
 
A number of studies have focused on the importance of social cohesion in shaping 
institutional quality (e.g. Easterly, 2001; Keefer and Knack, 2002). According to this 
genre of studies income inequality is likely to widen social division at the expense of 
the quality of institutions such as security of contractual and property rights. For 
example, high levels of income inequality are likely to provide grounds to individuals to 
take part in detrimental actions like revolts, protests, assassinations and mass violence 
(Alesina and Perotti 1996; Gupta, 1990). Additionally, the growing unequal distribution 
of wealth encourages the rich to undertake predatory practices at the expense of the 
poor, which have a detrimental impact on the security of property rights (Glaeser et al. 
2003). These kinds of instabilities tend to produce uncertainties concerning the 
soundness of political and legal environment, which results in a deterioration of the 
accumulation of physical capital. Since investment is of crucial importance for 
economic growth, higher wealth inequality would have a negative impact on the overall 
growth of the economy.  
 
Theory 2 
 
According to the joint schooling/fertility approach of Becker et al. (1990), fertility and 
educational decisions arise as the outcome of an assessment of the return of human 
capital investments and the return from having offspring. A rise in the wage rate has 
two contrasting effects: an income effect which increases the demand for children and a 
substitution effect which affects the demand in the opposite direction because of the 
increasing opportunity cost of having children. Under the assumption that the return to 
investment in education is increasing in the stock of human capital, the substitution 
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effect turns to dominate the income effect at sufficiently high level of human capital. 
Thus, an increase in income will result in higher investment in human capital and lower 
fertility. Perotti (1996) has extended this model to a framework in which wealth 
distribution affects the fertility rate. If fertility is positively correlated with inequality, 
more egalitarian countries will invest more in human capital, and consequently grow 
faster.  
 
Theory 3 
 
Another strand of literature has focused on the link between credit market 
imperfections, distribution of wealth and investment levels (e.g. Galor and Zeira, 1993; 
Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Banerjee and Newman, 1993). In an economy where human 
and physical investments are indivisible, individuals with low levels of income need to 
borrow money in order to finance their investment projects. However, under imperfect 
and costly information, agents who cannot provide assets as collateral for the loan are 
prevented from obtaining credit (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). This implies that the 
individuals’ economic opportunities depend on their parental wealth, not on their 
abilities. A talented child from a poor household will not be sent to school. Similarly, a 
potential but poor entrepreneur will remain a low paid worker. Thus, high levels of 
wealth inequality mean that a larger fraction of population is unable to undertake 
profitable investments, thereby decreasing the overall efficiency of the economy.  
 
2.2.3. The effects of income inequality on growth conditional on political 
regimes  
 
An additional explanation of why wealth inequality might have a negative impact on 
growth is based on the endogenous redistribution model formalized by Meltzer and 
Richard (1981). In its simplest version, the model illustrates the political equilibrium 
within a context where the selection of a linear tax rate- which defines the amount of 
income being redistributed - is left to a public-decision making process. Here, the level 
of taxation crucially depends on the income of the decisive voter relative to the mean 
income. Specifically, the higher the mean income relative to the decisive voter’s 
income, the higher is her preferred tax rate. The decisive voter in a democracy is the 
individual endowed with the median income. Since the median income is generally low 
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as compared to the income of a monarch or a dictator, universal suffrage is expected to 
lower the income of the decisive voter, thereby increasing the level of taxation.  
 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) add an additional 
“economic” channel to the “political” channel envisaged by Meltzer and Richard 
(1981).3 This economic channel links the level of redistribution to the rate of growth. 
Specifically, redistribution and growth are predicted to be negatively related because a 
higher tax rate is likely to discourage investment. The combination of the political and 
economic channels provides a mechanism at work in democracies which links 
inequality to growth: higher levels of income inequality foster policies aimed at 
redistributing wealth, which in turn lower the growth rate. On the other hand, a similar 
relationship does not necessarily manifest in dictatorships. In Persson and Tabellini’s 
words “in these countries there may be little relationship between income inequality in 
the population at large and the redistributive preference of government” (Persson and 
Tabellini, 1994, p. 612). This line of reasoning predicts the impact of income inequality 
on growth to be conditional on the political regime. Specifically, one would expect an 
uneven distribution of income to lower growth in democracies, but not in dictatorships.   
 
2.2.4. Empirical Evidence   
 
The empirical findings on whether income inequality affects economic growth 
differently across democracy and dictatorship are inconclusive. In this subsection I 
summarize those empirical studies that have focused on this issue.  
 
Persson and Tabellini (1994) analyse the effects of income inequality on growth for a 
sample of about 49 countries between 1960 and 1985. As a measure for income 
distribution they use the income share held by the third richer quintile.4 Using ordinary 
least squares, they found that the negative impact of inequality is statistically significant 
for the sample of democratic countries while it turns out to be insignificant for non-
                                                            
3
 The main difference between Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) is that the 
former allow for some kind of productive public expenditure while the latter focuses exclusively on 
redistributive policies. Thus, unlike Persson and Tabellini, the level of taxation which maximizes the 
growth rate is positive in Alesina and Rodrik. 
4
 This measure is a proxy for income equality. In their analysis the positive sign of the corresponding 
coefficient indicates an adverse effect of inequality on growth.  
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democracies. Furthermore, employing a two-stage least square procedure they show that 
inequality affects growth via investment, and this effect is only present in democracies.  
 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) study the relationship between inequality and growth for a 
panel of about 70 countries. They use the Gini index for both income and land as 
proxies for distribution of wealth. Their results generally show that wealth inequality is 
deleterious for economic growth. In contrast to the findings of Persson and Tabellini 
(1994) which indicate that inequality is harmful only for democracies, Alesina and 
Rodrik find that the effects of inequality on economic growth are negative and 
statistically significant for democracies as well as dictatorships.  
 
Clarke (1995) runs a growth regression for a large panel of countries using the Theil 
index and the Gini coefficient as measures of inequality. His findings indicate a 
negative effect of inequality on growth. Using data for the period 1970-1988, Clarke 
provides no evidence that the economic impact of inequality varies across different 
political regimes.  However, when he re-estimates the model on an extended set of data 
spanning 1960 to 1988, he finds some weak evidence in support of the differential effect 
of income inequality on growth conditional on political regimes.  
 
Perotti (1996) investigates the relationship between income inequality and growth for a 
panel of about 60 countries covering the period 1960-1985. Specifically, he examines 
whether the effect of inequality differs across democratic and non-democratic countries. 
To that end, he uses an interaction term between a measure of income equality and a 
dummy for democracy. The OLS estimations for the full sample show that there is a 
negative relationship between income inequality and growth. While the coefficient 
estimate for the interaction term is positive, it is not statistically significant indicating 
that there is no differential effect of income inequality across political regimes.  
 
Deininger and Squire (1998) analyze the effect of income inequality on growth using 
income distribution data from Deininger and Squire (1996), which provides a suitable 
dataset for panel technique estimations. They find that initial inequality affects 
subsequent growth in dictatorial countries, while the relationship turns statistically 
insignificant for the sample of democratic countries. This result stands in stark contrast 
to the findings of Persson and Tabellini (1994) that indicate that the negative effect of 
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inequality is statistically significant in democracies only. Some other studies such as 
Knack and Keefer (1997) and Weede (1997) also argue against Persson and Tabellini’s 
findings on the basis of unreliability of inequality dataset and the political regime 
classification used in their work.   
 
2.3.     The Model 
2.3.1. Theoretical Framework 
 
This chapter provides an important theoretical contribution to the median voter model. 
Specifically, I theorize that the relative strength of the effect of inequality on growth 
across democracies and dictatorships varies with the country’s income level. In this 
subsection I proceed to explains in details the underlying theoretical context.  
 
The economic channel of the “political-economic model” illustrated above is based on 
the assumption of perfect credit markets. Under this assumption the individual’s 
economic opportunities are shaped exclusively by her abilities, not by her parental 
wealth. In such circumstances, a non-lump sum redistribution of income necessarily 
lowers the growth rate because of the adverse impact that taxation has on investment. 
However, credit markets are far from working perfectly in the real world. In presence of 
credit imperfection, markets do not lend to individuals who lack collateral, however 
high the rate of return on their investment opportunities. Hence, fiscal policies could be 
used as a means to allow poor endowed households to undertake their investment 
projects. If the ensuing gain in efficiency exceeds the loss associated with the 
disincentive effect of taxation, then the overall impact of redistribution on growth would 
be positive.  
 
Under this scenario, the differential impact of inequality on growth across political 
regimes pointed by the political-economic model is no longer straightforward. In line 
with Persson and Tabellini (1994), let us maintain the assumption that democracies pay 
more attention to distributional issues than dictatorships. Once the hypothesis of 
perfect-functioning capital markets is abandoned, the negative growth effects of 
inequality will not necessarily be stronger in democracies. In fact, such negative effect 
might be even weaker in democracies if fiscal policies are used to foster poor 
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households’ investments. An additional reason of why the adverse impact of inequality 
on growth could be less serious in democratic countries is concerned with social peace. 
Fiscal policies which take the form of income-equalizing transfers and other welfare 
mechanisms raise the opportunity costs for the poor in taking part in disruptive activities 
(Sala-I-Martin, 1996). Therefore, redistributing wealth from the rich to the poor could 
prevent the occurrence of social unrest along with its negative consequences on growth 
rate. 
 
Whether democracy mitigates or exacerbates the negative effect of inequality probably 
depends on the country’s stage of development. As suggested by Barro (2000), it is 
likely that market imperfections are particularly serious in poor countries due to the 
absence of a developed financial sector which ameliorates the problem of asymmetric 
information. For this reason, I believe that in low-income economies democratic 
regimes could play an important role in tempering the adverse impact of uneven 
distribution of wealth. On the other hand, it is reasonable that in high-income countries 
credit markets do a better job in addressing asymmetric information which underlies 
credit imperfections. Further, social instability is of less concern in the presence of a 
wealthy middle class, which typically characterizes richer countries. Thus, there would 
be less for scope for efficiency improving redistribution policies in relatively rich 
economies. 
 
To conclude, if democracies are (generally) more sensitive to distributional issues than 
dictatorships, one would expect the negative impact of inequality in low-income 
countries to be less strong in democracies than in dictatorships. On the other hand, the 
differential impact across political regimes in relatively rich countries is ambiguous. I 
investigate this pattern by using the empirical model illustrated below. 
 
2.3.2. Empirical Model  
 
Several empirical studies have relied on longitudinal approach when testing the 
inequality and growth relationship (e.g. Forbes, 2000; Banerjee and Duflo, 2003; 
Voitchovsky, 2005; Castelló, 2010). I draw upon such studies to extend the empirical 
analysis to the investigation of the differential effect of income inequality on growth 
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across political regimes. Specifically, I estimate a growth equation in the following 
dynamic framework:   
 
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 , 1 ,i t i t i t i t i i tGrowth Income Inequality Xβ β β ψ ε− − −= + + + Ψ + +
                               
(1) 
 
where subscript i  represents country and t  represents time period. tiGrowth , is measured 
as the 5-year average growth rate of per capita GDP for country i  (the time frequency 
of the data is five-year). Explanatory variables are all measured at the end of the five-
year period. For example, this means that the average growth over the five year period 
between 1981 and 1985 is regressed on the explanatory variables measured in 1980.5 
This lag structure also reduces the potential of reverse causation from growth to 
inequality as pointed by some studies, such as Lunberg and Squire (2003) and Garcia-
Penalosa and Turnovsky (2006; 2007). 1, −tiInequality , my main variable of interest, is a 
measure of income inequality for country i  during period 1−t . iψ  is a vector of 
country-specific time-invariant factors and ti,ε  represents the error term. 1, −tiIncome is 
the level of income and 1, −tiX  is a vector of explanatory variables, which includes public 
spending, inflation, openness and secondary school enrolment for country i  during 
period 1−t . The selection of these control variables is based on previous theoretical and 
empirical studies in the growth literature: 
  
1) The (lagged) level of per capita GDP is included because one of the basic tenets of 
economic theory, the “conditional convergence”, points that low-income economies 
grow faster than high-income economies (other conditions held constant) due to 
capital flow from richer to poorer countries and technological catch-up (Barro and 
Sala-I-Martin, 2004). 
2) The inclusion of public spending, measured as a share of per capita GDP, is 
suggested by a large body of literature that has pinpointed fiscal policy as a strong 
predictor of the growth rate (Landau, 1983; Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 
2004). The expected sign is ambiguous since a higher share of public spending 
                                                            
5
 If an explanatory variable is not available in 1980 then the value of that variable is taken from the 
preceding year closest to 1980.  
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might increase or decrease the growth rate depending on some factors, such as the 
composition of the spending and fiscal budget positions (e.g. Gupta et al. 2002).6  
3) Inflation, calculated as the change in the consumer price index, is included to 
control for macroeconomic instability. This is expected to have a negative sign on 
growth because of the costs associated with inflation, such as “shoe leather’ costs”, 
“menu costs” and inefficient allocation of resources due to misperceptions of 
changes in relative price (Briault, 1995).  
4) Openness, defined as the sum of export and import as a share of GDP, is included as 
a proxy for trade policy. In general, an economy benefits from international trade by 
exploiting comparative advantages with the result to achieve a higher steady-state 
level of income. International trade also encourages internal competition, facilitates 
the flow of technological innovations between countries and provides entry to wider 
market (Grossman and Helpman, 1991).7 
5) The inclusion of school enrolment is based on theories which emphasize the role 
played by human capital in the process of economic growth. According to these 
theories, human capital raises the productivity of labour, fosters the economy’s 
capacity to innovate and facilitates the adoption of technology from leading 
countries (Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Romer, 1991). Thus, the coefficient of school is 
expected to be positive. 
 
Following Persson and Tabellini (1994), Alesina and Rodrick (1994) and Perotti (1996), 
I do not include investment because many of the theories linking inequality to growth 
work through the accumulation of physical capital. As regards the political-economic 
model, one should ideally run two structural equations that estimate the linkage between 
taxation and investment rate, on the one hand, and the linkage between investment and 
economic growth, on the other hand. However, computing such a structural model 
would have drastically reduced the size of the panel because of the limited data 
availability on taxation. I include the investment variable as a robustness check of the 
empirical results. 
 
                                                            
6
 To properly assess the impact of fiscal policy one should use disaggregated measures of public 
expenditures along with a variable gauging the countries’ fiscal budgetary positions. I have relied on an 
aggregate measure of the overall size of government for reasons of data availability. 
7
 Admittedly, this measure is a very imperfect proxy of the extent to which an economy is open to 
international trade. I use this variable for its extensive coverage of countries and time periods. 
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0β , 1β , 2β
 
and Ψ  denote the parameters of interest that are estimated. A negative sign 
of 1β supports the empirical literature on conditional convergence. The nature of the 
effect of income inequality on growth is revealed by the sign of 2β . A negative 
coefficient provides evidence in favour of an adverse effect of inequality on economic 
growth. Conversely, a positive coefficient implies that higher levels of inequality are 
conducive to higher rates of growth.   
 
2.3.3. The Role of the Level of Income in the Inequality-Growth 
Relationship  
 
The model as described in Equation (1) assumes a linear relationship between inequality 
and growth. However, as discussed in section 2.3.1, the country’s stage of development 
might play an important role in shaping the relative strength of the inequality-growth 
nexus across political regimes. In addition, a number of studies, such as Barro (2000), 
Lin et al. (2009) and Castelló (2010), have provided evidence that the growth effect of 
inequality is different across high and low-income economies.8 Therefore, to investigate 
this issue, I augment the empirical model by incorporating an interaction term between 
inequality and the level of income. Specifically, the augmented version of Equation (1) 
takes the following form: 
 
( )1,1,31,21,1, −−−− ×++= tititititi IncomeInequalityInequalityIncomeGrowth βββ  
                 tiitiX ,1, εψ ++Ψ+ −                                                                                         (2) 
 
where 1,1, −− × titi IncomeInequality is an interaction term between the income inequality 
measure and the income variable for country i  during period 1−t  and  3β  is a 
parameter associated with the interaction term. Whether the level of income weakens or 
strengthens the impact of income inequality on economic growth depends on the sign 
and the statistical significance of 2β  and 3β . In particular, if both 2β  and 3β estimates 
have the same sign and appear statistically significant then the level of income would 
amplify the effects of inequality on economic growth. On the other hand, if both 
                                                            
8
 Unlike my empirical investigation, these studies do not focus on the differential effect of inequality 
across democracy and dictatorship.  
42 
 
estimates enter into the model with opposite signs then a rise in income level would 
reduce the total effect of income inequality on growth. 
 
The inclusion of the interaction term enables us to compare the sensitivity of economic 
growth to income inequality across political regimes at different income levels. 
Specifically, I asses the elasticity of growth by using the following expression:  
 
*ˆˆ 32
1,
, Income
Inequality
Growth
ti
ti ×+=
∂
∂
−
ββ                                                                               (3) 
 
where 2ˆβ  and 3ˆβ  are the estimated coefficients of income inequality and the interaction 
term from Equation (2), respectively. *Income  is the particular level of income. 
Specifically, I calculate the sensitivity at 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 80th and 90th percentiles of 
the underlying income variable.  
 
Before concluding this section, it is important to call the reader’s attention to an 
important issue. My work is indirectly related to the literature on the so-called Kuznets 
curve whereby income inequality first increases and then decreases with the level of 
development. However, the Kuznets hypothesis is concerned with the issue of how the 
level of income shapes the distribution of income. On the other hand, my work deals 
with the issue of how the distribution of income affects the rate of growth (not the level 
of income). Therefore, not only the direction of causation, but also the variables under 
analysis are different. 
 
2.3.4. Estimation Method  
   
In a dynamic model such as given in Equation (2) the dependent variable depends on its 
values in previous periods.9 Thus, OLS estimation yields inconsistent estimates as the 
lagged dependent variable causes the fixed effects iψ  to be correlated with the set of 
                                                            
9
 This can be easily seen when the growth variable in Equation (2), is expressed in terms of first 
differences of income levels, and then the lagged income term is added to both sides. Setting 1 1 1α β= + , 
Equation (2) can be rewritten as follows:  
( ), 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 , 1 , 1 ,i t i t i t i t i t i t i i tIncome Income Inequality Inequality Income Xα β β ψ ε− − − − −= + + × + Ψ + +  
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right hand side variables (see, for example, Beck et al., 2000). Within estimator is also 
inconsistent because the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term 
(Nickell, 1981).  
 
To correct for the bias introduced by the lagged dependent variable, some researchers 
have utilized the first-difference GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991). Specifically, such a technique removes the fixed effects by taking the first 
difference of the underlying variables in the model and uses their lagged values as IV 
instruments. Although this difference estimator is designed to deal with the dynamic 
model, it still suffers from some econometric weakness. First, differencing drops 
valuable pieces of information from variability across country. Secondly, differencing 
intensifies the bias from measurement errors (Griliches and Hausman, 1986). Finally, 
the difference GMM estimator suffers from a “weak” instruments problem when the 
variables are persistent over time (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
  
Arellano and Bover (1995) provide a solution for these problems by elaborating the 
system GMM estimator later fully developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). 
Specifically, the model depicted in Equation (2) can be estimated as a system of 
dynamic equations as follows:  
 
( )1,1,31,21,1, ~~~ −−−− ×∆+∆+∆=∆ tititititi IncomeInequalityInequalityIncomeGrowth βββ  
                  
titiX ,1,
~
~
ε∆+Ψ∆+
−
                                                                                          (4) 
 
( )1,1,31,21,1, −−−− ×++= tititititi IncomeInequalityInequalityIncomeGrowth βββ   
                 
tiitiX ,1, εψ ++Ψ+ −                                                                                         (5) 
 
While the difference estimator only considers the Equation in difference (4), the system 
GMM technique estimates both Equations (4) and (5) simultaneously. As a result of 
using additional moment conditions from (5), the system GMM estimator yields more 
efficiency than the difference estimator and it effectively controls for the problem of 
weak instruments.  
 
44 
 
To test the validity of the instruments used in the system GMM estimation, I employ the 
J  test for overidentifying restrictions developed by Hansen (1982). The consistency of 
the GMM estimator depends on the additional assumption of no second-order serial 
correlation in the error 
,i tε . For this purpose, I use the Arellano and Bond (1991) test to 
check the presence of serial correlation. If both tests fail to reject their respective null 
hypotheses, then one can be reasonably confident that the system GMM is delivering 
valid estimates.     
 
2.4.     Data and Variable Definitions  
2.4.1. The Sample  
 
This study is based on an unbalanced panel of 88 countries covering the period 
spanning 1970 to 2005. The sample consists of countries which have different levels of 
economic development, geographical backgrounds and other country-specific 
characteristics. The sample is restricted to include only countries that have data for at 
least three consecutive periods.  
 
The datasets for regression analysis consists of up to seven non-overlapping sub-periods 
with five-year intervals. The 5-year frequency allows us to compare the results with 
relatively recent empirical studies, such as Forbes (2000), Lin et al. (2009) and Castellό 
(2010), who have used a similar dynamic framework. Since annual growth tends to 
reflect short-run fluctuations, the dependent variable is included as sub-periods average.   
 
The list of sample countries with their respective political regime is given in Table A.1 
in Appendix. As it can be seen the majority of the sample countries did not switch their 
political regime. Of the 88 countries included in the underlying sample, 28 of them have 
experienced at least one transition between dictatorship and democracy. The majority of 
changes are from dictatorship to democracy. In my panel any country-observation for a 
given sub-period is recorded as either democracy or dictatorship according to the 
classification of its political regime in the last year of that specific sub-period. For 
example, on the basis of Alvarez et al. (1996) classification rules, Indonesia had a 
transition toward democracy in 1999. Within the 5-year structure of my data, Indonesia 
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is recorded as dictatorship for the sub-periods 1981-1985, 1986-1990 and 1991-1995 
and as a democracy for 1996-2000 and 2001-2005.  
 
2.4.2. Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
 
Although the main purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between income 
inequality and economic growth across different political regimes, I include an 
additional set of variables to control for other conventional determinants of economic 
growth. A detailed discussion of the construction of the income inequality measure and 
the democracy index is given in the following subsections. Further details on variables 
and data sources are given in Table A.2 (Appendix).   
 
Democracy 
 
Since this study is aimed at analysing differential effects across democracies and 
dictatorships, I rely on a categorical index of political regime. Specifically, I use the 
index of democracy developed by Cheibub et al. (2010).10 This index is an extension, in 
terms of both time and coverage of countries, of the one published in Alvarez et al. 
(1996).  Cheibub et al. (2010) define political regimes based on the definition given in 
Alvarez et al. (1996). In particular, a regime is defined as democratic unless any of the 
following conditions is violated: 
 
1) The chief executive is chosen directly or indirectly by popular election. 
2) The legislature is selected by general elections.  
3) There are two parties at least which stand for the election.  
 
Based on these three rules Alvarez et al. (1996) construct a binary variable for a large 
sample of countries between 1950 and 1990, which takes the value 1 if the country is 
classified as democratic and 0 if the country is classified as a dictatorship. Cheibub et 
al. (2010) provide an updated series covering the 1950-2010 period.  
 
                                                            
10
 This index has been used, among others, by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) to construct their 
dataset of political transitions.  
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I preferred such index of political regime to a discrete transformation of a continuous 
ranking, such as Polity IV and Freedom House, for two reasons. First, there are several 
conceptual and methodological problems with continuous indices of democracy (see, 
for example, Gleditsch and Ward, 1997; Przeworski et al., 2000; Munck and Verkuilen, 
2002). Second, when dichotomising a continuous index there is no prior theoretical 
reason to choose among different cut-offs (Cheibub et al., 2010).  
 
Income Inequality 
 
The absence of data on the distribution of wealth for a sufficient number of countries 
forces researchers to use proxies in empirical investigation. The most common approach 
is to use data on income inequality as a proxy for wealth inequality.11 However, sources 
and methods are often heterogeneous not only across countries but also over time within 
a given country. In an attempt to overcome these problems, Deininger and Squire 
(1996) have constructed a dataset (hereafter DS) on income distribution with the 
specific purpose of allowing systematic analyses across countries and over time. 
Specifically, Deininger and Squire have started from a dataset of more than 2,600 
observations collected from a large variety of previous studies. Then they have 
proceeded to drop any observation which does not meet the following three criteria: (i) 
the source of information is the household survey; (ii) the survey must have national 
coverage; (iii) the information is drawn from a variety of income sources (or 
expenditure), such as wage, pensions and self-employment earning. The authors end up 
with a “high quality” dataset made of 682 observations.12 This dataset improves over 
previous data on income distribution in two ways. First, the number of high quality 
observations is considerably larger in the DS dataset than in other datasets. Second, the 
coverage of countries provided by the DS is much wider than alternative datasets.  
 
For these reasons, the DS dataset used by Deininger and Squire (1998) is more reliable 
than alternative dataset used by previous studies on the differential effect of inequality 
on growth across political regimes. Specifically, Paukert (1973) - the dataset on income 
inequality used by Persson and Tabellini (1994) – has several observations which do not 
                                                            
11
 Alternatively, one may proxy the distribution of wealth by using the information on the distribution of 
land (see, for example, Deininger and Squire, 1998). 
12
 A large number of studies, such as Forbes (2000), Banerjee and Duflo (2003) and Castellό (2010), have 
relied on the DS dataset to assess the impact of income inequality on economic growth. 
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meet the criteria underlying the DS dataset. 13 Field (1989) and Jain (1975) - the datasets 
used in Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Perotti (1996) - improve over Paukert, yet they 
include several observations whose value is quite different from the corresponding 
observations in the DS dataset (Deininger and Squire, 1996).14     
   
Although the DS dataset provides a more reliable basis for empirical investigation, 
serious problems remain. First, the coverage varies substantially across countries and 
over time. While for some countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, 
the dataset provides observations for almost every year, data on other countries, 
especially in Africa and Latin America, are sparse and highly unbalanced. Thus, any 
study based on the DS dataset fails to effectively represent those countries which have 
no surveys on a regular basis (Galbraith and Kum, 2003). Second, as discussed by 
Atkinson and Brandolini (2001), there are differences in definitions of variables which 
make the DS dataset ill-suited for cross-country analysis. Specifically, while some 
observations are based on income others are based on expenditure. This is problematic 
because, as acknowledged by Deininger and Squire (1996), inequality in expenditure 
tends to be less skewed than inequality in income. To account for this difference 
Deininger and Squire suggest adding 6.6 to expenditure-based Gini measures to make 
them comparable with income based measured (6.6 being the average difference 
between the two types of measures). However, as pointed by Atkinson and Brandolini 
(2001) it is doubtful “whether a simple additional or multiplicative adjustment is a 
satisfactory solution to the heterogeneity of the available statistics” (p. 790). In addition, 
there are further differences in definition concerning the recipient unit (household or 
individual) and the use of gross and net income. Finally, there are dubious cases even in 
variation over time within the same country. According to the DS dataset, there are 
several countries which experienced a variation in the Gini index by 5 or more points in 
just one year. It is puzzling that the distribution of income in a country could really 
change so dramatically in such short time, unless during time of social upheavals 
(Galbraith and Kum, 2003).    
 
                                                            
13
 Weede (1997) and Knack and Keefer (1997) use the same dataset as Persson and Tabellini (1994), 
namely Paukert (1973). As explained above, their investigations are aimed to show that Persson and 
Tabellini findings are driven by measurement error.   
14
 I am unable to make any assessment on the inequality data used by Clarke (1995), because the author 
does not report the source of the dataset. 
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Taking into account these considerations, Galbraith and Kum (2005) have made an 
attempt to construct an alternative, more reliable, dataset on income inequality. To start 
with, they have constructed a dataset on pay inequality from the data collected by the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). This dataset - compiled 
for the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) and known as the UTIP-UNIDO 
dataset- is based on the between-group component of the Theil’s statistics, which is a 
measure of manufacturing pay dispersions across industrial categories.15 This measure 
obviously embraces a narrower concept of inequality than the DS measure based on 
household income inequality. On the other hand, the UTIP-UNIDO measure of 
manufacturing pay inequality is based on a unique accounting framework - the 3-digit 
code of the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) – therefore it is more 
reliable for cross-section and time-series analysis than the DG measure, which is instead 
based on disparate household surveys. In addition, as explained in Galbraith and Kum 
(2005), pay is closely related to income inequality because pay accounts for a large 
share of total income.    
 
Then, Galbraith and Kum have proceeded to estimate an empirical relationship between 
the DS and the UTIP-UNIDO data set of inequality. They find that the UTIP-UNIDO 
measure of inequality has a strong explanatory power for the DS measure.16 Thus, they 
used the estimate coefficients to produce an income inequality dataset which match each 
of the observation contained in the UTIP-UNIDO dataset of pay inequality. The idea 
underlying this imputed dataset – which the authors label as the Estimated Household 
Income Inequality (EHII) Data Set - is to keep the reliable pieces of information from 
the DS dataset, while avoiding the afore-mentioned problems. The EHII measure of 
inequality varies from 0 (perfectly equal distribution of income) to 100 (only one person 
holds total income of the society).17 This dataset improves on the DS data in several 
ways. First, it provides a total number of observations above 3,000 against the 682 
observations contained in the DS data, which makes the EHII dataset less at risk of 
sample selection bias. Second, the EHII measure is more precise than the DS measure 
because it exploits additional pieces of information from the UTIP-UNIDO measure. 
                                                            
15
 See Conceição and Galbraith (1998) for more details on the Theil’s T statistic.  
16
 The set of regressors include some additional explanatory variables, such as the ratio of manufacturing 
employment to population and population growth.  
17
 Nel (2006), Daymon and Gimet (2009), Lin and Ali (2009) and Tan and Law (2011), among others, 
have used the EHII dataset for empirical analysis.  
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For example, unlike the DS dataset, the EHII measures clearly show that inequality in 
OECD countries has risen since 1979, which is likely to be what really happened given 
the advent of the Thatcher/Reagan era. Finally, as the model linking the DS measure to 
the UTIP-UNIDO measure contains a set of dummy variables for the different 
definitions of income (e.g. variable taking 1 if the measure is household based and 0 if 
income based), the EHII estimates effectively address the problems of heterogeneity 
which plague the DS measures.     
 
2.5.     Empirical Findings 
2.5.1. Summary Statistics and Correlation Estimates  
 
This subsection presents preliminary statistics illustrating means and standard 
deviations of the underlying variables for the full sample as well as for the samples of 
democracies and dictatorships separately. Table 2.1 presents the results.  The last 
column displays a t-test on the equality of means across democracies and dictatorships.   
 
The average growth for the democracy sample is 2.07, while the corresponding figure 
for the dictatorship sample is 1.39. This suggests that, without controlling for any other 
variable, democratic countries had on average higher economic growth compared to 
non-democratic countries over the period under investigation. The estimates of standard 
deviations reveal that the growth rate in democratic countries is also less volatile 
relative to non-democratic countries. This difference is statistically significant with a p-
value of 0.042. 
 
With regard to the per capita GDP, the estimated statistics reveal that democratic 
countries have on average higher levels of income than dictatorships. Democracies are 
also characterized by higher education levels compared with non-democracies. 
Dictatorships have on average more public spending (as a percentage of GDP) as 
compared to democracies. As shown by the t-test, differences in the inflation rate and 
trade openness across political regimes are not statistically significant.  
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for the Main Variables (1970-2005) 
Variables Full Sample Democracy Dictatorship t-test             (p-value) 
Growth 1.769 2.070 1.388 0.042 
  (3.334) (2.492) (4.138)   
Income 8.864 9.405 8.183 0.000 
  (1.099) (0.855) (0.990)   
Public Spending 17.215 16.159 18.543 0.001 
  (7.727) (5.677) (9.561)   
Education 64.775 80.973 44.404 0.000 
  (33.478) (28.139) (28.139)   
Inflation 39.796 29.719 52.469 0.522 
  (372.582) (157.926) (531.592)   
Openness 70.450 70.058 60.918 0.832 
  (43.692) (46.566) (39.895)   
Inequality 41.539 39.067 44.647 0.000 
  (6.459) (5.867) (5.804)   
Notes: The table illustrates the means of the variables used in the analysis (standard deviations in 
parentheses). The last column reports the p-values from the t- tests on the equality of means across 
democracies and dictatorships. 
 
The table also shows that democracies have been more egalitarian than dictatorships in 
terms of the Gini coefficient. Specifically, the mean value of income inequality for 
dictatorships is 44.65, which is higher than the mean value for democracies, 39.07. The 
mean growth has fluctuated between 0.58 (1981-1985) and 3.07 (2001-2005) percentage 
points while the Gini inequality has oscillated between 39.69 (1976-1980) and 43.31 
(2001-2005) (not shown here).   
 
To get preliminary evidence on the relationship between economic growth and other 
explanatory variables, I estimate correlations for the full sample as well as for each of 
the democracy and dictatorship samples. Table 2.2 presents the correlations.  
 
The table reveals that the economic growth rate is positively correlated with the level of 
income, education and the proxy for openness. In contrast, the correlation between 
economic growth and public spending, inflation rate and income inequality is negative 
in case of the full sample. The unconditional correlation between growth and Gini 
inequality varies from -0.37 in the (1986-1990) to 0.18 (2001-2005), which is 
statistically insignificant (not shown here). The signs of the correlations remain 
unchanged when the sample is split according to the political regime. However, the 
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coefficients for education, public spending and openness are not statistically significant 
for dictatorships. 
 
Table 2.2: Correlation Matrix 
Variables Full Sample Democracy Dictatorship 
Income 0.184 0.201 0.128 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.074) 
Public Spending -0.170 -0.336 -0.076 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.290) 
Education 0.137 0.122 0.086 
  (0.004) (0.055) (0.230) 
Inflation -0.131 -0.191 -0.121 
  (0.006) (0.002) (0.091) 
Openness 0.134 0.205 0.087 
  (0.005) (0.001) (0.225) 
Inequality -0.160 -0.138 -0.131 
  (0.001) (0.030) (0.066) 
Notes: The table shows simple correlations between economic growth and explanatory variables (p-
values in parentheses). 
 
 
2.5.2. Estimation Results 
 
I start the empirical investigation by estimating a standard dynamic growth model for 
the full sample without the interaction term between per capita GDP and the Gini index. 
The estimation results are displayed in Panel A of Table 2.3.   
 
Panel B of Table 2.3 presents the p-values of the Hansen (1982) test for overidentifying 
restrictions and the Arellano-Bond (1991) test for serial correlation in the residuals. The 
number of countries, observations and the number of instruments are shown at the 
bottom of the table.  
 
Commencing the analysis with the control variables, the results from the baseline model 
indicate that economic growth is positively related to education and openness, whereas 
growth is negatively affected by the level of income and public spending. Specifically, I 
find that the impact of income level on growth is negative and statistically significant, 
which is consistent with the literature on convergence (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 2004; 
Mankiw et al., 1992). 
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Table 2.3: System GMM Estimates for Income Inequality Effect on 
Economic Growth in Different Groups of Countries 
Panel A: Estimation Results 
  
Model 1                       
(Full sample) 
Model 2  
(Democracy) 
Model 3   
(Dictatorship) 
Incomet-1 -1.762*** -1.596*** -1.381** 
  (0.404) (0.431) (0.549) 
Public Spendingt-1 -0.078** -0.073* -0.103*** 
  (0.035) (0.042) (0.037) 
Educationt-1 0.062*** 0.043*** 0.058** 
  (0.014) (0.011) (0.022) 
Inflationt-1 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Opennesst-1 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.015** 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
Inequalityt-1 -0.089*** -0.095** -0.115** 
  (0.034) (0.038) (0.050) 
Constant 17.017*** 17.474*** 15.660*** 
  (3.572) (5.033) (4.049) 
Panel B: Diagnostic Tests 
AR(2) 0.763 0.188 0.886 
Hansen test 0.483 0.603 0.679 
Observations 271 166 105 
Countries 88 56 46 
 Instruments 60 59 29 
Notes: The table shows the main determinants of economic growth. Panel A reports the estimates 
obtained from robust two-step system GMM estimations. The figures given in parentheses are 
standard errors which are asymptotically robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation within panels. Panel B reports the p-values of the Hansen test and the Arellano and Bond 
test. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
The coefficient estimate for public spending is also negative and statistically significant, 
which indicates that the countries with higher levels of public spending are likely to 
have a relatively low growth rate. This result is in line with a large body of the literature 
which has corroborated a negative effect of public expenditure on growth (see, for 
example, Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 2004).  
 
The results from Model 1 (full sample) also show that education levels positively affect 
economic growth. This finding is in line with previous empirical findings by Mankiw et 
al. (1992), Barro (2001) and Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004). Contrary to the 
expectations, the inflation variable is statistically significant with a positive sign. Yet, 
the magnitude of the estimated coefficient is practically zero. Such a result is in line 
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with Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004) who also document an economically insignificant 
impact of lagged inflation on subsequent growth.  
 
Finally, the coefficient of trade openness, measured as the sum of exports and imports 
to GDP, is positive and statistical significant. This is in line with several studies, such as 
Yanikkaya (2003) and Lee et al. (2004), who also provide evidence for a positive 
impact of openness on growth. 
 
As for the consistency of the estimator, statistical tests suggest that the assumptions 
underlying Arellano and Bover’s estimators are met. As Panel B of Table 2.3 reveals, 
the test for second-order serial correlation cannot reject the null hypothesis that the error 
term is not serially correlated at order 2 and higher orders. Furthermore, the Sargan test 
of overidentifying restriction does not invalidate the set of instruments used in the 
estimation.  
 
The Effect on Growth of Income Inequality 
 
As can been seen from Model 1 of Table 2.3, the coefficient estimate for income 
inequality is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This implies that 
higher levels of income inequality result in a reduction of economic growth. In 
particular, according to the estimate of the inequality coefficient, a one-standard 
deviation increase in the measure of income inequality (Gini index) would reduce the 
growth rate of the economy by a magnitude of around 0.58 percent over the next 5-
years.18  
 
On theoretical grounds, in addition to the political-economic model, there are other 
models which can explain such negative relationship. For example, as explained in the 
literature review, wealth inequality is likely to be harmful for growth because of credit 
market imperfections which inhibit poor households from obtaining credit to finance 
their investment projects (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1993). Other 
models point out that economic inequality exacerbates social divisions, thereby 
                                                            
18
 This figure has been obtained as the difference between two fitted values of the growth rate. The first 
value is obtained by multiplying the estimated coefficient  by the average of the Gini index (41.54). 
The second value is computed by multiplying  by the sum of the average and standard deviation of the 
Gini index (41.54+6.46).   
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undermining investment and economic growth (e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Easterly, 
2001). 
 
On the empirical side, the negative effect of income inequality on growth is in contrast 
to the findings of Forbes (2000), who shows a positive impact of income inequality on 
economic growth using a model similar to the one used here. However, as Forbes’ 
analysis relies on the DS dataset on inequality, her estimation is likely to suffer from 
serious measurement errors. An additional reason underling the contrasting results 
might lie in differences in sample size and time coverage. The dataset used by Forbes 
include 45 countries over the years 1966-1995 while my dataset encompasses 88 
countries over the time period between 1970 and 2005. 
 
Furthermore, Forbes (2000) uses first difference GMM to address omitted variable bias 
and endogeneity of the explanatory variables. However, as explained above, the use of 
such estimators is problematic when applied to time series characterized by a high 
degree of persistence. This is particularly true for variables like income inequality 
whose variation is mainly cross-sectional. In fact, the within-country standard deviation 
of income inequality in my sample is about 2.91, which is almost half of the between-
country standard deviation, of about 5.77. On the other hand, system GMM improves 
over first differences GMM in that it also exploits information from an additional 
equation in levels (Equation 5). 
 
The Impact of Income Inequality across Democracies and Dictatorships  
 
To examine whether income inequality has a differential impact on growth across 
different political regimes, I estimate Equation (1) separately for the sample of 
democracies and dictatorships. The results are shown in Models 2 and Model 3, Table 
2.3. As can be seen, the inequality coefficient has a negative sign in both political 
regimes. Further, the null hypothesis that inequality does not affect growth is rejected at 
5% for each set of countries.  
 
I run a Wald test to check whether the estimated coefficients are jointly statistically 
different across the two political regimes. Specifically, the test statistic is 14.42 (p-
value: 0.02). Thus, the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients can be rejected at the 
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5% significance level in favour of the alternative hypothesis that the underlying 
estimates are statistically different across democracies and non-democracies.  
 
Although the analysis is not directly comparable with previous studies on the relative 
strength of the inequality-growth nexus across political regimes, it is still interesting to 
note that my results are consistent with the empirical findings of Alesina and Rodrick 
(1994), Clarke (1995) and Perotti (1996). On the other hand, these results are in contrast 
with Persson and Tabellini (1994) which suggest that the effects of income inequality 
on growth are significant for a sample of democratic countries only. My findings also 
differ from Deininger and Squire (1998) who document a retarding growth effect of 
inequality for a sample of dictatorships only.  
  
The other results in Table 2.3 indicate that the effects of country specific determinants 
of growth such as the income level, education and openness maintain their statistical 
significance for both political regimes.  
 
The Effect of Inequality across Different Levels of Income  
 
In this section I run the growth regression as specified in Equation (2) to allow for a 
nonlinear relationship between inequality and growth. Model 1 in Table 2.4 reports the 
estimation results for the full sample of countries.  
 
The coefficient estimates for both income inequality and the level of income have the 
expected negative signs and are statistically significant. The estimate on the interaction 
term between income inequality and the level of income enters into the model with a 
positive sign and it is statistically significant. These findings suggest that the negative 
effects of income inequality on growth weaken as income increases. For the sample 
considered here, the effect of income inequality on growth is negative if (the log of) 
GDP per capita < 9.20 and positive for higher values for the full sample of countries.   
 
 
 
56 
 
Table 2.4: System GMM Estimates for Income Inequality Effect on 
Economic Growth in Different Groups of Countries Conditional on the 
Level of Economic Development 
Panel A: Estimation Results 
  
Model 1                                      
(Full sample) 
Model 2           
(Democracy) 
Model 3      
(Dictatorship) 
Incomet-1 -7.672*** -4.897*** -10.842** 
  
(2.270) (1.569) (5.112) 
Public Spendingt-1 -0.072** -0.054* -0.086** 
  
(0.034) (0.031) (0.037) 
Educationt-1 0.059*** 0.048*** 0.063*** 
  
(0.012) (0.012) (0.021) 
Inflationt-1 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Opennesst-1 0.012** 0.013** 0.019* 
  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) 
Inequalityt-1 -1.335*** -0.746** -1.657** 
  
(0.488) (0.343) (0.782) 
Incomet-1*Inequalityt-1 0.145*** 0.079** 0.193** 
  
(0.051) (0.036) (0.093) 
Constant 68.928*** 44.657*** 90.452** 
  
(22.099) (15.056) (41.777) 
Panel B: Diagnostic Tests 
AR(2) 0.903 0.167 0.992    
Hansen test 0.330 0.600 0.897  
Observations 271 166 105    
Countries 88 56 46    
Instruments 58 45 45 
Notes: The table shows the main determinants of economic growth. Panel A reports the estimates 
obtained from robust two-step system GMM estimations. The figures given in parentheses are standard 
errors which are asymptotically robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within 
panels. Panel B reports the p-values of the Hansen test and the Arellano and Bond test. ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Because of the presence of the interaction term, the growth effect of inequality cannot 
be assessed from the linear term of inequality only. However, as shown in Equation (3), 
it is possible to examine the sensitivity of growth to income inequality at different 
income levels. The estimates of elasticity for the case of the full sample are given in 
Model 1 of Table 2.5 and plotted in Figure 2.1 (in Appendix). 
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Table 2.5: Elasticity of Growth with respect to Income Inequality across 
(log) Income Percentiles 
Panel A – Model 1 (Full Sample) 
  
P10 P25 P50 P75 P80 P90 
Income level 7.463 8.340 9.034 9.888 9.980 10.177 
Elasticity -5.636 -2.841 -0.627 2.093 2.388 3.016 
Panel B – Model 2 (Democracy) 
  
P10 P25 P50 P75 P80 P90 
Income level 8.106 8.906 9.703 10.038 10.088 10.220 
Elasticity -1.800 -0.738 0.319 0.765 0.831 1.005 
Panel C – Model 3 (Dictatorship) 
  
P10 P25 P50 P75 P80 P90 
Income level 6.834 7.550 8.394 8.719 8.875 9.228 
Elasticity -12.936 -7.586 -1.279 1.144 2.312 4.949 
Notes: The table reports the percentiles of the income level measured in terms of natural log of per 
capita GDP along with the estimates of the elasticities of growth with respect to income inequality. 
Panel A reports the elasticities for the full sample. Panels B and C report the elasticities for the 
sample of democracy and dictatorship.  
 
As can be seen, the elasticity is negative for income percentiles below the median but it 
turns positive for higher percentiles. These results indicate that whilst for relatively low 
levels of income the growth dampening aspects of inequality dominate the growth 
enhancing effects, the opposite occurs at relatively high levels of income. These 
estimates are in line with Barro (2000), Lin et al. (2009) and Castelló (2010) who have 
found that the growth effect of inequality is different across high and low-income 
economies. 
 
As already explained in the section on literature review, some previous theoretical 
works, such as Okun (1975), Bourguignon (1981) and Galor and Tsiddon (1997), have 
provided some explanations of why inequality might have a positive effect on growth. 
As for the differential impact of inequality across different levels of income, Barro 
(2000) points to the endogeneity of credit constraints as a possible explanation 
underlying such patterns. As discussed in section 2.2.2, a strand of theoretical models 
predict a negative relationship between inequality and growth due to market 
imperfections which prevent poor households from running profitable investment (e.g. 
Galor and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1993). On the other hand, as a country 
grows richer, it develops an institutional framework which ameliorates capital market 
imperfections and, thus, the adverse effect of inequality. As a result, the effect of 
inequality on economic growth may vary with the country’s level of income. 
Specifically, while for relatively low levels of income the growth dampening aspects of 
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inequality dominate the growth enhancing effects, the opposite may occur at relatively 
high levels of income (Barro, 2000).    
 
With regard to the remaining variables, signs and statistical significance are overall 
preserved (results in Table 2.4 as compared to the results in Table 2.3). Second order 
correlation and Sargan tests detect no statistical problems associated with the system 
GMM estimation (Panel B in Table 2.4). 
  
The Differential Effect across Political Regimes Conditional on Income Levels  
 
I now estimate Equation (2) separately for the sample of democracies and 
dictatorships.19 The coefficient estimates are given in Model 2 and 3 of Table 2.4 and 
the corresponding elasticities are given in Panels B and C of Table 2.5. As can been 
seen, the interaction term is positive and statistically significant for both samples, 
meaning that the negative effect on inequality weakens regardless of the political 
regime. The turning points for the sample of democracies and dictatorships are 9.44 
(close to the average income of Argentina in 1996-2000) and 8.59 (approximately the 
average of Panama in 1976-1980), respectively. A comparison of elasticities between 
political regimes in Table 2.5 reveals that the sensitivity of growth is generally higher 
for dictatorships than democracies regardless of whether the sensitivity is negative or 
positive. 
 
To get more visual insight into the sensitivity of growth to inequality across different 
levels of income, I plot the estimates given in Panel B and C of Table 2.5 in Figure 2.2 
(Appendix). The sensitivity of growth exhibits significant differential patterns across 
political regimes. Specifically, as is clear from Figure 2.2, the sensitivity of growth to 
income inequality differs across political regimes at the same income quintiles. For 
percentile of income between 40th and 65th, the elasticity is positive for democracies but 
negative for dictatorships. As for the remaining percentiles the sensitiveness of growth 
to inequality is larger under dictatorships than under democracies, irrespective of 
whether the elasticity attains negative or positive sign.        
                                                            
19
 The Wald statistic for testing the null hypothesis of equality of all coefficients across the two political 
regimes is 3.67 (p-value: 0.00).  
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Taken together, the estimates of elasticity offer empirical evidence that the effects of 
inequality vary with the level of income differently for democracies and non-
democracies. As far as relatively low-income countries are concerned, the results show 
that the overall impact of inequality on growth, which is of negative sign, is weaker 
under democracies than under dictatorships. One possible reason for such differential 
impact revolves on the beneficial effects of redistributional policies in poor countries. 
First, redistribution could be used to mitigate liquidity constraints that otherwise prevent 
poor households from engaging in productive investments. Secondly, by providing a 
system of social safety nets redistribution might easy political instability and social 
unrest. The empirical result revealed by the estimates is thus in line with the 
expectations of my model.20 
 
On the other hand, the estimates show that the overall impact of inequality in rich 
countries, which is of positive sign, is stronger under dictatorships than under 
democracies. As explained in section 2.3.1, credit market imperfections and social 
unrest are likely to be of less concern in richer countries. Hence, it is plausible that 
redistributional policies here do not sort out the same beneficial effects as in poorer 
countries. Given the disincentive effect on saving and investment of taxation, it might 
be that fiscal policies turn to be bad for growth at relative high levels of income.21 This 
could be one potential explanation of why the overall positive impact of inequality on 
growth in rich countries is lower under democracies than under dictatorships.  
 
Admittedly, the empirical findings along with the above explanation have to be 
interpreted with a great deal of caution. First, because of their parsimonious 
specification, the equations estimated in this chapter cannot test directly the underlying 
mechanisms linking inequality to growth. Second, the explanation of the differential 
effect works if (i) higher inequality leads to higher demand for redistribution and (ii) 
democracies are more sensible to redistributional issues than dictatorships, on 
average.22 Finally, it is possible that political institutions are endogenous to the 
                                                            
20
 In line with the political model approach, my model assumes that democracies are (generally) more 
sensitive to distributional issues than dictatorships. This point is further discussed below. 
21
 The empirical test of this conjecture requires detailed data on fiscal policy which are currently 
unavailable for large panel of countries. However, this might be an interesting starting point for future 
empirical analysis. 
22
 Several studies, such as Brown and Hunter (2004), Stasavage (2005) and Avelino et al. (2005), find 
that democracies have relatively high levels of social spending. Other studies, for example, Finseraas 
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distribution of economic resources (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2004).23 Although there is 
currently no general theory of democratization, the possibility that my empirical 
findings are driven by some selection mechanisms cannot be ruled out. 
 
2.5.3. Robustness Check   
 
In this section I perform some further estimation to test the robustness of the empirical 
results. First, I check for the effect of dropping outliers.24 Specifically, my findings 
could be driven by few countries with relatively high (low) growth rates. To identify 
such potential influential observations I use the quartile method whereby a value is 
defined as an outlier if it is lower than 1 1.5Q H− or higher than 3 1.5Q H+ , 1Q and 3Q
being the lower and upper quartile, respectively, and H the inter-quartile range (Doane 
and Seward, 2007, Ch. 4). The results for the sample of democracies and dictatorships 
are shown in Models 1 and 2 of Table A.3 in Appendix.25 Interestingly, the coefficient 
of public spending for the sample of democracies is now statistically insignificant for 
the sample of democracies. As for the remaining variables, the results are robust in 
terms of both their statistical significance and sign.26  
 
Next, I proceed to identify influential data on the basis of a visual inspection of the 
residuals. Figures 2.3-2.4 in the Appendix plot the residuals against the fitted values of 
the dependent variables. The observations concerning the sample of democracies with 
residuals more than 4 or less than -4 (5 and -5 for dictatorships) are those which are 
poorly fitted by the model. 27 Thus, it would be interesting to check the robustness of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
(2009) and Dallinger (2010), provide empirical evidence in favour of a positive relationship between level 
of inequality and demand for redistribution. However, there is no general agreement among scholars on 
such issues (see Mulligan et al., 2004; Lübker, 2007). 
23
 See also Stiglitz (2012) who argues that excessive concentration of economic power is undermining 
political institutions in the US.  
24
 A variety of statistics has been designed to evaluate influential data. There are two commands in Stata 
based on the DFITS and DFBETA statistics which provide an automatic detection of outliers (Baum, 
2006). Unfortunately, these commands do now work after the estimation with “xtabond2”. 
25
 The observations classified as outliers for the sample of democracies are Ireland 1996-2000, South 
Korea 1986-1990 and Trinidad and Tobago 1996-2000. As regards for dictatorships the outliers are  
Azerbaijan 2001-2005, Cameroon 1986-1990, Jordan 1986-1990, Kuwait 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 2001-
2005 and Togo 1981-1985.   
26
 As it can be seen from Panel B, the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation for the sample 
of dictatorships is rejected at the 5% but it cannot be rejected at the 10% level of confidence. 
27
 With regard to democracies the observations having relatively large residuals are Finland 1991-1995, 
Ireland 1996-2000, South Korea 1986-1990, Thailand 1986-1990, 1991-1995, Trinidad and Tobacco 
1996-2000 and Venezuela 1981-1985. As regards for dictatorships large residuals have been found for 
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estimates to the removal of these observations. Models 3 and 4 of Table A.3 illustrate 
the results for each of the sub-samples. It is interesting to note that public spending 
loses statistical significance for democracies as well as dictatorships. As for the 
coefficient estimates of the inequality measure and the interaction term, signs and 
statistically significance are preserved.   
 
I have also used the Hampel method of outlier detection on the regressions’ residuals. 
According to this method an outlier is defined as any observation for which 
( )5.2i nx Me mad− ≥ x , where Me  is the median and ( )nmad x is the median absolute 
deviation (Davies, 2009). Once the outliers so identified are dropped, I note that only 
public spending and openness maintain statistically significance for the sample of 
democracy. As for dictatorships, all variables become statistically insignificant. Such 
lack of robustness is hardly surprising because of the remarkable high number of 
observations which the Hampel methods identify as outliers. Specifically, for the 
sample of democracies (dictatorships) 100 out of 166 (77 out of 105) observations turn 
to be outliers, which leaves us with an overall number of observations of just 66 (28).  
 
Another concern with estimations is regime classification. For example, according to 
the 5-year structure of my data, Mexico 1996-2000 has been recorded as a democracy. 
However, based on Alvarez et al. (1996) rules of classification, Mexico switches to a 
democracy in 2000, spending the four years between 1996 and 1999 as dictatorship. 
Thus, it is interesting to check whether the results are robust to reclassification of 
Mexico 1996-2000 as a dictatorship. More generally, to account for such cases I adopt a 
regime classification whereby a country-observation is recorded as a democracy 
(dictatorship) if the country was democratic (dictatorship) for at least three out of five 
years. Thus, according to this classification, Mexico enters as a dictatorship for overall 
the sub-periods for which data for the country are available (from 1971 to 2000). The 
empirical findings are illustrated in Models 5 and 6 of Table A.3. As it can be seen, the 
results are not affected by such alternative regime classification.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Azerbaijan 2001-2005, Jordan 1986-1990, Kuwait 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000, 
Madagascar 1981-1985, Malaysia 1991-1995, Mozambique 1996-2000, Philippines 1981-1985, Syria 
1986-1990 and Togo 1981-1985.   
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Levine and Renelt (1992) sensitive analysis has shown physical capital investment to be 
among the variables with the highest explanatory power for economic growth. Thus, it 
is of interest to test whether the results are robust to the inclusion of the investment 
variable (defined as a share of GDP) in the set of regressors. The results are given in 
Models 1-2 of Table A.4 (Appendix). As can be seen, the coefficient estimate for 
investment has the expected sign (positive) and is statistically significant for both 
democracy and non-democracy samples, indicating that an increase in physical capital 
investment generates faster growth over the next 5 years. The other variables are 
unaffected by the inclusion of investment.  
 
An additional issue which is worthy of investigation is the 1997-98 East Asian financial 
crises. As explained above, the endogeneity of credit market imperfections is probably 
the reason underlying the non-linear relationship between inequality and growth (Barro, 
2000). This explanation suggests that financial development might play an important 
role in shaping the impact of inequality on growth. Since the 1997-98 East Asian crises 
born out from the financial sector, it would be interesting to include a dummy for the 
1996-2000 time period as an additional control variable.28 The results are illustrated in 
Models 3-4 of Table A.4 (Appendix). Interestingly, the time dummy is positive and 
statistically significant for the sample of democracy only. This suggests that 
democracies grew faster in 1996-2000 than in the previous and following years under 
analysis, on average. Sign and statistical significance associated with the other variables 
are preserved.     
 
As a final robustness check, I run a model for the pooled sample of countries which 
includes a dichotomous variable in the set of regressors to accounts explicitly for the 
impact of political regime on economic growth. To allow the impact of inequality to 
vary across political regimes I have interacted both the Gini index and the interaction 
term with the democracy dummy variable. As shown in Model 5 of Table A.4 the 
democracy variable is statistically insignificant at any conventional level. This finding 
implies that being a democracy had no direct impact on growth rate for the sample 
under investigation. This result is in line with Jalles (2010), who show that democratic 
institutions have neither fostered nor hindered economic growth. The coefficient 
                                                            
28
 As explained in section 2.4.1, the panel data is organized in seven non-overlapping five-year intervals. 
This time structure does not allow to generate a time dummy for 1997-1998 only. 
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estimate for the inequality retains its negative sign while the Gini index interacted with 
the political regime dummy is positive. In line with the findings obtained from running 
separate regressions, this shows that the impact of inequality on growth is weaker under 
democracies than under dictatorships.  
 
2.6.     Conclusions 
 
Existing empirical findings on the comparative strength of the relationship between 
income inequality and growth across different political regimes are mixed. This chapter 
assesses the differential impact of inequality on growth across democracies and 
dictatorships by using new and more reliable dataset on inequality and political regime 
and modern methodological tools. Further, it adopts an empirical model which allows 
the impact of income inequality on growth to vary with income levels. 
 
I find that there is a significant negative relationship between income inequality and 
economic growth, even after controlling for country-specific characteristics. The results 
also show that income inequality is harmful for growth, irrespective of whether the 
country has a democratic or non-democratic government structure. However, when the 
interaction term between the Gini index and per capita GDP is included in the set of 
regressors, I find that the impact of inequality on growth turns out to be positive at 
relatively high levels of income. To examine further the effects of inequality I compute 
elasticities at different percentiles of income. The findings reveal that the impact of 
inequality on growth, regardless of whether it is positive or negative, is generally larger 
for dictatorships as compared to democracies at corresponding percentiles of income.  
 
These results have potentially interesting implications for the debate on the economic 
performance of different political regimes. Specifically, the findings run counter to 
theoretical views which view democracy as a luxury that poorer countries cannot afford 
(e.g. Moyo, 2009).29 My empirical analysis shows that the negative impact of inequality 
on growth is less serious under democracies than under dictatorships precisely at 
relatively low levels of income. If such a superior macroeconomic performance is 
                                                            
29
 In Moyo’s popular book Dead Aid, it is pointed that “democracy, at the early stages of development, is 
irrelevant, and may even be harmful” (p. 42). The author adds “In a perfect world what poor countries at 
the lowest rungs of economic development need is not a multi-party democracy, but in fact a decisive 
benevolent dictator to push through the reforms required to get the economy moving” (p. 42).  
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caused by the redistributional mechanism which mitigates the adverse growth effects of 
inequality, then these findings reveal that democracies are economically valuable in 
economies where social spending is needed as a remedy for market imperfections and 
social conflict. In contrast, for richer countries, where equity and efficiency are more 
likely to conflict with each other, the positive impact of political freedoms on growth 
might be weaker.  
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2.7.     Appendix A 
 
Table A.1: List of Countries 
Always Democracy 
Countries Coverage Countries Coverage 
 Australia  1991-2005  Japan  1971-2005 
 Austria  1981-2000  Lithuania  1991-2005 
 Belgium  1971-2000  Luxembourg  1971-2000 
 Canada  1975-2005  Malta  1971-2005 
 Colombia  1971-1985  Mauritius  1971-2000 
 Costa Rica  1981-2005  Moldova  1991-2005 
 Croatia  1991-2005  Netherlands  1971-2000 
 Denmark  1971-2000  New Zealand  1971-2000 
 Finland  1971-2000  Norway  1971-2005 
 France  1976-2000  Slovenia  1991-2005 
 Iceland  1971-2000  Sweden  1971-2000 
 India  1986-2005  Trinidad and Tobago  1981-2000 
 Ireland  1971-2000  United Kingdom  1971-2000 
 Israel  1971-2005  United States  1971-2005 
 Italy  1971-2000  Venezuela 1971-2000 
 Jamaica  1971-1985 
    
Always Dictatorship 
Countries Coverage Countries Coverage 
Algeria  1971-2000 Malaysia  1971-2005 
Azerbaijan  1991-2005 Morocco  1976-2000 
Botswana  1981-2005 Mozambique  1986-2000 
Burkina Faso  1971-1985 Qatar  1976-2005 
Cameroon  1975-2000 Rwanda  1971-1990 
Cote d'Ivoire  1971-1985 South Africa  1986-2005 
Egypt  1971-2005 Swaziland  1971-1995 
Ethiopia  1991-2005 Syria  1971-2000 
Fiji  1971-1985 Tanzania  1971-2000 
Gambia  1971-1985 Togo  1971-1985 
Iran  1981-2000 Tonga  1981-1995 
Jordan  1971-2005 Tunisia  1991-2005 
Kenya  1971-1985 Uganda  1986-2005 
Kuwait  1975-2005 Zimbabwe  1971-2000 
Madagascar  1971-1990     
(continues) 
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Table A.1 (Continued) 
Political Transition  
Country Coverage  Entry into 
Democracy  
Exit from 
Democracy 
Argentina  1981-2000 1983  
Bulgaria  1986-2005 1990  
Burundi  1971-1995 1993  
Central African Republic  1981-1995 1993  
Cyprus  1971-2005 1983  
Ecuador  1971-2000 1979 2000 
El Salvador  1971-1985 1984  
Ghana  1971-1990 1979 1981 
Greece  1971-2000 1973  
Guatemala  1971-2000 1985 1982 
Hungary  1971-2000 1990  
Indonesia  1981-2005 1999  
Korea, South  1971-2005 1988  
Malawi  1981-2000 1994  
Mexico  1971-2000 2000  
Nepal  1986-2005 1990 2002 
Pakistan  1971-2000 1972 1977 
  1988 1999 
Panama  1971-2000 1989  
Peru  1981-2000  1990 
Philippines  1971-2000 1986  
Poland  1971-2000 1989  
Senegal 1971-2005 2000  
Spain  1971-2005 1977  
Sri Lanka  1976-1995 1989 1977 
Suriname  1971-1995 1988 1980 
  1991 1990 
Thailand  1971-1995 1975 1976 
  1979 1991 
  1992  
Turkey  1971-2000 1983 1980 
 1981-2000 1985  
Uruguay 1981-2000 1985  
Notes: The table illustrates the sample of countries used in the empirical investigation. The last 
two columns denote a transition toward democracy and dictatorship, respectively.  
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Table A.2: Definitions of Variables 
Variable Description Source 
Growth Logarithmic change of real per 
capita GDP on five-year basis   Author’s calculation 
Inequality Estimated Household Income Inequality 
UTIP-UNIDO 
Available at: http://utip.gov.utexas.edu 
Income Natural logarithm of Real 
GDP per capita (I$ in 2005 
Constant Prices: Chain series) 
    Penn World Table 6.3 Public Spending Government Share of Real GDP per capita 
Openness 
Sum of exports and imports of 
goods and services (% of 
GDP) 
Inflation Annual percentage change in 
the consumer price index World Bank 
Education School enrolment, secondary (% gross)  
Democracy 
Dummy Variable taking value 
1 if the regime is classified as 
democratic, 0 otherwise 
Cheibub et al. 2010 
Available at: 
https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/cheibub 
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Figure 2.1: Elasticity of Growth with respect to Income Inequality across 
Income Percentiles – Full Sample
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Elasticity of Growth with respect to Income Inequality across 
Income Percentiles – Democracies vs. Dictatorships
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Figure 2.3: Residuals versus fitted values plot – Democracies 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Residuals versus fitted values plot – Dictatorships 
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Chapter 3 : Absolute Poverty, Relative Poverty and Financial 
Development 
 
3.1.     Introduction 
 
A large body of literature has successfully established a significant relationship between 
a financial system which effectively provides financial services and the process of 
economic growth (e.g. King and Levine, 1993; Beck et al., 2000; Beck and Levine, 
2004). In recent years another strand of literature has focused on whether and how a 
well-functioning financial system affects the standard of living for the poor. The central 
issue under consideration is whether financial development is conducive to poverty 
reduction, or whether in fact it advantages the rich with no benefit to (or at the expense  
of) the poor.  
 
From a theoretical point of view, the impact of financial development on poverty 
alleviation is ambiguous. In the presence of credit market imperfections, poorer 
households who are unable to obtain funds from markets tend to discard investments in 
human and physical capital which are highly rewarding in the long term (e.g. Galor and 
Zeira, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Barro, 2000). Thus, to the extent that liquidity 
constraints are relaxed, the impact of financial development is likely to be beneficial for 
the poor. Moreover financial development might benefit the poor indirectly, through its 
positive impact on economic growth (see, for example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 
2009). On the other hand, improvements in the financial system may principally 
advantage families and firms which are already using financial services. For example, 
Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Claessens and Perotti (2007) argue that the financial 
system, especially where governments are weak, might mainly convey resources to the 
rich and elites with strong political connections, while leaving out the poorer fractions 
of the population. 
 
On empirical grounds, when testing the effect of financial development on poverty one 
would ideally use a measure which gauges how well the financial system performs its 
functions. However, there is no adequate conceptual framework to reduce the notion of 
financial development to a single aggregate index. Instead the literature has relied on 
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several indicators each one focusing on a specific dimension of the financial system. 
The most commonly used proxies of financial development, such as liquidity liabilities, 
private credit and stock market capitalization, are measures of the size of the financial 
sector. Other indices, such as commercial-central bank and turnover ratio, reflect 
mainly the efficiency and the degree of liquidity of the financial sector. I explain each of 
the mentioned indicators in detail in section 3.4. 
 
Several empirical works, based on large sample of countries, have used one or more 
proxies of financial development to assess whether financial development alleviates 
absolute poverty, commonly measured as the percentage of the population living below 
a specified poverty line, for example $2 a day (Honohan, 2004; Beck et al., 2007; Akter 
et al., 2010; Perez-Moreno, 2011; Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011). Additional research 
has been done to estimate the  impact of financial development on  the poorest 20 % of 
population relative to the national income, which is seen as a measure of relative 
poverty (Jalilian and Kirkpatrick, 2005; Beck et al., 2007; and Jeanneney and Kpodar, 
2011).1 The empirical evidence found by these studies is in favour of a positive impact 
of financial development on the income share of the poorest quintile. Still further work 
have analysed the linkage between financial development and poverty within single 
countries (e.g. Quartey, 2005; Odhiambo, 2009; Inoue and Hamori, 2012; Ho and 
Odhiambo, 2011). Taken together, these studies find that financial development has 
decreased the number of people below the poverty line and it has increased the share of 
the income accruing to the lowest quintile. 
 
On the other hand, it does not seem safe to say that the theoretical ambiguity concerning 
the effect of financial development on poverty alleviation has been settled empirically 
because of methodological limitations with prior analyses. As it will be discussed in 
section 3.3, most of the afore-mentioned studies suffer from sample heterogeneity 
and/or omitted variable bias. In addition, only two studies, namely Beck et al. (2007) 
and Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011), analyse the impact of financial development on both 
absolute and relative poverty. This chapter is aimed at empirically reassessing the 
impact of financial development on absolute poverty as well as relative poverty while 
overcoming the methodological difficulties which characterize previous studies. The 
                                                            
1
 Beck et al. (2007) and Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) consider the headcount index as well as the bottom 
quintile while Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2005) focus only on the latter index. 
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results show that the impact of financial development on poverty alleviation is 
statistically significant when liquid liabilities and credit granted to the private sector is 
used as proxy of financial development and poverty is measured either by the headcount 
index or the poverty gap. However, the empirical estimates provide little evidence for a 
causal link from financial development to poverty when alternative indices of financial 
development, namely stock market capitalization, commercial-central bank and turnover 
ratio, are used. When the focus of the analysis is moved to the income share of the 
poorest quintile, the empirical results yield no evidence for a significant impact of 
financial development on the poor, whatever the proxy for financial development. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that the inference for a pro-poor effect of 
financial development depends primarily on the measure of poverty. The results also 
show that the choice of the proxy for financial development is relevant in assessing the 
poverty reduction effect of financial development. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized in the following way. Section 2 illustrates 
theoretical and empirical literature review. Section 3 presents the investigation plan, 
including the empirical model and the methodological technique. Section 4 explains the 
sample under investigation and illustrates the alternative indices of financial 
development used. Section 5 shows the findings of the empirical investigation. Section 
6 summarizes the empirical findings and provides some concluding remarks. 
  
3.2.     Literature Review 
 
In recent years a growing strand of literature has debated whether and how the 
development of the financial system could have any relevant effect on the standard of 
living for the poor. In this section I discuss the two main mechanisms by which 
financial development might affect the poorest segments of the population. Then I 
illustrate the studies which have looked at the empirical evidence.   
 
3.2.1. The Direct use of Financial Services by Poor Households  
  
One of the main debates in the economic literature revolves around the impact of an 
uneven distribution of wealth on the agents’ economic opportunities. If markets were 
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perfect, poor endowed households could borrow from credit markets to implement their 
investment projects. Thus, a talented but poor individual would still be able to grow out 
of poverty by obtaining from the market the funds that she lacks. On the other hand, in 
presence of credit imperfections markets are unwilling to lend to those who cannot 
provide sufficient collateral for the loan (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Under such 
circumstances, individuals’ economic opportunities are strictly determined by their 
parental wealth: an individual from a poor dynasty will hardly step out of poverty, 
however talented she is (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Aghion 
and Bolton, 1997).  
 
On the theoretical side, financial development could benefit the poorer segments of the 
population by expanding the financial services to the poor who were previously unable 
to borrow (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009). For example, a lower reserve 
requirement could boost the supply of credit to private agents, including the poor ones. 
On the other hand, the benefits from increasing availability of credit might principally 
accrue to the insiders, thereby leaving the poorest fraction of the population unaffected 
by a deepening in the financial system (Claessens and Perotti, 2007). In fact, the access 
to credit could even narrow if financial development generates a shift of resources from 
the informal to the formal sector – given that the informal sector is the main source of 
funds for the poor (Arestis and Caner, 2009). Thus, whether financial development 
could have any direct effect on poverty alleviation seems to be an empirical issue.  
 
3.2.2. The Economic Growth Channel 
 
A large body of theoretical literature suggests that the development of the financial 
sector mitigates asymmetric information and transaction costs which prevent economic 
agents from exploiting profitable investment opportunities, thereby leading to an 
improvement in the allocation of resources (see Levine, 2005, and the reference 
therein). On the empirical side, several studies have provided evidence in favour of a 
positive impact of financial development on economic growth (e.g. King and Levine, 
1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Beck et al., 2000; Fink et al. 2003; Beck and Levine, 
2004). If a trickle- down effect is at work it follows that financial development will 
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mitigate poverty indirectly through an increase in the economic growth rate (Arestis and 
Caner, 2009).2  
 
In addition, a higher growth rate means that the policy maker can rely on a larger 
amount of resources which could be redistributed in order to mitigate poverty incidence. 
Financial development can also mitigate poverty by boosting the income share of labour 
– given that labour is the main income source of the poor. Specifically, by stimulating 
economic growth financial development might raise the demand for labour. If such 
higher demand is directed toward low-skilled labour, then financial development will 
lead to further poverty alleviation. In practice, whether this is the case depends on 
whether the increase in the growth rate fosters the demand for low or high skilled 
labours (Jerzmanowski and Nabar, 2013).   
 
3.2.3. Empirical Studies 
 
In this section I summarize previous empirical works on the financial development-
poverty nexus based on large sample of countries. Overall, the empirical evidence is in 
favour of a significant impact of financial development on poverty alleviation.  
 
Honohan (2004) examines the relationship between financial development and the $2 
per day poverty ratio using cross-country analysis for a set of more than 70 developing 
economies. He shows that the amount of private credit is negatively associated with the 
poverty rate. However, he finds little evidence for a significant relationship between 
stock market development, proxied by either stock market capitalization or turnover 
ratio, and poverty incidence. The estimated relationships are robust to the selection of a 
lower poverty line, namely $1 per day. 
 
Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2005) use a large sample of countries to assess the impact of 
financial development on the poorest 20% of the population. To do so, they estimate 
three models separately, namely: (i) the linkage between financial development and 
growth; (ii) the linkage between financial development and inequality; (iii) the linkage 
                                                            
2
 Based on a sample of 92 countries, Dollar and Kraay (2002) find that the elasticity of income share of 
the bottom quintile to growth is equal to one, which means that growth benefits the poor as much as 
everyone else.  
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between economic growth and poverty. They find that financial development (proxied 
by private credit) fosters growth, especially in poorer countries; that the relationship 
between financial development and growth is inverted U-shaped; and that the growth 
accrues to the poorest quintile as much as anyone else. On the basis of their findings 
Jalilian and Kirkpatrick estimate that a one unit increase in private credit raises the 
income growth of the poor by 0.3 per cent.    
 
Beck et al. (2007) use changes in the poorest quintile and changes in the headcount 
index of poverty in the attempt to assess the effect of financial development on the poor.  
Their sample covers a number of countries up to 72 over the period 1960-2005. As for 
the estimation technique, they employ cross-country regressions as well as longitudinal 
approach based on the system generalized methods of moments panel estimator. Their 
results show that the a rise in financial development, measured by either private credit 
or commercial central bank ratio, boosts the income share of the poorest quintile and 
decreases the number of people living under the poverty line of $ 1 a day.      
 
Akhter et al. (2010) employ a fixed-effect vector decomposition (FEVD) to examine the 
relationship between financial development and the headcount index of $ 1 a day for a 
sample of 54 developing countries spanning over the period 1993-2004. Unlike Fixed 
Effect estimators, the FEVD approach allows the authors to include time invariant or 
slowly changing variables, such as the country’s legal origin and the level of corruption, 
in the set of controls. Their results reveal that financial development is conducive to 
poverty alleviation.  In addition, the authors show that an increase in private credit has a 
larger impact on poverty than an increase in liquid liabilities. 
 
Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) uses system GMM estimation approach to examine the 
effect of financial development on the poorest quintile poverty for a dataset of 75 
developing countries over the period from 1950 to 1999. To proxy for financial 
development they use the value of credit to private sectors as well as a broad index of 
liquid liabilities. Their findings show that higher levels of liquid assets lead to poverty 
alleviation. However, unlike Akhter et al. (2010), they find little evidence for a 
significant impact of private credit on poverty. They also show that the results remain 
unchanged when the $1 per day poverty line is used as a measure of poverty. Similar 
evidence is provided by Moreno (2011) who uses a Granger causality test to assess the 
80 
 
linkage between financial development and the poverty headcount indices at $2 and $1 
a day for a sample of 35 developing countries spanning three decades from 1970 to 
2000. 
 
3.3.     Investigation Plan 
 
As the reader might have observed, empirical works so far have corroborated a pro-poor 
impact of financial development. From this empirical evidence it follows that the policy 
maker who desires to alleviate poverty could pursue policies which foster financial 
development rather than relying on more explicit redistributive policies. The underlying 
reason is that, unlike non-lump sum redistribution, financial development mitigates 
poverty without any adverse effect on the incentives to invest by the rich (Beck et al., 
2007). However, when looking at the empirical literature, one can observe that previous 
analysis suffer from one or more of the following problems:  
 
1) Sample heterogeneity 
2) Omitted variable bias  
3) Omission of relative poverty 
 
When testing the impact of financial development on poverty, both Jalilian and 
Kirkpatrick (2005) and Beck et al. (2007) use a sample which includes developed as 
well as developing countries. However, empirical estimates based on a pooled sample 
of countries are likely to suffer from heterogeneity problems.  For example, if richer 
countries have a higher level of financial development as well as lower poverty, running 
a pooled sample might yield an overly optimistic estimate of the impact of financial 
development on poverty. Both studies include in their set of explanatory variables an 
interaction term between the proxy of financial development and a dummy for poor 
countries or the level of GDP to allow for a differential effect of financial development 
on poverty across different income levels. However, they do not use similar interaction 
terms for other explanatory variables, neither do they run any test to check whether the 
coefficients are different across poor and rich countries. 
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The estimates provided by Honohan (2004) are likely to suffer from omitted variable 
bias because cross-sectional regressions do not control for unobserved country-specific 
effects. Furthermore, cross-section analyses ignore any available information in the 
time-series dimension of the data. Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) address these 
difficulties by using a system GMM estimator for a sample including only developing 
countries. Yet, their results are also subject to omitted variable bias because they do not 
include the lagged dependent variable in their set of explanatory variables.  
 
Honohan (2004), Akter et al., (2010) and Perez-Moreno (2011) focus on absolute 
poverty while ignoring relative poverty. However, this might be an incomplete approach 
for estimating the impact of financial development on poverty. The reason is that 
absolute levels of poverty are generally not too high in middle income economies, yet 
the distribution of wealth in developing countries is quite uneven, with the bottom 
quintile of the population sharing only a very small fraction of the national income 
(high relative poverty). This is indeed the case for some South American countries, such 
as Brazil, Argentina and Peru, where the headcount index based on the $1 poverty line 
is less than 1%, yet the income share of the poorest quintile is less than 3 %, which is 
quite below the sample mean, namely 5.6% (see Table 3.1). Thus, measures of both 
absolute and relative poverty should be used to properly evaluate the relationship 
between financial development and the poor.   
 
This study overcomes some of the problems reported in the previous empirical literature 
in three ways. First, it systemically studies the financial development-poverty nexus 
using alternative indices of absolute poverty as well as measure of relative poverty. 
Second, to mitigate sample heterogeneity from using pooled sample of both rich and 
poor countries, this study focuses on a sample of developing economies while leaving 
developed economies out of the analysis. Third, to address the dynamics bias associated 
with the inclusion of the lagged dependent variables in the set of explanatory variable, I 
use a two-step system GMM estimator. This methodology also effectively addresses the 
omitted variable bias from unobserved heteroskedasticity. A number of indices which 
gauge the size and the liquidity/efficiency of the financial sector are employed to proxy 
for financial development.  
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3.3.1. Empirical Model and Strategy 
 
The main aim of this study is to examine the direct effect of financial development on 
poverty using alternative measures of poverty as well as different proxies of financial 
development. To conduct my empirical analysis, I estimate a dynamic panel regression 
model as follows: 
 
, , 1 , , ,i t i i t i t i t t i tPov Pov FD Xα β γ λ ε−= + + + Γ + +
                                                             
(1)
 
, ,i t i i tε η ν= +  
 
where i  represents country and t  stands for time period. 
,i tPov  is the measure of 
poverty, and
,i tFD , the main variable of interest, is the proxy for financial development.
X is a vector of additional explanatory variables including per capita growth rate, 
inflation rate, the Gini index of inequality, public spending, primary school enrollment 
and an index for the quality of institutions.
,i tε is the composite error term, ,i tη  is the 
country-specific effect and 
,i tν  is an idiosyncratic error. tλ  is a time-specific effect 
which is captured by a set of time dummy variables. The inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable
, 1i tPov −  on the right-hand side allows us to model the dynamic 
process underlying poverty incidence and to account for inertia effects.  
 
The selection of the set of explanatory variable in matrix X is based on previous 
empirical studies. Specifically: 
 
1)  The growth rate is included to isolate the impact of financial development on 
poverty from its growth effect (Arestis and Caner, 2010). Countries which grow 
faster are likely to experience larger drops in poverty because of the trickle-down 
effect and potentially increases in the demand of low-skilled workers from the 
expansion of economic activity. Thus, growth is expected to mitigate poverty 
incidence.  
2) Inflation, measured as the change in the consumer price index, is included to control 
for the instability of the macroeconomic environment (Jeanneney and Kpodar, 
2011). Inflation is expected to worsen poverty because the poor generally have a 
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larger fraction of their wealth in cash than richer individuals. In addition, unlike the 
capital rents, income wages – the main source of income for the poor- are not 
perfectly indexed to inflation (Easterly and Fischer, 2001). 
3) Public spending (expressed as share of GDP) is a proxy of the overall size of 
government. It has been included to control for public policies which transfer 
income from the wealth to the poor, such as state subsidy and public expenditure for 
education. The impact of public consumption expenditure is a priori ambiguous 
because it depends largely on the extent to which public resources are employed for 
uses which primarily benefit the poor (Dollar and Kraay, 2002).   
4) Education, calculated as the primary school enrolment, is included to control for 
human capital investment. Education is generally thought to mitigate the levels of 
poverty (Christiaensen et al., 2003). In practice, whether the level of education is 
conducive to lower poverty depends on the extent to which households can afford to 
send their children to school.    
5) A proxy for institutional quality has been included because institutional 
characteristics such as corruption in the political system and quality of bureaucracy 
can affect poverty reduction (Chong and Calderón, 2000). Institutional reforms 
which widen the formal sector at the expense of the informal sector might entail 
high transaction costs for the poor. On the other hand, a higher level of institutional 
quality is likely to improve the effectiveness of public services. Therefore, the sign 
associated with quality of institutions is ambiguous.  
6) The Gini coefficient is included to purge the effect of financial development on 
poverty from its distributional effects (Jalilian and Kirkpatrick, 2005). Given the 
level of growth, the higher the level of inequality, the lower the share of rising 
income which accrues to the poor. On the other hand, when the level of inequality is 
high, there are a large number of poor households which the growth can potentially 
benefit. Thus, the sign of the Gini index is ambiguous. The Gini coefficient is 
excluded in the regression on the poorest quintile since both variables, though with 
some differences, are concerned with distributional issues. 
 
α , β , γ  and Γ denote the parameters to be estimated. The specific impact of financial 
development on poverty is revealed by the coefficientγ . When either the poverty 
headcount index or the poverty gap is used as the dependent variable, a negative sign of 
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γ  reveals that higher levels of financial development lead to poverty alleviation in 
absolute terms. On the contrary, a positive sign means that a higher degree of financial 
development is harmful to the poor. When the income share of the poorest 20% of the 
population appears as the dependent variable, then a positive sign of γ  suggests that as 
an economy achieves higher levels of financial development the income share accruing 
to the poor increases (relative poverty decreases). On the other hand, a negative sign of 
γ means that higher levels of financial development lower the income share of the 
poorest quintile (relative poverty increases).  
 
All the above scenarios assume that γ is statistically distinguishable from zero. 
Conversely, if the coefficient fails to achieve the standard levels of significance, then the 
estimates imply that the impact of financial development on poverty is statistically 
irrelevant. It is important to remember that financial development might also have an 
impact on poverty indirectly, for example, via rising levels of economic growth and 
demand for unskilled labour. Such effects could be assessed by a structural system 
which accounts for all the relevant channels. However, this is beyond the scope of the 
current investigation. 
 
3.3.2. Estimators 
 
To estimate the empirical model I use a system GMM panel estimator (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). This technique runs a system of two equations, 
one in levels and the other in first-differences. The estimator uses the lagged values of 
the explanatory variables, in levels as well as in first-differences, as IV instruments for 
the respective equations (“internal” instruments). A number of “external” instruments 
for financial development and growth, taken from the empirical literature, have also 
been used as additional IV variables. This set of instruments includes legal origin (La 
Porta et al., 1999), ethnic fractionalization (Easterly and Levine, 1997), total population 
(Beck et al., 2008), trade openness (Islam, 1995), investment (Mankiw et al.,1992) and 
two dummies variables for oil exporter and tropical countries (Sachs and Warner, 1995; 
Beck, 2011).  
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The system GMM estimator controls effectively for unobserved country-specific effects 
and mitigates the problem of measurement error. Contrary to within estimators, system 
GMM leads to consistent parameter estimates in presence of the lagged dependent 
variable on the right hand side of the equation.    
 
To be a valid IV variable, the set of instruments has to satisfy the population moment 
conditions used by the estimation process. The validity of this assumption can be 
assessed empirically by checking the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. 
Failure to reject the null hypothesis supports the overall validity of the instruments. An 
additional assumption has to be satisfied to generate consistent GMM estimates. 
Specifically, it is required that the error term 
,i tν  exhibits no serial correlation higher 
than order one. Such assumption can be tested with the Arellano and Bond test. If the 
null hypothesis is not rejected, then second-order serial correlation can be discarded.  
 
3.4.     Data, Sample and Variable Definitions 
3.4.1. The Sample 
 
My investigation focuses on an unbalanced panel set of countries over the period 1985-
2008. The size of the sample varies depending mainly on the availability of data for the 
proxy of financial development. Following Arestis and Caner (2010), I average the 
variables over four-year intervals to maximize the number of country-observations. This 
also allows us to abstract from short run disturbances. Thus, the panel includes 
observations with a maximum of six periods. Only countries with observations for at 
least two consecutive periods are included in the panel. 
 
To mitigate sample heterogeneity, I focus on the sample of less-developed countries 
only. Specifically, any country which is classified by the World Bank as high income 
has been excluded ($12,476 or more according to the 2011 GNI per capita). Doing so 
also yields more salient results from the viewpoint of policy, since the nexus between 
financial development and poverty is most debated precisely in developing countries. 
The complete list of countries is displayed in Appendix, Table B.1   
 
86 
 
Most of the data are collected from the World Bank’s Financial Structure and Economic 
Development Database (2010) and the World Development Indicators (2012). Table B.2 
in Appendix provides a description of the main variables with data sources. The 
measures for poverty as well as the proxies of financial development used in this study 
are briefly discussed in the next two sections. 
 
3.4.2. Alternative Indices of Poverty 
 
Poverty has been defined and operationalised in different ways (see e.g. Grusky and 
Kanbur, 2006). One classical measure of poverty counts how many people live with an 
income below a threshold line based on a minimum amount of resources needed to 
sustain life. One problem which arises when assessing poverty at the global level is the 
heterogeneity of data on poverty across different countries. An attempt to set an 
international poverty line has been made by Ravallion, Chen and Sangraula (2009). 
Specifically, they compile a dataset of national poverty lines based on the World Bank’s 
Poverty Assessment and country governments’ Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and 
other sources for 75 developing countries. Using the 2005 purchasing power parity 
(PPP), Ravallion et al. (2009) define the poverty line at $ 2 a day, which corresponds to 
the median line in their sample of countries. A more “conservative” poverty line is that 
of $ 1.25 a day, which is the average of the lines for the sub-sample of the 15 poorest 
countries.   
 
In keeping with standard development literature, I use the headcount poverty index 
based on $ 2 and $ 1.25 a day. This index simply counts the number of people with per 
capita consumption (or income) below the poverty line. One problem with such an 
index is that it does not reflect the “breadth” and intensity of poverty. Such kind of 
information is reflected in my second measure of poverty, namely the poverty gap 
index. The higher the index, the farther is the average poor from the poverty line. 
 
While the headcount index and poverty gap based on the $ 2 and $ 1.25 a day provide a 
measure of absolute poverty, they give no sense of the extent of relative poverty. For 
this reason, I use the income share of the poorest quintile as an additional indicator of 
poverty. Increasing levels of poorest quintile means that a higher share of the income is 
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accruing to the poorest 20% of population. It is important to note that the correlation 
between the Gini index and the poorest quintile, about – 0.97, is very high (see Table 
3.2 displayed in section 3.5.1), meaning that when income share of the poorest 20% 
increases (decreases), inequality will decrease (increase). Such a strong correlation 
reveals that the poorest quintile is closely concerned with distributional issues. Thus, the 
present analysis is dealing with both poverty and inequality.   
 
3.4.3. Alternative Indices of Financial Development 
 
A proper index of financial development would ideally provide a direct measure of the 
extent and effectiveness to which the financial system performs its main functions such 
as risk amelioration, information processing and monitoring services.3 However, 
summarizing the stage of development achieved by the financial system in a single 
aggregate measure is not a straightforward task. Instead, empirical works use several 
indices, each with its own advantages and weakness, which operationalize the financial 
system in different ways. Therefore, to carry my empirical investigation, I rely on the 
most commonly used indices in the literature on financial development.   
 
The first proxy of financial development is liquid liabilities, which is M3, expressed as 
a share of GDP, where M3 consists of currency as well as demand and interest-bearing 
liabilities of bank and non-bank financial institutions. This index gauges the size of the 
formal financial system relatively to the size of the real economy. It has been 
extensively used in the empirical literature on finance, growth and poverty (e.g. King 
and Levine, 1993; Perez-Moreno, 2011; Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011).  
 
As M3 focuses on the liabilities side of the financial system, it does not seize one of the 
most relevant financial services, namely credit allocation. This brings us to the second 
proxy of financial development, namely private credit, which gauges the amount of 
credit provided to the private sector by financial intermediaries as a share of GDP.4 This 
is a standard variable in the finance literature and it has been used, among others by 
Honoan (2004), Beck et al. (2007) and Perez-Moreno (2011), to analyse the impact of 
                                                            
3
 In Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine’s words “the inverse of the cost of joining the financial intermediary 
represent the level of financial development” (2009, p. 16). 
4
 Financial intermediaries are banks, bank-like and non-bank institutions, such as insurance companies, 
pension funds and mutual funds.  
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financial development on poverty rate. This measure excludes credit to the public sector 
such as government and public enterprises. Also, unlike liquid liabilities, it omits credits 
issued by central banks and government agencies. The intuition underlying this index is 
that financial systems which engage with the private sector provide more valuable 
services than systems that confine financial services to the public sector (Beck and 
Demirgüç-Kunt, 2009).  
 
As an additional indicator of financial development, this study uses the commercial-
central bank asset ratio, which equals the amount of bank deposits divided by the assets 
of the central bank. This index captures the efficiency with which banks provide 
financial functions. The rationale underlying this proxy is that commercial banks 
perform financial intermediation services more effectively than central banks do (Beck 
and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2009). This index has been firstly used by King and Levine (1993) 
to examine the finance-growth nexus and it has been extended by Dollar and Kraay 
(2002) and Beck et al. (2007) to analyse the impact on poverty.  
 
While the afore-mentioned indices are mainly concerned with the banking sector, they 
give no sense of the development of the stock market. However, a number of theoretical 
studies have pointed out that stock markets also provide an important channel of 
financial intermediation (e.g. Levine, 1991 and Bencivenga et al., 1995). On the 
empirical side, several studies, such as Levine and Zervos (1998) and Beck and Levine 
(2004), have shown that capital markets play an important role in economic growth. To 
account for the potential role of equity market on poverty incidence, I use two further 
proxies of financial development, namely stock market capitalization to GDP and 
turnover ratio. The former, is a proxy for the size of the stock market, and measures the 
amount of shares listed on the domestic stock exchange as a share of the GDP. The 
latter, is an index for the liquidity of the stock market, and measures the value of shares 
traded on the domestic stock exchange divided by stock market capitalization. Both 
measures have been used by Honoan (2004) in the analysis of the financial 
development-poverty nexus. 
 
Before concluding this section, it should be noted that the literature on financial 
development provides a large number of variables to proxy for financial development. 
Unfortunately, some of these variables, such as deposits and the number of bank 
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branches per 1000 people, are unavailable for a large panel of countries. Other indices 
are scarcely available for developing countries because they refer to institutional 
investors, such as insurance companies and mutual funds, which operate mostly in 
developed countries. Still other proxies are strongly correlated with the proxies used 
here.  For example, the correlation between private credit and the overall amount of 
deposits held in the banking system is quite high, approximately 0.88 (results not shown 
here). This should not be surprising because the bulk of financial services in developing 
country are provided by banks (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2009).  Thus, I believe that 
the choice of the above indices suffices for the purpose of the current investigation. In 
addition, the specific set of indices under analysis makes my results comparable with 
previous empirical studies of financial development and poverty. 
 
3.5.     Results and Analysis 
3.5.1. Overview of the Data 
 
Table 3.1 illustrates descriptive statistics for the largest sample available for empirical 
analysis. Rates of poverty vary considerably across countries. For example, the 
headcount index at $2 a day ranges from virtually zero (no poor) for Bulgaria in 1989-
1992 to 0.94 (almost all poor) for Malawi in 1997-2000. Similarly, income share held 
by the poorest quintile fluctuates from just 1% in Panama in 1989-1992 to 10.12% in 
Bulgaria in 1997-2000.  
 
Growth rate of per capita GDP and primary education also show considerable variation. 
The lowest per capita GDP growth rate is recorded in Romania in the years 1989-1992, 
while the highest per capita GDP growth has been seen in Azerbaijan in 2005-2008. The 
panel also includes cases of hyperinflation, such as Argentina and Brazil in the years 
between 1989 and 1992, with rates of inflation above 1000. 
 
Table 3.2 displays the correlations between the indices of poverty and the independent 
variables. With the exception of turnover ratio, the proxies of financial development are 
all significantly correlated with the headcount ratio and poverty gap, though the size of 
the correlation is not high.  
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Headcount ($2 at day) 0.347 0.287 0.000 0.935 
Headcount ($1.25 at day) 0.204 0.227 0.000 0.831 
Poverty gap ($2 at day) 15.386 15.890 0.000 62.270 
Poverty gap ($1.25 at day) 7.905 10.115 0.000 45.960 
Poorest quintile 5.628 2.161 1.000 10.120 
Liquid liabilities 0.402 0.254 0.057 1.260 
Private credit 0.313 0.263 0.024 1.450 
Commercial-central bank 0.787 0.186 0.145 1.000 
Turnover ratio 0.264 0.424 0.001 2.909 
Stock market capitalization 0.268 0.391 0.001 2.547 
Institutions 4.682 1.247 0.556 7.708 
Growth 2.810 3.546 -8.035 22.570 
Inflation 36.655 150.985 -3.973 1440.722 
Gini 43.262 9.121 24.385 60.530 
Public spending 12.984 4.225 3.482 26.438 
Education 101.740 18.749 26.148 150.978 
Notes: The table illustrates summary statistics of the main variables. Headcount, poverty gap and the 
poorest quintile are the dependent variables. 
 
Table 3.2: Correlation Matrix [1] 
  
Headcount 
($2) 
Headcount 
($1.25) 
Poverty 
gap  
($2) 
Poverty 
gap 
($1.25) 
Poorest 
Quintile 
Liquid liabilities -0.360 -0.388 -0.388 -0.385 0.113 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.100) 
Private credit -0.348 -0.357 -0.360 -0.350 -0.092 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.181) 
Commercial-central bank -0.264 -0.286 -0.295 -0.312 0.051 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) -0.440 
Turnover ratio 0.186 0.101 0.099 -0.014 0.236 
  (0.017) (0.196) (0.206) (0.863) (0.002) 
Stock market capitalization -0.212 -0.215 -0.226 -0.231 -0.056 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.472) 
Institutions -0.262 -0.251 -0.250 -0.221 -0.038 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.566) 
Growth -0.110 -0.130 -0.138 -0.161 0.258 
  (0.095) (0.048) (0.036) (0.014) (0.000) 
Inflation -0.117 -0.092 -0.093 -0.068 -0.106 
  (0.076) (0.166) (0.159) (0.302) (0.105) 
Gini -0.058 0.013 0.038 0.144 -0.971 
  (0.380) (0.849) (0.567) (0.028) (0.000) 
Public spending -0.222 -0.156 -0.155 -0.084 -0.031 
  (0.000) (0.018) (0.018) (0.203) (0.639) 
Education -0.335 -0.326 -0.321 -0.284 -0.306 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: The table shows simple correlations between the set of dependent variables and the 
explanatory variables (p-values in parentheses). 
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On the other hand, the corresponding correlations with the poorest quintile are 
statistically insignificant. This provides some preliminary evidence that the impact of 
the financial market depends on both the measures of poverty and financial 
development. Similarly, the pairwise correlations show that poverty and inflation are 
not significantly correlated with each other. 
 
Table 3.3 illustrates the correlations between the indices of poverty. As it can been seen, 
the headcount index and poverty gap are strongly correlated. On the other hand, the 
correlations between the poorest quintile and the two absolute indices of poverty are 
very low and, with the exception of the headcount at $ 2 a day, not statistically 
significant. Therefore they are capturing different things and hence are interesting to 
look at. 
 
Table 3.3: Correlation Matrix [2] 
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Headcount ($1.25 at day) 0.966       
 
(0.000)       
Poverty gap ($2 at day) 0.967 0.998     
  (0.000) (0.000)     
Poverty gap ($1.25 at day) 0.877 0.962 0.970   
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
Poorest quintile 0.157 0.071 0.046 -0.078 
  
(0.017) (0.285) (0.484) (0.239) 
Notes: The table shows simple correlations between alternatives measure of poverty (p-values in 
parentheses).  
 
 
Table 3.4 presents the matrix correlation for the proxies of financial development. The 
correlation between liquid liabilities and private credit is high and statistically 
significant. Similarly, stock market capitalization is significantly correlated with both 
liquid liabilities and private credit, though the coefficients are not too high. On the other 
hand, commercial central bank and, especially, turnover ratio are weakly correlated with 
the other indices of financial development. This should not be surprising as commercial 
central bank and turnover ratio are measures of efficiency and liquidity whereas the 
remaining indices are based mainly on the size of the financial sector. 
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Table 3.4: Correlation Matrix [3] 
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Private credit 0.821       
  (0.000)       
Commercial-central bank 0.329 0.456     
  (0.000) (0.000)     
Turnover ratio 0.159 0.116 0.149   
  (0.047) (0.148) (0.054)   
Stock market capitalization 0.632 0.670 0.331 0.154 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.050) 
Notes: The table shows simple correlations between the proxies for financial developments (p-
values in parentheses).  
 
Figures 3.1-3.10 in Appendix plot the time trend of the indices of poverty and the five 
proxies of financial development over the 1985-2008 period. As it can be seen, poverty 
as measured by the headcount and the gap indices have been volatile with a decreasing 
trend over time. The income share of the poorest quintile has fluctuated over time. Its 
average in 2008 (6.11%) is slightly higher than the corresponding average in 1985 
(5.9%). Financial indices show an increasing time trend, though there are some 
differences. For example, the turnover ratio displays a remarkable variation over time, 
while other indices are characterized by a relatively smooth trend. Clearly, visual 
analysis cannot be used to draw any inference and panel estimations are needed to 
assess the impact of financial development on poverty.   
 
3.5.2. Estimation Results 
 
To assess the financial development-poverty nexus, I compute first several 
specifications of the empirical model, each focusing on a particular proxy of financial 
development. For a given index, I then proceed to run further regressions across 
different measures of poverty. The empirical estimates are shown in Tables 3.5-3.9. 
Specifically, columns 1 and 2 illustrate the impact of financial development on the share 
of the population earning less than $ 2 and $ 1.25 a day at 2005 international prices, 
respectively. Column 3 refers to the poverty gap computed at the $ 2 poverty line while 
column 4 shows the corresponding estimates for poverty gap associated with the cut-off 
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of $ 1.25. The final column illustrates the statistical results on the income share of the 
poorest quintile.  
 
Starting the analysis from the set of controls, all tables show a significant impact of per 
capita GDP growth on poverty alleviation, irrespective of the poverty index. Such a 
finding provides evidence in favour of a pro-poor impact of growth, meaning that 
poverty alleviation and growth are likely to go hand in hand. This result is in line with 
several empirical studies, such as Dollar and Kraay (2002), Jalilian and Kirkpatrick 
(2005) and Kraay (2006).  
 
The coefficient on primary education is never statistically significant in the regression 
with the headcount index or the poverty gap. On the other hand, in all but one 
specification (Table 3.9, column 5), primary education is statistically significant with a 
negative sign in the regressions with the poorest quintile as the dependent variable 
(Table 3.5-3.8, column 5). This means that a higher level of (primary) school enrolment 
decreases the share of the income received by the poorest quintile. This finding suggests 
that rising levels of primary education in poor countries benefit mostly the richer 
quintiles, thereby increasing their income share relatively to the lowest quintile. One 
possible reason is that an increase in primary school enrolment by the poor is not 
followed by an equivalent increase in secondary school because of the high opportunity 
cost of education in developing countries. As the payoff from primary school is low as 
compared with secondary school, most of the benefits associated with higher education 
levels will accrue only to those households who can allow their children to continue 
their studies.     
 
Remarkably, the coefficients associated with inflation fail to achieve any conventional 
level of statistically significance. These estimates are somewhat surprising because one 
would expect inflation to hurt especially the poor. However, on the empirical side, the 
finding is in line with Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) who 
also find little evidence for a statistically significant impact of inflation on poverty 
incidence. The lagged poverty term is positive and statistically significant for all 
specifications with a value less than one. This figure supports the choice of using 
dynamic panel techniques. 
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Public spending appears to be statistically insignificant, the only exception being the 
regression on the $2 per day poverty ratio with stock market capitalization as the proxy 
for financial development (Table 3.9 column 1). One possible explanation for this lack 
of statistical significance is that governments in developing countries devolve large 
share of public resources to expenditures which do not benefit the poor, such as military 
spending, while marginalizing pro-poor spending, such as expenditure for education and 
health.  Another explanation is that public spending has no direct effect on poverty, yet 
it affects the poor indirectly, through the rate of economic growth. This finding is in line 
with Dollar and Kraay (2002) who show the impact of government consumption on the 
bottom quintile to be statistically insignificant.   
 
The Gini coefficient is statistically significant with a positive sign in two of the 
regressions with private credit as a proxy for financial development (Table 3.6 column 2 
and 3). The positive sign means that a widening in the income inequality distribution is 
conducive to an aggravation of poverty. However, lack of statistical significance of the 
Gini coefficient in other regressions casts doubt on the robustness of such finding. 
These estimates resemble Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) who find no evidence for a 
statistically significant impact of inequality in land distribution on the poor.   
 
Overall, the quality of institutions seems to have no significant impact on poverty. It is 
possible that the effects of institutional reforms, such as lower levels of corruption and a 
more efficient bureaucracy benefit principally the rich as well as the middle class. An 
alternative explanation might be that the benefit for the poor is offset, at least in the 
short term, by transaction costs entailed by institutional reforms which affect the 
informal sector. On the empirical front, these findings are in line with Honohan (2004) 
who also finds little evidence that institutional quality has a statistically significant 
impact on poverty rate.  
 
The p-values of the Sargan test and the Arellano-Bond test are displayed in Panel B. As 
can be seen, in no case does the Sargan test invalidate the set of instruments used in the 
estimation. Further, serial correlation of order 2 in the error term can be rejected in all 
specifications. 
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One can wonder whether these results are partially driven by the causal relationship 
running in the opposite direction, from poverty to financial development. However, the 
poor in developing countries are unlikely to hold a significant share of financial assets 
(Honoan, 2004). On the empirical side, using a Granger causality test for a sample of 35 
countries, Perez-Moreno (2011) provides little evidence for a reversal effect from 
financial development to poverty. Thus, unlike the finance-growth nexus, the problem 
of reverse causality should not be severe for the relationship between poverty and 
financial development, at least within four year-intervals. An additional source of 
concern in panel data is the presence of unit roots. Because of the small time series 
dimension of the data (up to six periods), it is not possible to run formal test. Given that 
system GMM estimator takes first differences and that most economic series are 
stationary in first differences, one can be reasonably confident that the estimates are not 
reflecting a spurious relationship. 
 
Liquid Liabilities to GDP ratio 
 
Table 3.5 displays the empirical findings concerning liquid liabilities as a proxy of 
financial development. Specifically, column 1 shows that the coefficient associated with 
liquid liabilities is statistically significant with a negative sign, just missing the 0.5 
confidence level (p-value: 0.052). Taken at face value, the coefficient implies that a 
one-standard deviation increase in liquid liabilities (by 0.25 in the overall time period 
1985-2008) is estimated to lower the poverty rate by 0.01 (1%).5 Using the poverty line 
of $ 1.25 a day confirms the statistical and economic significance of the impact of 
financial development on poverty.   
 
Columns 3-4 show that the choice of a different index of absolute poverty, namely 
poverty gap, does not affect the empirical estimates. This means that financial 
development reduces not only the incidence of poverty but also its depth. On the other 
hand, the coefficient of liquid liabilities fails to reach any conventional level of 
statistical significance when the income share of the poorest 20% of population is used 
as a measure of poverty (column 5). This finding suggests that, unlike absolute poverty, 
                                                            
5
 This figure has been obtained as the difference between two fitted values of the headcount index. The 
first value is the product between the estimated coefficient  and the average of liquid liabilities (0.40). 
The second value is computed by multiplying  by the sum of the average and standard deviation of 
liquid liabilities (0.40 + 0.25).   
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relative poverty is unaffected by a rising level of liquid assets. In other words, the share 
of the income accruing to the lowest quintile has neither increased nor decreased as a 
result of an increase in the size of the financial sector.   
 
Table 3.5: System GMM Estimates for Financial Development Effect - 
Liquid Liabilities to GDP 
Panel A: Estimation Results 
  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
  
Headcount  
($2 per 
day) 
Headcount 
($1.25 per 
day) 
Poverty 
gap       
($2 per 
day) 
Poverty 
gap ($1.25 
per day) 
Poorest 
quintile 
yt-1 0.951*** 0.866*** 0.872*** 0.810*** 0.883*** 
  
(0.033) (0.044) (0.041) (0.048) (0.046) 
Liquid liabilitiest -0.045* -0.052* -3.755* -3.724*** 0.210    
  
(0.022) (0.027) (1.900) (1.064) (0.398) 
Institutionst 0.012 0.016 0.990 1.068** 0.031    
  
(0.012) (0.015) (0.775) (0.430) (0.106) 
Growtht -0.009** -0.006* -0.426* -0.340** 0.057*   
  
(0.004) (0.003) (0.251) (0.142) (0.030) 
Inflationt -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000    
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Ginit 0.001 0.001 0.052 0.023            
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.083) (0.052)            
Public spendingt 0.001 0.001 0.052 0.069 -0.014    
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.151) (0.098) (0.024) 
Educationt -0.000 -0.001 -0.026 -0.016 -0.013*   
  
(0.000) (0.001) (0.044) (0.052) (0.007) 
Constant -0.028 -0.029 -2.027 -1.877 1.784**  
  
(0.080) (0.093) (7.408) (6.238) (0.877) 
Panel B: Diagnostic Tests 
AR(2) 0.696 0.343 0.290 0.177 0.844 
Hansen test 0.686 0.391 0.383 0.661 0.764 
Observations 155 155 155 155 158 
Countries 53 53 53 53 54 
Instruments 28 28 28 28 40 
Notes: The table shows the main determinants of poverty. Panel A reports the estimates obtained 
from robust two-step system GMM estimations. The figures given in parentheses are standard errors 
which are asymptotically robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within 
panels. Panel B reports the p-values of the Hansen test and the Arellano and Bond test. All 
regressions include a set of time dummy variables. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
These findings are in line with Akther et al. (2010) who use a fixed effect vector 
decomposition to estimate the financial development-poverty nexus. The results are also 
in line with Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) who provide evidence for a significantly 
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negative impact of broad liquidity on the poverty rate (headcount index) using system 
GMM. However, contrary to Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011), my results yield little 
support for a poverty alleviation effect of financial development when poverty is 
proxied by the poorest income share. Such variety in results might be explained by 
differences in model specification, sample size and time coverage. These dissimilarities 
are discussed in more detail in the next section where the value of credit granted to the 
private sector is used as proxy of financial development.  
 
Credit to Private Sector to GDP ratio 
 
The estimation results regarding the amount of credit offered by financial intermediaries 
to private sector are illustrated in Table 3.6. As can be seen in column 1, the estimated 
coefficient of private credit is negative, which indicates that a higher level of credit to 
the private sector predicts lower poverty levels. Specifically, the estimate suggests that 
an increase in credit to the private sector by 0.26 (its standard deviation in the 1985-
2008 period) would decrease the poverty rate by 0.01 (1%).6 The p-value associated 
with the coefficient is 0.09, which is just below the 10% level of confidence. Thus, the 
coefficient is only marginally significant. However, the statistical significance of credit 
to private sector is preserved across alternative measures of absolute poverty (columns 
2-4).  
 
These findings are generally in line with Honohan (2004), Beck et al. (2007) and Akter 
et al. (2010). On the other hand, the effect of private credit on poverty alleviation is in 
contrast with Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) who document a statistically insignificant 
impact of private credit on the headcount index. One plausible explanation for such a 
variety in results is differences in specification. Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) do not 
include the lagged dependent variable in their set of regressors. However, the empirical 
model used here shows that lagged poverty is highly significant, its coefficient ranging 
from 0.95 to 0.77. Thus, failing to include lagged poverty on the right hand side is likely 
to be a source of omitted variable bias.7  
 
                                                            
6
 See footnote 5 for how this figure has been calculated. 
7
 It has to be acknowledged that Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) include the lagged dependent variable on 
the right hand side when running the regression with the poorest quintile as the dependent variable. The 
estimated coefficient in their regression is statistically significant, ranging from 0.35 to 0.53.  
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Table 3.6: System GMM Estimates for Financial Development Effect - 
Private Credit to GDP 
Panel A: Estimation Results 
  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
  
Headcount  
($2 per 
day) 
Headcount 
($1.25 per 
day) 
Poverty 
gap        
($2 per 
day) 
Poverty 
gap     
($1.25 per 
day) 
Poorest 
quintile 
yt-1 0.908*** 0.855*** 0.868*** 0.769*** 0.815*** 
  
(0.030) (0.040) (0.036) (0.064) (0.062)    
Private creditt -0.040* -0.036* -2.640* -2.643* 0.082    
  
(0.024) (0.021) (1.416) (1.469) (0.321)    
Institutionst 0.006 0.002 0.327 0.408 -0.044    
  
(0.009) (0.012) (0.830) (0.869) (0.106)    
Growtht -0.007*** -0.005** -0.383** -0.248* 0.076**  
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.162) (0.142) (0.034)    
Inflationt -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.004 0.000    
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001)    
Ginit 0.001 0.002** 0.090* 0.058            
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.048) (0.042)            
Public spendingt -0.002 0.000 0.015 -0.008 0.030    
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.113) (0.124) (0.020)    
Educationt -0.000 -0.001 -0.030 -0.016 -0.019**  
  
(0.000) (0.001) (0.040) (0.040) (0.009)    
Constant 0.009 -0.007 -1.114 -0.753 2.608**  
  
(0.046) (0.066) (5.517) (4.690) (1.069)    
Panel B: Diagnostic Tests 
AR(2) 0.430 0.239 0.242 0.105 0.680 
Hansen test 0.592 0.699 0.644 0.504 0.390 
Observations 154 154 154 154 157 
Countries 53 53 53 53 54 
Instruments 52 44 44 51 40 
Notes: The table shows the main determinants of poverty. Panel A reports the estimates obtained 
from robust two-step system GMM estimations. The figures given in parentheses are standard errors 
which are asymptotically robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within 
panels. Panel B reports the p-values of the Hansen test and the Arellano and Bond test. All 
regressions include a set of time dummy variables. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Different samples might be also relevant for explaining contrasting results. Jeanneney 
and Kpodar focus on a larger number of countries (65) than my study, yet the overall 
number of observations is relatively small (121), which indicates that the coverage of 
their dataset is particularly scant.8 Further, their analysis covers the period from 1980-
2000 which is different from the time span analysed by this study. In line with 
                                                            
8
 It should be noted that the sample of countries used by Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) increases to 75 
countries and 187 observations when the dependent variable is the poorest quintile. 
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Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011), Perez-Moreno (2011) also provides little evidence for an 
impact of private credit on poverty. However his study relies on a relatively small 
sample of country (35) with observations separated by not less than 8 years over the 
period 1970-1998.   
 
Finally, according to the last column of Table 3.6, private credit turns out to be 
statistically insignificant when the bottom quintile is used as the regressand. This 
specific result is in line with Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) who also find little evidence 
for a statistically significant impact of private credit on the poorest quintile. On the 
other hand, this finding is in contrast with Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2005) and Beck et 
al. (2007) who find empirical evidence of a positive and statistically significant impact 
of private credit on the income share of the poorest quintile. Differences in econometric 
techniques and sample composition might be at the core of these contrasting results. 
These are discussed in more detail in the next section.  
 
Ratio of Commercial Bank to Central Bank Assets  
 
Table 3.7 displays the estimated relationship between poverty and the commercial to 
central bank assets ratio. Remarkably, the sign of the corresponding coefficient varies 
across difference specifications of absolute levels of poverty (columns 1-4). However, 
the coefficient fails to reach statistical significance at any conventional level, whatever 
the measure of poverty. This means that the extent to which commercial financial 
intermediaries allocate savings relative to central banks has no sensible (direct) effect on 
the poverty rate.9 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
9
 Lack of statistical significance does not imply that a variable has no impact on poverty. For example, 
commercial-central bank might lead to poverty alleviation indirectly, by increasing the growth rate of an 
economy. Empirical works, such as King and Levine (1993) and Beck et al. (2000), provide evidence for 
a growth-enhancing impact of this variable.   
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Table 3.7: System GMM Estimates for Financial Development Effect - 
Commercial-Central Bank Assets ratio 
Panel A: Estimation Results 
  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
  
Headcount  
($2 per 
day) 
Headcount 
($1.25 per 
day) 
Poverty 
gap ($2 
per day) 
Poverty 
gap ($1.25 
per day) 
Poorest 
quintile 
yt-1 0.913*** 0.846*** 0.881*** 0.812*** 0.849*** 
  
(0.032) (0.031) (0.043) (0.059) (0.057)    
Commercial-                 -0.059 -0.029 0.925 1.127 -0.787    
  central bankt (0.052) (0.052) (3.512) (3.727) (0.496)    
Institutionst -0.005 0.001 -0.200 -0.355 0.011    
  
(0.009) (0.007) (0.428) (0.473) (0.121)    
Growtht -0.006** -0.004** -0.465* -0.280* 0.049**  
  
(0.003) (0.002) (0.258) (0.163) (0.023)    
Inflationt 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000    
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)    
Ginit 0.001 0.000 -0.088 -0.041            
  
(0.002) (0.001) (0.106) (0.091)            
Public spendingt -0.000 -0.001 -0.158 -0.097 0.004    
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.115) (0.104) (0.023)    
Educationt 0.001 0.000 0.038 0.016 -0.021**  
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.062) (0.048) (0.010)    
Constant -0.048 -0.031 2.439 2.624 3.543**  
  
(0.106) (0.082) (3.348) (3.382) (1.346)    
Panel B: Diagnostic Tests 
AR(2) 0.489 0.653 0.347 0.370 0.993 
Hansen test 0.291 0.391 0.705 0.653 0.481 
Observations 166 166 166 166 169 
Countries 59 59 59 59 60 
Instruments 44 36 43 51 53 
Notes: The table shows the main determinants of poverty. Panel A reports the estimates obtained 
from robust two-step system GMM estimations. The figures given in parentheses are standard errors 
which are asymptotically robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within 
panels. Panel B reports the p-values of the Hansen test and the Arellano and Bond test. All 
regressions include a set of time dummy variables. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Similarly, the coefficient of commercial-central bank turns statistically insignificant 
when the poorest quintile is the dependent variable (column 5). This result is in line 
with Dollar and Kraay (2002) who also uses system GMM estimator to estimate the 
impact of commercial-central bank assets on the poorest quintile.10 On the other hand, 
my findings are in contrast with Beck et al. (2007) and Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2005) 
who show a significant impact of commercial-central bank ratio on the poorest 
                                                            
10
 The main focus of Dollar and Kraay (2002) is on growth rather than financial development.  
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quintile.11 Such divergence in results is likely to be due to differences in econometric 
techniques. Specifically, Beck et al. run a pure cross-sectional analysis using standard 
OLS. However, there are some econometric issues, such as simultaneity bias and 
omitted variables, including unobserved country-specific characteristics that cross-
section regressions fail to account for. Further, cross-section estimations ignore the time 
series dimension of the data, thereby discarding an important source of information for 
inference analysis.12  
 
Another possible reason underlying the difference of results might be the composition 
of the sample. Specifically, while my investigation focuses on developing countries 
only, the sample investigated by Beck et al. (2007) and Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2005) 
also includes advanced economies. However, as explained in section 3.3, combining 
developed and developing countries in the same sample can introduce a strong element 
of heterogeneity. The presence of developed economies could be a driving force behind 
their results.    
 
Capital Market Development 
 
The results for the last two proxies for financial development are shown in Table 3.8 
and 3.9. As can be seen from Table 3.8, the estimates of the turnover ratio indicate that 
more liquid stock markets are associated with higher (absolute) poverty (columns 1-4). 
The coefficients turn out to be negative in the regression on relative poverty (column 5). 
These results suggest that higher levels of liquidity in the stock market are somehow 
detrimental for the poorest. However, in no specification does the variable achieve 
conventional levels of statistical significance. Table 3.9, column 1 shows that the 
coefficient associated with stock market capitalization has a negative sign, but again, the 
impact is statistically insignificant. This finding is robust across different indices of 
poverty (columns 2-5).  
 
                                                            
11
 It has to be noted that, in line with my estimations, Beck et al. (2007) provide no evidence for a 
significant relationship between commercial-central bank and the headcount poverty index.  
12
 It has to be acknowledged that Beck et al. (2007) also use system GMM to assess the impact of private 
credit on poverty. However, they use simple OLS regression when moving on commercial-bank ratio as 
an index of financial development.   
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Table 3.8: System GMM Estimates for Financial Development Effect - 
Turnover ratio 
Panel A: Estimation Results 
  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
  
Headcount  
($2 per 
day) 
Headcount 
($1.25 per 
day) 
Poverty gap 
($2 per day) 
Poverty gap 
($1.25 per 
day) 
Poorest 
quintile 
yt-1 0.891*** 0.847*** 0.911*** 0.778*** 0.811*** 
  
(0.064) (0.089) (0.069) (0.061) (0.114)    
Turnovert 0.043 0.023 0.264 1.069 -0.461    
  
(0.029) (0.029) (1.501) (1.116) (0.453)    
Institutionst -0.012 -0.009 -0.501 -0.402 -0.338    
  
(0.010) (0.012) (0.487) (0.422) (0.208)    
Growtht -0.013** -0.010** -0.582** -0.272* 0.120**  
  
(0.005) (0.004) (0.256) (0.149) (0.050)    
Inflationt -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000    
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Ginit 0.001 -0.000 0.021 0.026             
  
(0.002) (0.001) (0.076) (0.054)             
Public 
spending  
0.003 0.003 0.108 -0.005 0.000    
  
(0.002) (0.004) (0.173) (0.154) (0.058)    
Educationt -0.001 -0.001 -0.038 -0.011 -0.047**  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.033) (0.030) (0.020)    
Constant 0.068 0.098 5.095 2.957 7.099**  
  
(0.082) (0.072) (5.144) (4.016) (2.967)    
Panel B: Diagnostic Tests 
AR(2) 0.571 0.880 0.910 0.729 0.180 
Hansen test 0.442 0.181 0.165 0.270 0.721 
Observations 122 122 122 122 125 
Countries 42 42 42 42 43 
Instruments 36 28 36 36 39 
Notes: The table shows the main determinants of poverty. Panel A reports the estimates obtained from 
robust two-step system GMM estimations. The figures given in parentheses are standard errors which 
are asymptotically robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within panels. Panel 
B reports the p-values of the Hansen test and the Arellano and Bond test. All regressions include a set of 
time dummy variables. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
These results suggest that the development of stock market, either as measured by size 
or degree of liquidity, has played no significant role in poverty alleviation. These 
findings are in line with Honoanh (2004) who also provides no evidence for a 
statistically significant impact of turnover ratio and stock market capitalization on 
poverty rate. One possible explanation for such a lack of statistical significance is that, 
contrary to the banking sector, the development of capital market is irrelevant for 
poverty reduction. An alternative reason for this result is that equity markets simply are 
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not sufficiently developed in low and middle-income countries to have any significant 
impact on poverty.13 
 
Table 3.9: System GMM Estimates for Financial Development Effect - 
Stock Market Capitalization 
Panel A: Estimation Results 
  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
  
Headcount  
($2 per 
day) 
Headcount 
($1.25 per 
day) 
Poverty 
gap ($2 
per day) 
Poverty 
gap ($1.25 
per day) 
Poorest 
quintile 
yt-1 0.937*** 0.888*** 0.903*** 0.846*** 0.830*** 
  
(0.035) (0.037) (0.039) (0.074) (0.115)    
Stock market                 -0.002 -0.011 -0.774 -0.510 -0.175    
  capitalizationt (0.030) (0.014) (1.034) (0.955) (0.672)    
Institutionst -0.009 -0.003 -0.191 0.033 -0.291    
  
(0.011) (0.005) (0.323) (0.300) (0.185)    
Growtht -0.013** -0.009*** -0.604** -0.380* 0.116**  
  
(0.006) (0.003) (0.244) (0.214) (0.057)    
Inflationt 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000    
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Ginit 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.001            
  
(0.002) (0.001) (0.085) (0.081)            
Public spendingt 0.004** 0.003 0.164 0.067 -0.014    
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.178) (0.132) (0.054)    
Education t -0.001 -0.001 -0.038 0.002 -0.033    
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.050) (0.052) (0.044)    
Constant 0.064 0.064 3.643 0.617 5.517    
  
(0.068) (0.074) (4.365) (2.301) (5.586)    
Panel B: Diagnostic Tests 
AR(2) 0.782 0.547 0.575 0.553 0.189 
Hansen test 0.269 0.424 0.281 0.284 0.628 
Observations 116 116 116 116 119 
Countries 41 41 41 41 42 
Instruments 36 36 36 36 32 
Notes: The table shows the main determinants of poverty. Panel A reports the estimates obtained 
from robust two-step system GMM estimations. The figures given in parentheses are standard errors 
which are asymptotically robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within 
panels. Panel B reports the p-values of the Hansen test and the Arellano and Bond test. All 
regressions include a set of time dummy variables. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
                                                            
13
 By comparing the number of observations across alternative indices of financial development, it can be 
seen that the number of countries drops dramatically when either stock market capitalization or liquidity 
ratio is used. The reason is that these proxies include only countries with equity markets. Several 
countries, particularly the small and low-income ones, lack any stock market (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 
2009). 
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Discussion 
 
The results have provided evidence that financial development, as proxied by the depth 
of the banking sector, seems to be neutral in terms of relative poverty. On the other 
hand, financial development appears to effectively relieve absolute poverty. Given the 
aggregate nature of the proxies of financial development, the current analysis does not 
allow us to be specific about the financial policies which should be carried in order to 
effectively tackle poverty. Traditional examples of policies which expand the banking 
sector are the liberalization of interest rates and the removal of reserve requirements. 
However, as illustrated by Arestis et al. (2002) these financial policies do not always 
foster financial development. Specifically, using an Error Correction Model, the authors 
estimate the relationship between financial development, as proxied by liquid liabilities, 
and a number of policy variables including reserve requirements and interest rate 
restraints for a sample of 6 countries. According to their findings, the effects of financial 
liberalization are mixed. Specifically, they show that for some countries financial 
restraints have fostered financial development.  
 
An additional example of financial policies is the 1:4 license rule adopted in India 
between 1977 and 1990. Under this rule, a commercial bank could have opened an 
additional branch in a location with bank presence only if it opened four branches in 
locations devoid of banks. It has been estimated that such policy boosted the creation of 
new branches in 30000 rural areas. Burgess and Pande (2005) have used this policy as a 
natural experiment to assess the impact on poverty of bank expansion in rural areas. 
Their study show that poverty incidence declined faster in areas which previously 
lacked bank access. Specifically, they find that a one per cent raise in the number of 
banks in rural areas has lowered poverty by 0.36 per cent. 
 
To sum up, my study suggests that financial development might alleviate poverty, 
though it does not seem to favour disproportionately the poor. Previous analyses based 
on case studies suggest that the specific set of financial policies to adopt depends 
greatly on the context within which the financial sector works.   
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3.5.3. Financial Crisis 
 
One of the major financial events occurred during the time period under study is the 
crisis experienced by Southeast Asia in the years 1997 and 1998. As the poor are likely 
to be particularly vulnerable to financial turmoil, the empirical analysis should account 
for such events. One way to do so is to include time dummies in the set of control 
variables. As it has been explained in section 3.3.1, the right hand side of the regression 
contains time dummies for each of the four year- intervals within the time period 1985-
2000.14 Thus, it is interesting to have a look to the variable taking value of 1 for the 
period 1997-2000 to gain possible insights about the impact of the 1997-1998 financial 
crisis.  
 
The coefficient of the 1997-2000 time variable is statistically significant at the 10% 
level for the regression on the $ 2 a day headcount with commercial-central bank as 
proxy for financial development (results now shown here). The magnitude is 
approximately 0.3 and the sign is positive which means that poverty incidence is indeed 
increased in this four-year interval. However, this finding is far from being robust 
because of the lack of statistically significance of the 1997-2000 time variable in all the 
other regressions (results available upon request). Such results are somewhat surprising 
because one would expect the poor to have been particularly hurt by the 1997-1998 
financial crisis. One plausible explanation is that the events occurred in 1997 and 1998 
were limited to the East Asian countries whereas the sample under study include all but 
the high-income countries. In fact, the empirical analysis could tell a different story if 
the on-going financial crisis which started in 2008 was accounted for in the estimation.  
The main difference with the 1997-1998 crises is that the current financial crisis has 
turned to be a major worldwide recession. Unfortunately, the panel data in this study 
covers the time period up to 2008, which make impossible any empirical investigation 
of the 2008-onward crisis. This could be carried in a future analysis as additional data 
become available.  
 
 
                                                            
14
 Please note that the construction of the panel data in six non-overlapping four-year intervals makes it 
impossible to generate a specific variable for the two consecutive years 1997 and 1998.  
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3.5.4. Robustness Check 
 
The empirical findings might be driven by the presence of specific observations which 
have an unusual effect on the estimates. Thus, as a robustness check, I have investigated 
the observations associated with relatively large residuals. These are specifically the 
point observations that are greatly overpredicted (or underpredicted) by the model. A 
graphical inspection detects different potential outliers depending on the specification. 
Thus, I excluded such observations from the sample and re-run estimations (results not 
shown). 
 
With regard to the indices of liquid liabilities, commercial-central bank and private 
credit, the observations which appear as outliers in most of the regressions on absolute 
poverty are Gambia 2001-2004 and Honduras 1989-1992. Remarkably, once these 
observations are excluded from the sample, the coefficient of liquid liabilities in the 
regression using the $ 2 a day headcount index turns out to be statistically insignificant 
(p-value: 0.11). On the other hand, the statistical significance of liquid liabilities is 
preserved across the other three specifications (the statistical significance raises to the 
5% level of confidence for the $1.25 poverty line).  
 
The exclusion of such observations has no qualitative effect on the coefficient of private 
credit, which remains statistically significant, neither does it have any effect on the 
coefficient of commercial-central bank, which continues to show no significant impact 
on absolute poverty. Similarly, dropping the outliers does not affect the estimates 
associated with the poorest quintile, which continues to lack statistical significance.15 
Similarly, the empirical findings concerning the indices of stock market development 
(turnover ratio and stock market capitalization) are not affected by the omission of 
outliers.16 Thus, lack of evidence for a significant impact of stock market development 
is not driven by observations which are poorly predicted by the model. 
 
 
                                                            
15
 Malawi 2001-2004 and Paraguay 1993-1996 are common outliers to most of the regressions where the 
poorest quintile is the dependent variable. 
16
 When using the indices of development of stock market, the observations which results as outliers in 
most of the regressions are Bolivia 1997-2000, Guatemala 2001-2004 and Zambia 2001-2004, 2005-
2008.  
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3.5.5. Results from alternative estimation techniques  
 
In this section I proceed to run different estimation methods, namely OLS, FE and RE 
estimators and first-difference GMM. Because of the drawbacks from employing these 
techniques in the present context, it is not surprising that the respective estimates might 
differ substantially from those obtained by using system GMM.17 Such additional 
estimators have been used exclusively for illustrative purposes. I have done such 
exercise for the regression having the headcount ratio ($2 per day) as dependent 
variable and liquid liabilities as proxy for financial development. The results are shown 
in Table B.3. Column 5 of Table B.3 replicates the estimates from system GMM 
(column 1 of Table 3.5).  
 
As it can be seen, both the sign and statistical significance of the coefficients associated 
with economic growth and liquid liabilities are preserved under OLS and RE estimators. 
On the other hand, both variables turn to be statistically insignificant when FE estimator 
or first-difference GMM is used.18 One possible explanation behind such lack of 
statistically significance is that both estimators drop cross-country variation, thereby 
discarding an important source of information. Another reason is that mean-differencing 
(FE) as well as first-differencing (first-difference GMM) intensifies measurement errors 
(Griliches and Hausman, 1986). The tables show that the lagged dependent variable,
, 1i tPov − , results statistically significant with a positive sign regardless of the estimation 
technique. Yet the size of the coefficient is considerably smaller under FE. This is 
precisely what one would expect because FE estimator yields an estimate of 
, 1i tPov − that 
is seriously downward biased in panel with many cross-sections for relatively few time 
periods (Nickell, 1981). As regards for first-difference GMM, the relative small size of 
, 1i tPov − is probably due to the weak instruments problem that affects such technique in 
presence of highly persistent variables (Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
   
                                                            
17
 See Chapter One for more details on the methodological difficulties which characterize alternative 
estimation approaches (pp. 24-27). 
18
 When comparing the number of observations across alternative techniques, it can be seen that first-
difference GMM drastically reduces the size of the sample. The reason is that the first observation for 
each unit is lost from first-differencing (the countries which have only two observations are dropped). 
The same does not occur for system GMM because, as explained in section 3.3.2, in addition to the 
equation in difference, this technique also uses an equation in levels.   
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3.6.     Conclusions 
 
Previous empirical studies have generally provided evidence of a beneficial impact of 
financial development in favour of the poorest. The aim of this study is to reassess the 
causal link from financial development to poverty for a sample of developing countries 
using alternative measures of poverty as well as a large array of indices of financial 
development. 
    
The main results from this empirical investigation can be summarized as follows. The 
empirical evidence of a relationship between financial development and poverty 
primarily depends on the nature of the poverty index used. I find some evidence in 
favour of a mitigating effect of financial development on the poor when poverty is 
measured by the headcount index or the poverty gap at the cut-off line of $ 2 day 
(absolute poverty). Thus, financial development is likely to reduce the incidence as well 
as the depth of poverty. This finding is robust to the choice of a more conservative 
poverty line based on $ 1.25 a day. On the other hand, the results show that financial 
development does not appear to benefit disproportionately those at the lower end of 
distribution (relative poverty). Thus, financial development appears to be neither 
“regressive” nor “progressive”. 
 
The results also suggest that evidence of a beneficial effect of financial development on 
the poor is sensitive to the proxy of financial development. When financial development 
is gauged by the size of the banking sector (as proxied by the value of liquid liabilities 
and the value of the credit provided by financial intermediaries to private, both as a 
share of GDP), the estimates corroborate a pro-poor effect of financial development. On 
the other hand, when indices of the size/liquidity of the stock markets are used (proxied 
by stock market capitalization and turnover ratio) the results provide no support in 
favour of a pro-poor effect of financial development. Similarly, the relative degree to 
which credit is being allocated by commercial banks vis-à-vis central banks has no 
statistically significant impact on poverty.  
 
These findings carry some important insights for policy makers in developing countries. 
My results suggest that, unlike stock market reforms, banking sector reforms that 
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promote financial development may be an effective instrument to tackle absolute levels 
poverty. On the other hand, the policy maker should not rely on financial development 
to narrow the gap between the poorest quintile and the richer fractions of the population. 
In this regard, fiscal policies, such as progressive taxation and public-expenditure 
projects which redistribute resources from the wealthy to the poor, should not be 
replaced by policies which foster financial development. 
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3.7.     Appendix B 
 
Table B.1: List of Countries 
Albania Guatemala Niger 
Argentina Guyana Nicaragua 
Armenia Honduras Pakistan  
Azerbaijan Indonesia Panama 
Burkina Faso Iran Peru 
Bangladesh Jamaica Philippines 
Bulgaria Jordan Paraguay 
Belarus Kazakhstan Romania 
Bolivia Kenya Russia 
Brazil Sri Lanka Senegal 
China Latvia Thailand 
Cote d'Ivoire Morocco Tunisia 
Cameroon Moldova Turkey 
Colombia Madagascar Uganda 
Costa Rica Mexico Ukraine 
Dominican Republic Mali Uruguay 
Ecuador Mongolia Venezuela 
Egypt Mozambique Vietnam 
Ghana Malawi South Africa 
Gambia Malaysia Zambia 
Notes: The table illustrates the largest sample of countries used in the empirical investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
111 
 
Table B.2: Description of Variables 
Variable Description Source 
Headcount ($ 2) Share of the population living on less 
than $ 2 per day at 2005 PPP 
World Development 
Indicator           
(World Bank) 
Headcount ($ 1.25) Share of the population living on less 
than $1.25 per day at 2005 PPP 
Poverty gap ($ 2) Mean shortfall from the poverty line of $ 
2 per day measured as a share of the 
poverty line  
Poverty gap ($ 1.25) Mean shortfall from the poverty line of $ 
1.25 per day measured as a share of the 
poverty line 
Poorest quintile Income share earned by lowest 20% 
Growth Percentage change of per capita GDP per 
capita based on constant local currency 
Inflation Percentage change in the consumer price index 
Gini 
Ratio of the area between the Lorenz 
curve and the line representing perfect 
equality 
Public spending General government final consumption 
expenditure as a share of GDP 
Education Primary school enrolment  (% gross) 
Investment Gross capital formation (%GDP) 
Openness Sum of exports and imports to GDP ratio 
Population Total population 
Liquid liabilities 
Currency plus demand and interest-
bearing liabilities of bank and other 
financial intermediaries as a share of 
GDP 
Financial Structure 
Database 2010 
Private credit Credit to the private sector by financial institutions as a share of GDP 
Commercial-central       
bank 
Claims of commercial banks on non-
financial domestic sectors to the claims of 
central banks 
Turnover ratio Value of the total shared traded to stock 
market capitalization ratio 
Stock market     
capitalization 
Value of the listed share as a share of 
GDP 
    (continues) 
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Table B.2 (Continued) 
Institutions 
Arithmetic average of the ICRG variables 
“Corruption”, “Law and Order” and 
“Bureaucracy Quality” 
 International 
Country Risk Guide 
Legal origin Legal origin dummy for English, French, Socialist German and Scandinavian La Porta et al.1999 
Ethnic Index of ethnic fractionalization Alesina et al. 2003 
Oil exporter Dummy for oil exporter country Global Development 
Network Tropic Dummy for tropical country 
Notes: Data on Institutions, legal origin and ethnic have been retrieved from Teorell, Jan, Marcus 
Samanni, Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein (2011). The Quality of Government Dataset, version 
6Apr11. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute [access via:  
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se.]. 
 
 
Table B.3: Robust two-step System GMM estimates for Liquid liabilities 
effect on the Headcount  ($2 per day) 
Panel A: Estimation results 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
OLS FE RE DIF-GMM SYS-GMM 
yt-1 0.907*** 0.347*** 0.888*** 0.598**  0.951*** 
  (0.023) (0.110) (0.031) (0.268)    (0.033) 
Liquid liabilitiest -0.035* -0.065 -0.043* -0.042    -0.045* 
  (0.018) (0.096) (0.023) (0.083)    (0.022) 
Insitutionst -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 0.006    0.012 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012)    (0.012) 
Growtht -0.007*** 0.000 -0.007*** -0.003    -0.009** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)    (0.004) 
Inflationt -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000    -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) 
Ginit 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.004    0.001 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)    (0.001) 
Public spendingt 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.005    0.001 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)    (0.003) 
Educationt 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001    -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)    (0.000) 
Constant 0.065 0.075 -0.005 0.008    -0.028 
  (0.057) (0.124) (0.052) (0.179)    (0.080) 
Panel B 
Observations 155 155 155 96 155 
Countries 53 53 53 41 53 
R2 0.949 0.809 0.949   
Wald Statistic     196.247 161.266   
Notes: Panel A reports the estimates obtained from robust OLS, FE, RE, two-step difference GMM and 
system GMM estimators. The figures given in parentheses are standard errors which are asymptotically 
robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within panels. Panel B reports the overall 
number of observations, the number of countries, the R-squared and the Wald Statistic. ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Figure 3.1: Plots of the Headcount Index ($2 at day) over 1985-2008 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Plots of the Headcount Index ($1.25 at day) over 1985-2008 
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Figure 3.3: Plots of the Poverty Gap ($2 at day) over 1985-2008 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Plots of the Poverty Gap ($1.25 at day) over 1985-2008
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Figure 3.5: Plots of the Poorest Quintile over 1985-2008 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Plots of Liquid Liabilities over 1985-2008 
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Figure 3.7: Plots of Private Credit over 1985-2008 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Plots of Commercial-Central Bank Assets over 1985-2008 
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Figure 3.9: Plots of Turnover ratio over 1985-2008 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Plots of Stock Market Capitalization over 1985-2008 
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Chapter 4 : Determinants of CO2 and SO2 Emissions: 
Empirical Evidence for Different Political Regimes 
 
4.1.     Introduction 
 
Scientific opinion is unanimous that environmental degradation is the direct 
consequence of human activities around the world. Many researchers have focused on 
examining the relationship between the quality of the environment and both economic 
and socio-demographic variables. Examples of these variables are the income level, 
economic growth, trade openness, technologies, urbanization, energy intensity, 
population size and density, and age structure (see, for example, Grossman and Krueger, 
1995; Dietz and Rosa, 1997; Heil and Selden, 2001; York et al., 2003; Cole and 
Neumayer, 2004; Fan et al,. 2006; Auci and Becchetti, 2006; Managi et al., 2009; 
Naryan and Naryan, 2010). In analysing the effects of these variables on the 
environment, a large number of studies in the literature have considered measure for air 
quality, notably emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and sulphur dioxide (SO2). 
 
Within this body of literature there are several studies which have assessed whether the 
political regime plays any role in shaping the economic performance of a particular 
country.  On the empirical side, several studies have included a measure of democracy 
in their explanatory variables to assess the impact of political institutions on air 
pollution. Midlarsky (1998) and Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992) provide evidence of 
a positive impact of democracy on CO2 and SO2 emissions. On the other hand, a large 
number of empirical analysis have documented that more democratic countries are 
associated with lower levels of CO2 and SO2 emissions (Torras and Boyce, 1998; 
Scruggs, 1998; Barrett and Graddy, 2000; Farzin and Bond, 2006; Li and Reuveny, 
2006; Bernaeur and Koubi, 2009; Menz and Kühling, 2011; Arvin and Lew, 2011). 
Overall, whereas the theoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the effect of political 
regime on pollution, the empirical research, with some exceptions, is generally in 
support of a beneficial effect of democracy on air quality. 
 
All the afore-mentioned studies have implicitly assumed that the impact of the driving 
forces of pollution, such as rising population and increasing levels of production, are 
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homogenous across different political regimes. However, this assumption should be 
questioned: in practice, if democracies deliver better environmental outcomes than non-
democracies, they should do so by successfully mitigating the adverse impacts of the 
driving forces of pollution. This in turn indicates that the relationship between, for 
example, production and emissions will be different in democracies as opposed to 
dictatorships. The only exception is Farzin and Bond (2006) who use interaction terms 
between a democracy index and a set of explanatory variables. However, because their 
focus is on the degree of democracy, their analysis does not allow us to assess 
differences in effects across different kinds of political regime.    
 
This chapter is aimed at estimating the differential effects of the main factors underlying 
CO2 and SO2 emissions across democracies and dictatorships. Specifically, I carry out 
the empirical investigation in three steps. First, I quantify the impact of the level of 
income (proxied by per capita GDP), population size, the share of population aged less 
than 15, and trade openness, on CO2 and SO2 for a large sample of countries. These are 
commonly seen as the main driving forces underlying CO2 and SO2 emissions. This 
model can be considered as the baseline specification. Next, I proceed to explore the 
differences in the driving forces across different political regimes. To do so I use a set 
of the interaction terms between the explanatory variables and dummies for the kind of 
political regime. Finally, I re-estimate the differential impact across political regimes 
using a flexible functional form which allows the effects to vary with a country’s stage 
of development. I do so by including the interactions between the explanatory variables 
(population, youth and openness) and the level of per capita GDP into the specification.  
 
My work differs from existing empirical studies mainly in three key ways: (i) I relate 
the effects of the determinants of emissions to the kind of regime, namely democracy 
vis-à-vis dictatorships. This allows me to focus on the interaction effects between the 
political regimes and the driving forces under investigation; (ii) I use a more recent, 
comparable and consistent dataset on political regime which comes from Cheibub et al. 
(2010). This index is constructed based on well-defined classification rules and 
operational definitions and, thus, it is more reliable for empirical analysis than 
alternative indices of democracy; (iii) I estimate the empirical model in a dynamic 
framework using a two-step system GMM estimator, which allows us to obtain 
consistent estimators when the lagged dependent variable is included in the set of 
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controls. Further, this methodology is also effective in controlling for unobserved 
country-specific time-invariant effects. 
 
The primary findings are follows. First, I find significant evidence supporting an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between income and emission levels, known as the 
environmental Kuznets curve, for the full sample of countries. My findings also suggest 
that population levels and openness have positive and significant effects on emissions. 
This holds for both CO2 and SO2 emissions. However, the share of youth seems to have 
no statistically significant impact on emissions levels. When the differential effects of 
the determinants of CO2 and SO2 emissions across democratic and non-democratic 
regimes is examined, I find that the estimates of the baseline model hold for both 
political regimes with the exception of the per capita GDP squared term on CO2 
emissions which turns statistically insignificant for dictatorships. When the effects of 
the underlying determinants of air pollution are interacted with the level of income, the 
results suggest that the adverse impacts weaken as a country achieves higher levels of 
income. However, several differences across political regimes emerge. Specifically, the 
estimates display that the adverse impact of increasing levels of population on air 
quality is generally less strong under dictatorships than under democracies. Conversely, 
the adverse impact of greater trade openness is stronger under dictatorships than under 
democracies. Finally, the impact of youth on SO2 emissions turns out to be statistically 
significant for democracies only. Taken together, such findings suggest that empirical 
studies which simply include democracy in the set of explanatory variables are likely to 
yield an overly optimistic view of the effect of democracy on environmental quality.  
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates both theoretical and 
empirical works explaining the potential impact of the key factors on CO2 and SO2.  The 
empirical model along with the estimation method is presented in Section 3. Section 4 
describes the data used in this study. Section 5 displays the empirical findings.  Finally, 
Section 6 concludes the Chapter. 
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4.2.     Literature Review 
 
It is well established among scientists that increased emissions of CO2 and SO2 mainly 
result from anthropogenic factors.1 Among the driving forces underlying air pollution, 
the main ones are: (i) levels of production (proxied by income levels); (ii) population 
size; (iii) age structure; (iv) openness toward international trade; (v) political regime. 
This section provides a review of the literature on the impact of such factors on air 
pollution. 
 
4.2.1. Levels of income 
 
A large body of the literature has focused on the impact of economic growth processes 
on the environment.  The fundamental question is whether there is a trade-off between a 
process of sustained growth and environmental quality, or, on the contrary, whether 
economic growth is (or, at least, can be) part of the solution of environmental problems. 
  
About 40 years ago, Meadows et al. (1972) argued that economic growth is one of the 
major threats to environment quality. From a policy prospective, they suggest a steady-
state economy with zero growth in order to prevent the occurrence of ecological 
disasters in the future. However, these sort of pessimistic ideas about a trade-off 
between economic growth and environment quality have been criticised on several 
theoretical and empirical grounds. For example, Goodland and Ledec (1987) point out 
that “government concerned with long term sustainability need not seek limit growth in 
economic output so long as they stabilize aggregate natural resource consumption” (p. 
39). Other researchers take even more optimistic views, considering economic growth 
as a solution to environmental problems (e.g., Bhagwati, 1993). 
 
Empirical Studies 
 
On the empirical side, several studies such as Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992), 
Panayotou, (1993) and Grossman and Krueger (1993) have provided evidence that 
                                                            
1
 It should be noted that global emissions of SO2 emissions have decreased in the 1990s. However, the 
trend seems to have reversed afterward (see Smith et al. 2010).  
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while economic growth is detrimental to environment in the early stages of 
development, it leads to an improvement in the environment quality when a country has 
achieved a relatively high level of development. This inverted-U shaped relationship 
between the level of income and environment quality is known as the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve, hereafter EKC.  As quoted in the World Bank’s World Development 
Report 1992 (IBRD, 1992), according to the EKC advocates, “the view that grater 
economic activity hurts the environment is based on static assumptions about 
technology, tastes and environment investment” (p. 38).          
 
More recent studies on the relationship between income and environmental quality have 
provided mixed results. For example, Cavlovic et al. (2000) run a meta-analysis of a 
number of studies to explore the income turning point concerning the EKC. They find 
that the magnitude of the turning point is sensitive to methodological choices. They also 
find that the income turning point is higher for CO2 than for SO2. Likewise, Harbaugh et 
al. (2002) examine the relationship between air pollution and GDP per capita using two 
different datasets on SO2. They find that the empirical EKC is very sensitive to both the 
source of pollution data and econometric specifications. 
 
Perman and Stern (2003) test the EKC hypothesis in a cointegration framework using 
data on a sample of 72 countries. They find no evidence of an inverted-U shaped 
relationship between per capita income and SO2. Bertinelli and Strobl (2005) use a 
semi-parametric Kernel regressions method on CO2 and SO2 emissions data for 122 
countries covering the period from 1950-1990. They show that the relationship between 
air pollution and GDP per capita is (positively) linear.  
 
Galeotti et al. (2006) study how per capita GDP affects the level of emissions (CO2) 
separately for OECD and non-OECD countries. They find evidence in favour of the 
EKC only for the OECD countries. In contrast, they show that the relationship between 
GDP and the level of emissions is less pronounced (relatively slow concaved EKC 
curve) for non-OECD countries. 
 
Narayan and Narayan (2010) analyse the relationship between CO2 emissions and 
income per capita for a panel of 43 developing countries in the years between 1980 and 
2004. They find that the short-run income elasticity is bigger than the long-run elasticity 
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for about 35 percent of the countries included in the sample, providing some evidence 
for the existence of the EKC. In a recent paper, Hossain (2011) documents similar 
results for a panel of newly industrialized countries.  
 
To summarize, the existing empirical findings are generally in support of a statistically 
significant relationship between the level of income and air pollution. Yet the argument 
that growth eventually turns beneficial for environment remains controversial. Even in a 
win-win scenario where growth and environmental quality goes together, economic 
growth in itself does not seem to be a satisfactory way to solve the problem of 
environmental degradation.2   
 
4.2.2. Population 
 
Several studies in the literature have provided evidence of a significant impact of 
demographic factors such as population size, urbanization and age structure on 
environment quality.  The fundamental issue is whether rapid population growth would 
lead eventually to natural catastrophes, for example famine, due to increasing pressure 
on environmental resources.   
 
Scientific analysis of the relationship between population and environment was 
pioneered by Thomas Maulthus (1798) in “Essay on the Principle of Population”.  
Malthus’ popular view was that the growth of population would have outpaced food 
production which eventually results in a scarcity of natural resources. Debates in the 
1960s on the impact of demographic factors on the environment have revived the 
Malthusian tradition. For example, Ehrlich’s (1968) book “Population Bomb” warned 
of imminent worldwide episodes of famine as a consequence of the growing population. 
More recently, some scholars have pointed out that environment resources are not 
keeping pace with humankind needs (e.g., Daily and Ehrlich, 1992). On the other hand, 
some scholars have argued that it is likely that population pressure on environment 
resources would be counterbalanced by technological advances which improve 
humankind capabilities to cope with environmental issues (Boserup, 1981; Simon, 
1981).     
                                                            
2
 When mentioning Arrow et al. (1996), Cavlovic et al. (2000) points out that the “EKC relationship 
should not be interpreted as a substitute for environmental policy or institutional change” (p. 32). 
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Along with the effect of the size of pollution on environment quality, considerations on 
the age composition of population have also been raised recently. The impact of 
population on pollution might be heterogeneous across different age cohorts since 
consumption, work and leisure habits, recreational activities, and sensibility toward 
environmental problems substantially vary with age (Tonn et al., 2001). For example, 
the share of the working age population might have a higher impact on air pollution as 
compared to the younger and older shares of population. In addition, a higher share of 
youth could strengthen the environmental preferences of the older share of population in 
the pursuit of leaving a better environment for their children (intergenerational 
environmental altruism). 
 
Empirical Studies 
 
On empirical grounds, there is ample evidence showing a significant relationship 
between population and air quality. For example, Dietz and Rosa (1997) estimate a 
cross-section regression for year 1989 to examine the impact of population on CO2 
emissions for a large panel of countries. They find that emission levels are a positive 
linear function of population size. This implies that population affects air quality 
adversely. Further their results suggest that the emission levels turn to be a quadratic 
function of population when China and India are included in the sample.  
 
Shi (2003) uses a GLS estimation approach and examines the effect of size and age 
structure of population on CO2 for a dataset of 93 countries over the period from 1975 
to 1996. He finds that a higher percentage of working-age population leads to higher 
CO2 emission levels. With regard to population size, he finds that the effects on 
emissions are conditional to per capita income levels. Specifically, the impact is 
(positively) stronger in countries with low income levels as compared to countries with 
high income levels. 
  
York et al. (2003) run a cross country regression on CO2 emissions for 146 countries for 
the year 1996. They show that the impact of the share of population aged 15-65 is 
positive but statistically insignificant. Cole and Neumayer (2004) analyse the impact of 
a number of demographic factors on both CO2 and SO2 emissions. They find that the 
relationship between population and air pollution is linear for CO2 and U-shaped for 
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SO2. Their findings provide no evidence of a statistical significant impact of age 
structure on emission levels. 
 
Fan et al. (2006) analyse the effect of several variables including population and age 
composition on CO2 emissions for a large panel set of countries over the period 1975-
2000. Their findings suggest that the impact of population size and age composition 
varies at different income levels. Specifically, they show that the impact of population 
on emissions is stronger for the sample upper-middle income countries, and it is weaker 
for the lower middle income cohort. They also document a negative effect of population 
aged 15-64 on emissions at the high income level, while the effect turns positive for 
poorer countries.  
 
Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2007) analyse the impact of population growth on CO2 
emissions in European Union countries during the period 1975-1999. Their results 
indicate that the detrimental impact of population growth is higher for new members of 
the EU compared to the old EU members – the former being less rich than the latter, on 
average. Using SO2 emissions data from Stern (2005), Menz and Kuhling (2011) 
estimate the impact of the share of young population on air pollution for a panel of 25 
OECD countries. Their analysis covers the period from 1970-2000. They find a 
negative relationship between the share of the population under 15 years and emission 
levels. They also show that this negative effect weakens as income per capita increases.  
 
Overall, the empirical analysis does provide evidence of significant effects of 
population on air pollution. However, the severity of this impact is likely to be 
heterogeneous across countries depending on the level of income. Furthermore, other 
demographic factors, particularly age structure, might also be significant in affecting air 
pollution.  
 
4.2.3. International trade 
 
Trade openness is another important determinant of air pollution.  A large number of 
studies have shown that there is a significant relationship between international trade 
and both CO2 and SO2.  In principle, it is possible that free trade might have both 
positive and negative effects on emissions levels.   
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Many scholars have pointed out that free trade activities lead some countries to exploit a 
comparative advantage in “dirty production”. For example, according to the pollution 
heaven hypothesis (PHH henceforth) the trade of “dirty goods” leads pollution intensive 
industries to relocate in countries with low environmental standards, namely poor 
countries (e.g., Saint-Paul, 1994; Copeland and Taylor 1995).3 However, according to 
the factor endowment hypothesis, dirty production is likely to move in countries with 
high capital to labour ratio, not necessarily to the poorer countries (e.g., Antweiler et al., 
2001). Moreover, if countries relax their environmental regulation to avoid an outflow 
of capital, then free trade might trigger a race to the bottom (Daly, 1993). Another 
strand of the literature argues that trade is good for the environment because it 
encourages the diffusion of clean technology and extends environmental consciousness 
around the globe (Bhagwati, 1993). 
 
Empirical Studies 
 
Earlier empirical studies have found that trade is good for air quality. For example, 
Grossman and Krueger (1993) use the dataset collected by the Global Environmental 
Monitoring System (GEMS) to estimate the impact of trade policy on SO2 emissions for 
a number of countries. Using total trade to GDP ratio as a proxy for trade openness, 
they show that countries with higher levels of trade have lower levels of emissions.  
Similar results are found by Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992), who focus on the 
impact of trade on SO2 emissions for a panel of 149 countries spanning the years 
between 1960 and 1990.  
 
Recent studies examine the conditional impact of trade openness on air quality, 
depending on the level of income. For example, Heil and Selden (2001) allow the 
impact of trade on carbon emissions to vary with the level of income by interacting 
trade intensity with per capita GDP. They use data for a panel of 132 countries between 
the period 1950 and 1992.  They find that the effect of trade on air pollution is 
asymmetric across different level of income. Specifically, their results show that while 
                                                            
3
 It is interesting to note that if the PHH holds then the EKC scenario provides overly optimistic forecasts 
of emission trend in relatively poor countries. Specifically, once higher levels of income will be achieved, 
these countries will find no locations beyond their national borders where to transfer polluted activities. 
As a result the income turning point for these countries might be considerably higher as compared to the 
level found by current statistical estimates (see Kearsley and Riddel, 2010). 
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trade openness leads to higher emissions in poorer countries, it is likely to reduce the 
level of emissions in relatively richer countries.  
 
Cole (2004) tests the PHH using several different measures of pollution for USA, Asia, 
UK, Latin America and Japan. His analysis covers the period from 1980 to 1997. Cole 
uses two variables, namely, the ratio of dirty exports to total exports in non-OECD 
countries and the ratio of dirty imports to total imports from the non-OCED countries.  
Their results provide evidence in favour of the PHH for 2 (SO2 and biological oxygen 
demand) out of 10 pollutants.  
 
Managi (2004), using the instrumental variable estimation method, examines the impact 
of trade on CO2 emissions for a panel of 60 countries, covering the time span from 
1960-1990. He finds that higher levels of trade lead to higher emission levels of CO2. 
Moreover, his findings show that the adverse impact of trade on environment increases 
as the level of income increases. 
 
Frankel and Rose (2005) quantify the effect of trade openness on air pollution for a 
panel of about 40 countries in 1990. They find evidence that trade has a significant 
negative effect on SO2 emissions, while the impact on CO2 is statistically insignificant.  
They also document that the negative relationship between trade and SO2 emissions 
weakens as the level of income increases. This implies that the environmentally 
beneficial effect of trade is stronger for poor countries as compared to richer countries. 
 
Managi et al. (2009) use a first difference GMM estimator to analyse the impact of trade 
on SO2 and CO2 emissions for a panel of 88 countries. The study covers the period from 
1973 to 2000. They find that for OECD countries, trade openness has a statistically 
significant negative impact on the level of SO2 and CO2 emissions. However, they find 
evidence of adverse effects of trade on air quality for non-OECD countries.   
 
Kearsley and Riddel (2010) study how trade affects CO2 emissions for a panel of 27 
OECD countries over the years between 1980 and 2004. Their findings provide no 
evidence of a statistically significant impact of trade on emissions. Similar evidence is 
documented by Sharma (2011), who examines the effect of trade on CO2 separately for 
the samples of high, middle and low income countries.   
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To summarise, empirical evidence, with some exceptions, generally seems in support of 
a significant relationship between international trade and air pollution.  However, there 
is no general consensus on whether the net effect is generally bad or good for the 
environment. Further, it seems that the impact of trade on air pollution is asymmetric 
across different levels of income.   
 
4.2.4. Socio-Political regime 
 
Since the characteristics of environmental quality, such as clean air and preservation of 
forest, are those of a public good, markets are unable to provide the optimal level of 
them. Some kind of state intervention is therefore necessary to overcome market 
failures. A large body of the literature has analysed whether countries with democratic 
institutions are more concerned with environmental issues as compared to non-
democratic countries.  
 
Because of electoral accountability, one would expect that democracies tend to meet 
higher environmental standards than dictatorships (Payne, 1995; Li and Reuveny, 
2006). On the other hand, the literature also provides some theoretical arguments in 
favour of dictatorships. One line of reasoning is based on the relative size of the 
national income share accruing to the actors who have a pivotal role in matter of the 
political process, namely the ruling elite in a dictatorship and the median voter in a 
democracy. It is likely that the share of national income held by the ruling elite is 
substantially bigger than the share detained by the median voter. To the extent that 
environment is a normal good, dictatorships might well show more concerns toward 
environmental issues as compared to democracies (Congleton, 1992).   
 
Another argument in favour of dictatorships derives from a critique of electoral 
accountability as a mechanism that provides the stimulus to preservation of the 
environment (Bernaeur and Koubi, 2009). While the benefits from stricter 
environmental policies on air pollution manifest in the long run, the costs associated 
with them materialize in the short term. This means that a myopic voter will not reward 
a pro-environment policy maker. On the other hand, if the ruling elite has a strong hold 
on power, an authoritarian regime might be in a better position to implement 
environmental policy precisely because, unlike democracies, the dictator face no 
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elections.4 In a similar vein others scholars, such as Hardin (1968) and Heilbronner 
(1974), suggest that democracies dare not impose “harsh” measures that counteract the 
individual’s inclination to over exploit public resources. In this view, only dictatorships 
are capable of doing so.  
 
Empirical Studies 
 
Looking at the empirical evidence, we find that most of the prior studies, such as Torras 
and Boyce (1998), Scruggs (1998), Barrett and Graddy (2000), Gleditsch and Sverdrup 
(2003), Bernaeur and Koubi (2009) and Arvin and Lew (2011), have documented that 
democracy is good for environment quality. However, a few studies, such as Midlarsky 
(1998) and Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992) provide evidence of a detrimental impact 
of democracy in terms of relatively high CO2 and SO2 emission levels. Midlarsky 
(1998) run a cross-section analysis on CO2 emissions for a sample of 98 countries for 
the year 1990. He finds that more democratic countries are associated with higher levels 
of CO2 emissions. Similar results are found by Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992) for 
SO2 emissions. 
 
Barrett and Graddy (2000) estimates the effects of the level of democracy on SO2 
emissions for a pooled sample of countries over a period of 33 years. As a measure of 
democracy they use the Freedom House indexes of political and civil freedoms which 
rank countries on a scale from 1 to 7, where 7 is the lowest level of freedom. Their 
findings suggest that higher levels of democracy lead to lower SO2 emissions. 
 
Gleditsch and Sverdrup (2003) examine the impact of political regimes on per capita 
CO2 emissions for a sample of 108 countries in 1990. They use a categorical variable 
for political regime based on a dichotomization of the Polity index of democracy. Their 
analysis suggests that democratic countries have lower CO2 emissions than non-
democratic countries.   
 
Farzin and Bond (2006) use a fixed effects model for a panel of countries to study the 
effect of the degree of democracy on air pollution. They use both CO2 and SO2 
                                                            
4
 It has to been noted that this argument in favour of dictatorships assumes that environment figures into 
the dictator’s objective function.  
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emissions as a measure of air pollution in their analysis. Their set of explanatory 
variables includes interaction terms with per capita GDP as well as the degree of 
democracy. They show that at low levels of income, an increase in the level of 
democracy leads to higher CO2 and SO2 emissions. However, this effect weakens and 
even turns negative as income rises.  Similarly,  Li and Reuveny (2006) focusing on a 
panel of 143 countries from 1961 to 1997 show that more democratic countries produce 
lower CO2 emissions per capita.  
 
Bernaeur and Koubi (2009) quantify the impact of democracy on SO2 concentrations for 
a panel of 42 countries over a time period between 1971 and 1996. They employ both 
fixed and random effects methods to estimate their empirical models. They use Bueno 
de Mesquita et al.'s (2003) measure of democracy as well as the civil liberties index 
constructed by the Freedom House as a proxy for interest groups’ power. They find that 
higher degree of democracy is good for the environment. In contrast, the coefficient of 
civil liberties is positive, but it appears to be statistically insignificant. 
 
Recently, Arvin and Lew (2011) study whether the effect of democracy on CO2 differs 
across different levels of income as well as across different geographical regions. They 
use a panel of 141 countries between 1976 and 2003. They find that the effect of 
democracy on pollution is negative and statistically significant for the sample of 
middle-income economies while the impact turns statistically insignificant for the 
samples of high and low income countries.    
 
4.3.     The Model 
 
On the theoretical side, the impact of democratic institutions on the environment is 
ambiguous, yet the large majority of previous studies find that democracies perform 
better than dictatorships, at least for CO2 and SO2 emissions: countries with higher 
levels of democracy are shown to emit lower levels of emissions.   
 
All the afore-mentioned studies are based on a reduced-form model which examines the 
direct effect of democracy on an environmental outcome. One problem with this 
approach is that pollution is closely related with a plethora of factors including 
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population, the level of production and technological progress. Simply including these 
factors in the set of control variables might not be a satisfactory approach to assess the 
role played by the political regime in environmental issues. I believe that democracies 
affect environmental outcomes, if at all, indirectly, by promoting legislation and 
environmental-friendly behaviour which effectively mitigate (strengthen) the adverse 
(beneficial) impacts of the driving forces underlying environmental degradation 
(protection).  
 
For this reason, the hypothesis of homogeneity of the environmental impact of the 
driving forces across political regimes, which is implicit in previous studies, should be 
questioned. Indeed, the role played by democracy might be better assessed precisely by 
looking at differential effect in the relationship between the driving forces and 
environmental quality across democracies and dictatorships. One partial exception is 
Farzin and Bond (2006), who has studied the interaction terms between the policy 
variable and a set of other explanatory variables.  I differ from their study mainly in two 
ways. First, rather than focusing on the degree of democracy, I use a dichotomous index 
of political regime which allows us to assess difference in effects across different kinds 
of political regime. Using a minimalist definition of democracy allows us to avoid the 
conceptual and methodological problems associated with the operationalization of the 
degree of democracy. Second, unlike Farzin and Bond (2006), I allow the emission 
levels to depend on their values in previous period to account for inertial effect. To do 
so I employ a technique precisely designed for dealing with dynamic models, namely 
system GMM estimator.  
 
The empirical model along with the estimation technique used in the current study is 
displayed in this section. Data on political regime are illustrated in the next section.  
 
4.3.1. The Empirical Model 
 
Following prior studies that examine the determinants of air pollution, I start the 
empirical investigation by estimating the following model for the full sample of 
countries.  
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2
, 0 , 1 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , ,    (1)i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i i tE E GDP GDP Pop Youth Open Tα γ γ γ γ γ γ δ ψ ε−= + + + + + + + + +
  
where subscript i  represents country and t  represents time period. 
,i tE  is the emission 
levels of the air pollutant. I consider two measures of air pollution, namely CO2 and 
SO2. The fundamental difference between these two measures of air quality is that the 
adverse effects of CO2 are global in nature while SO2 is primarily a local externality 
(Farzin and Bond, 2006, and the reference cited therein). 
,i tGDP is the level of per capita 
income of country i  at time t . 
,i tPop  denotes the size of population, ,i tYouth   is the 
share of population under age of 15 and 
,i tOpen  is the ratio of total trade (exports plus 
imports) to GDP as a proxy for openness.5 In keeping with previous studies, the 
exogenous component of technological progress is proxied by a linear time trend 
variable  (e.g. Bernaeur and Koubi, 2009; Farzin and Bond, 2006). The lagged-
dependent variable is included in the right-hand side of the regression to account for 
inertia of environmental degradation (Li and Reuveny, 2006; Managi et al., 2009). iψ is 
a vector of country-specific time-invariant factors  and 
,i tε  represents the disturbance 
process.  
 
The selection of the explanatory variables is based on previous theoretical and empirical 
works (please see the literature review, section 4.2). There are other important factors, 
such as urbanization, the average household size and energy intensity which underlie 
emissions (e.g. Sharma, 2011; Poumanyvong and Kaneko, 2010; Cole and Neumayer, 
2004). However, these factors are strongly correlated with the variables which have 
been included in Equation (1), particularly income levels (Menz and Kühling, 2011; 
Liddle and Lung, 2010; Zhao and Zhang, 2009). Thus, I am confident that the set of 
explanatory variables is picking up the main forces which affect the anthropogenic 
emissions of CO2 and SO2.  
 
                                                            
5
 There are other measures, such as the Dollar index and the parallel market exchange rate, to proxy for 
trade openness (see, for example, Shafik and Bandyopadhyay, 1992). I chose the share of trade in terms 
of GDP because its coverage of country is wider than alternative indices of openness. Sharma (2011), 
Kearsley and Riddel (2010) and Managi et al. (2009), among others, have used this index to assess the 
impact of openness on emissions. 
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All variables are measured in natural logarithms in keeping with the STIRPAT 
empirical literature.6 This model can be viewed as the baseline specification. Whether a 
particular factor is good or bad for the environment depends on the sign and the 
statistical significance of the associated coefficient. A positive sign means that the 
factor under analysis exacerbates environmental degradation. Conversely, a negative 
sign means that the factor improves environmental quality. Since all the variables are in 
logarithm form the coefficients are empirical estimates of the elasticities of emissions 
with the exception of the income level. For instance, 3γ is a measure of the 
responsiveness of emission levels to a change in population size. With regard to per 
capita GDP, an inverted U-shaped relationship between income and air pollution (the 
EKC) arises if 1 0γ >   and 2 0γ <  and both are statistically significant. The inclusion of 
the quadratic term complicates the interpretation of the income elasticity. The income 
elasticity of emissions indeed varies depending on the level of GDP. 
 
4.3.2. The Differential Effects of the Determinants of Air Pollution across 
Political Regimes 
 
To account for differential effects across political regimes, I generate the following two 
dummies:
,
D
i tPR , which is equal to one if the country i  is classified as democratic in year 
t
 and zero otherwise;  and 
,
N
i tPR , which is equal to one if the country i  is classified as 
dictatorship in year t  and zero otherwise. Therefore, by construction,
, ,
1D Ni t i tPR PR+ = , 
where 1  is a vector of all ones. I then interact these two dummies with the explanatory 
variables.  Specifically, I estimate the following model:   
 
( )2, 0 , 1 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , ,Di t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tE E GDP GDP Pop Youth Open PRα γ α α α α α−= + + + + + +
 
        
( )21 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , , ,Ni t i t i t i t i t i t i i tGDP GDP Pop Youth Open PR Tβ β β β β δ ψ ε+ + + + + + + +       (2)                                                                                                                          
 
 Equation (2) allows us to capture differential effects of the underlying determinants of 
emissions across political regimes; if jα is different from the corresponding coefficient 
                                                            
6
 The STIRPAT model is the stochastic generalization of the IPAT identity (Impacts by Regression on 
Population, Affluence, and Technology) which emphasizes the environmental impact of three factors, 
namely population, affluence (production) and technology. See York et al. (2003) for more details on the 
IPAT model and empirical application.   
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jβ  in terms of sign and/or statistical significance, then there is evidence of a differential 
effect. Specifically, one could infer that democracy provides more environmental 
protection (or less environmental pollution) as compared to its autocratic counterpart if 
estimation of Equation (2) yields one of the two following outcomes:  
 
i) jα is negative and statistically significant for democracies while jβ is statistically 
insignificant or, if it is significant, has a positive sign. 
ii) jα is statistically insignificant for democracies whereas jβ is positive and 
statistically significant for dictatorships. 
 
On the other hand, an outcome such as 0jα >  and 0jβ < (both statistically significant), 
would indicate that dictatorships are more environmentally friendly than democracies. 
Still other scenarios, such as jα and jβ  both statistically significant with the same sign, 
would tell us that political regime play no relevant role in shaping the environmental 
impact of the driving force under study.  
                              
4.3.3. The Differential Effects of the Determinants of Air Pollution across 
Different Levels of Income and Different Political Regimes 
 
Estimation of Equations (1) and (2) assumes that the effects of the underlying 
determinants of air pollution are homogenous across different income levels. However, 
as documented in the literature review, a number of empirical studies, such as Heil and 
Selden (2001), Shi (2003), Fan et al. (2006), Farzin and Bond (2006), Martínez-Zarzoso 
et al. (2007),  Managi et al. (2009), and Menz and Kühling (2011), have documented 
that the impact of socio-economic factors varies at different levels of income.  Thus, to 
account for such differential effect across different income levels, I augment Equation 
(2) by interacting the explanatory variables (population size, youth and openness) with 
the level of per capita GDP. Specifically, the model takes the following form:    
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( )2, 0 , 1 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , ,Di t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tE E GDP GDP Pop Youth Open PRα γ α α α α α−= + + + + + +
     
     
( ) (21 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , , 6 ,Ni t i t i t i t i t i t i tGDP GDP Pop Youth Open PR Popβ β β β β α+ + + + + +
        
     
) ( )7 , 8 , , , 6 , 7 , 8 , ,D Ni t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tYouth Open PR GDP Pop Youth Open PRα α β β β+ + ⋅ + + +
                                                                                                                             
         
, ,i t i i tGDP Tδ ψ ε+ + +                                                                                              (3) 
 
Whether the impact of the specific factor on emission levels weakens or strengthens as 
income increases depends on the sign and the statistical significance of the interaction 
term between the variable and per capita GDP. For example, if both 4α  ( 4β ) and 7α
     
( 7β ) estimates have the same sign and appear statistically significant then the predicted 
effects of youth on emissions levels would be larger at higher levels of income in 
democracies (dictatorships). On the other hand, if both estimates enter into the model 
with opposite (regardless of positive or negative) signs then a rise in income level 
would reduce the total effect of youth on emissions.  The model given in Equation (3) 
not only allows for the differential effects of the explanatory variables across political 
regimes but it also enables us to examine whether these differential effects are 
conditional on income levels.  
 
4.3.4. Estimation Method 
 
In the literature, researchers have applied different estimators to quantify the effect of 
explanatory variables on air pollution.  For instance, some studies, such as Torras and 
Boyce (1998), Li and Reuveny (2006) and Bernaur and Koubi (2009) have used OLS, 
Fixed effect and Random effect while others, such as Taskin and Zaim (2000) and 
Bertinelli and Strobl (2005), have utilized semi- or non-parametric methods.  
 
Given the dynamic context of the empirical model, I use a two-step system GMM 
estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). The OLS estimation of Equation (1) 
yields inconsistent estimates because of the presence of unobserved and time-invariant 
country-specific factors,
 
iψ .To overcome the omitted variable problem, the common 
approach is to apply the within estimators. Specifically, such technique applies OLS 
estimation on demeaned data. Although the within estimator is effective in removing the 
unobserved fixed effects, these estimators yield a downward biased estimate of the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (Nickell, 1981). Further, the coefficients of 
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other explanatory variables might also be biased if these are correlated with the lagged 
dependent variable (Baum, 2006).  
 
The differenced estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is a solution to this 
problem. Specifically, this estimator is robust to the bias introduced by the lagged 
dependent variable. Further, it also controls for potential endogeneity in the independent 
variables by using their lagged values as instruments in the estimation. More 
specifically, in Arellano and Bond fashion, the Equation (1) can be rewritten as follows: 
 
2
, 0 , 1 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , ,i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tE E GDP GDP Pop Youth Openγ γ γ γ γ γ ε−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆% % % % % % %
   
(4) 
 
In Equation (4) all the variables are now expressed as first differences. The first 
differenced GMM estimator uses lagged levels dated 2t −
 
and earlier as instruments. 
 
It is important to note that the Arellano and Bond estimator suffers from a “weak” 
instruments problem when the dependent variable is highly persistent over time 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998). Arellano and Bover (1995) provide a solution for this 
problem by elaborating a system GMM estimator later fully developed by Blundell and 
Bond (1998). Specifically, the system GMM estimator runs simultaneously both an 
equation in levels (Equation 1) and an equation in first differences (Equation 4).  This 
technique effectively overcomes the problem of weak instruments by using the 
additional moment conditions for the levels equation.  
 
The consistency of the system GMM estimation depends on the absence of the 
autocorrelation in the residuals. I test this by applying the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
AR(2) test.  Given the nature of the model, it is very likely that the residuals exhibit first 
order correlation. However, the first-differenced residuals are expected not to display 
second-order serial correlation. An additional assumption that has to be satisfied for the 
GMM estimator to be consistent is that the instruments are appropriately uncorrelated 
with the disturbance process. This is tested by using the J test for overidentifying 
restrictions developed by Hansen (1982).  
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4.4.     Data and Variable Definitions 
 
In this section I describe the sample and discuss data sources. I also provide definitions 
of the dependent variables and give some explanations of the index used for classifying 
political regimes. Definitions of the remaining variables in the analysis and data sources 
are given in Table C.1 in Appendix.   
 
4.4.1. The Sample 
 
This study is based on a fairly large unbalanced panel of both democratic and non-
democratic countries. The size of panel varies according to the dependent variables, 
namely CO2 and SO2 emissions.  Specifically, I construct the dataset for a total of 138 
countries for the years between 1961 and 2007 for CO2 emissions. For SO2 emissions, 
the sample consists of 116 countries over the time period from 1961 to 2005. The 
samples have been selected to include only countries that have no missing data on the 
variables used in the analysis.  
 
Approximately 46.7 (50) per cent of the country-year observations are classified as 
democratic in the CO2 sample (SO2 sample). Of the 138 (116) countries included in the 
CO2 (SO2) sample, 51 (41) have experienced at least one regime transitions over the 
examined period. The list of sample countries is given in Table C.2 in Appendix.  
 
4.4.2. CO2 Emissions 
 
I use the log of CO2 emissions as a measure of air pollution.7 Data on CO2 emissions are 
obtained from World Development Indicators database developed by the World Bank. 
Specifically, the data on CO2 emissions is collected by the Carbon Dioxide Information 
Analysis Centre, Environmental Sciences Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 
Tennessee, the United States. This data is made available by the World Bank.  
 
Emissions of CO2 are one of the main components of greenhouse gases which result in 
global warming and change in the overall climate. The main source of the emission of 
                                                            
7
 The extent of the emissions of CO2 in air is measured in Kilotons.   
138 
 
carbon dioxide is the combustion of fossil fuels. The emissions of CO2 have risen by 
approximately 1.9% per year during the last three decades. The estimated figures for 
2030 are between 40% and 110% higher than emission levels in 2000 (IPCC, 2007).  
 
4.4.3. SO2 Emissions 
 
I also use another measure of air pollution, namely sulphur dioxide (SO2). Specifically, 
I use the natural logarithm of SO2 emissions.8 Unlike CO2 emissions, SO2 is a local 
pollutant. The combustion of coal and petroleum is the main source of SO2 emissions. 
SO2 considerably contributes to smog and localized air pollution and acid rain. 
Emissions levels of SO2 declined since the mid of the 1970s until 2000 with a reversal 
in the trend afterward (Smith et al., 2010).    
 
The data are obtained by Smith et al. (2010) who provide estimates of global and 
country-level sulphur dioxide anthropogenic emissions for the period 1850-2005. The 
emissions have been constructed using calibrated country-level inventories data 
compiled from a large variety of sources.9 
 
4.4.4. Political Regime 
 
To examine the differential effect of the driving forces underlying CO2 and SO2 
emissions across different political regimes, I use the index of democracy constructed 
by Alvarez et al. (1996) and later extended by Cheibub et al. (2010) in terms of both 
time and coverage of countries. This index is a binary variable which takes value one if 
the country is classified as democratic and zero if the country is classified as non-
democratic. The criteria underling regime classification has already been illustrated in 
Chapter One. This subsection explains further why I prefer this index to alternative 
operationalizations of political regime.   
 
                                                            
8
 SO2 emissions are measured in gigagram (Gg).  
9
 See Smith et al. (2010) for more details on the construction of the dataset.  
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One common critique to the measure from Cheibub et al. is that the coding rules are 
based on a minimalist definition of democracy and, as such, they are incomplete. 10 For 
example, it can be argued that the presence of contested election is not enough to call a 
regime as democratic. In addition, categorical indices cannot accounts for cases of 
countries being more democratic than others. For these reasons, some researchers 
advocate the use of continuous indices, such as the Freedom House and the Policy 
Index, based on maximalist definitions of democracy. According to these indices, 
regimes differ with each other in the “degree” of democracy.  However, maximalist 
definitions of democracy and continuous indices entail even more serious problems than 
minimalist indices. The fact that some countries are more democratic than other by no 
means implies that democracy is an intrinsic attribute of all regimes. To argue that all 
countries have some positive degrees of democracy or, saying that a country is less 
democratic than another, seems to make not much sense in cases such as China in the 
1970s, Pinochet’s Chile and the military’s Brazil. After all, although the presence of 
contested elections is not sufficient, it is nonetheless a necessary condition to give a 
political regime any feature of democracy.  
 
In addition, maximalist definition of democracy blunders the boundary line between 
political regime and a desirable output. For example, when defining democracy as a 
regime where the ruler is held accountable by the electorate, rather than testing, one is 
assuming that a regime based on the majority rule works in line with the public interest. 
Moreover, the coding and aggregation rules to construct continuous indices are often 
unclear and embody a high degree of subjective judgement (e.g. Arndt and Oman, 
2006). Obtaining all the pieces of information required for their construction is such a 
hard task that the coding of democracy sometime seems to be based on guesses 
(Cheibub et al., 2010). In contrast, the coding rules underlying the Cheibub et al.’s 
index are transparent and the information they require is relatively easy to obtain. 
Although there might be cases which are not easy to be classified as democratic or not, 
the classification, once done, is unambiguous (either democracy or dictatorship).11 If the 
                                                            
10
 All the conceptual and methodological issues discussed in the current context have been taken from 
Cheibub et al. (2010). For a painstaking illustration of these and other problems underlying alternative 
indices of democracy, the reader could also consult Munck and Verkuilen (2002) and Arndt and Oman 
(2006).  
11
 Li and Reuveny (2006) have used a discrete cut-off from the Polity index to categorize political 
regimes in democracy and dictatorships. I still prefer Cheibub et al.’s index because there are no 
theoretical reason to select any specific threshold on a scale of -10 to 10.   
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researcher does not agree with the classification of some countries, she still can 
reclassify these cases according to her view (dictatorship instead of democracy and vice 
versa).  
 
To conclude, although a minimalist index of democracy has several limitations, I 
believe, in line with Cheibub et al. (2010), that for practical purposes, continuous 
indices of democracy do not offer a valid alternative. For this reason, I prefer to focus 
on the kind of political regime rather than the degree of democracy.  
 
4.5.     Empirical Findings 
4.5.1. Summary Statistics and Correlation Estimates  
 
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for the full sample, as well as for both 
democracies and non-democracies, based on CO2 data availability. Specifically, the 
table reports means, standard deviations (in parenthesis) and a t-test on the equality of 
means across democracies and dictatorships.  
 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics - CO2 
Variables Full Sample Democracy Dictatorship  t-test             (p-value) 
CO2 9.301 10.161 8.547 0.000 
  (2.411) (2.115) (2.402)   
GDP 8.366 9.038 7.777 0.000 
  (1.283) (1.090) (1.142) 
Pop 15.869 15.964 15.786 0.000 
  (1.664) (1.698) (1.630)   
Youth 3.512 3.321 3.679 0.000 
  (0.332) (0.341) (0.212)   
Open 3.994 3.996 3.992 0.853 
  (0.716) (0.670) (0.754)   
Notes: The table illustrates the means of the variables used in the analysis (standard deviation in 
parentheses). The last column reports the p-values from the t-tests on the equality of means across 
democracies and dictatorships. 
 
The mean value of CO2 for the full sample is 9.30. On average, the level of CO2 
emissions is smaller in non-democracies as compared to their democratic counterparts. 
The average income (log of per capita GDP) for the democracy sample is 9.04, while 
the corresponding figure for the non-democratic sample is 7.78. This implies that 
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countries with a democratic political system have on average higher income levels as 
compared to non-democratic countries over the examined period. Average population is 
slightly higher in the sample of democratic countries as compared to the sample of non-
democratic countries. Regarding youth, the table indicates that the share of young 
population on average is higher in non-democratic countries than in democratic 
countries. However, there is no significant difference in the average of the trade 
openness measure across political regimes.   
 
Table 4.2 presents summary statistics for the sample based on the availability of SO2 
data. The average value of SO2 is 4.85 for the full sample of countries. The differences 
in variables across political regimes are similar to the case of CO2. The only exception 
is population, for which the difference in the means across democracies and non-
democracies is now statistically insignificant.  
 
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics - SO2 
Variables Full Sample Democracy Dictatorship t-test             (p-value) 
SO2 4.850 5.249 4.453 0.000 
  (2.022) (1.903) (2.058)   
GDP 8.561 9.138 7.986 0.000 
  (1.202) (0.991) (1.116) 
Pop 16.122 16.121 16.124 0.942 
  (1.572) (1.629) (1.513)   
Youth 3.482 3.304 3.661 0.000 
  (0.333) (0.330) (0.221)   
Open 3.931 3.922 3.941 0.399 
  (0.726) (0.674) (0.774)   
Notes: The table illustrates the means of the variables used in the analysis (standard deviation in 
parentheses). The last column reports the p-values from the t-tests on the equality of means across 
democracies and dictatorships. 
 
To have some preliminary evidence on the interactions between the measures of air 
quality and other explanatory variables, I estimate simple correlations. Tables 4.3 and 
4.4 present the estimates of correlation for CO2 and SO2, respectively.  
 
In both tables, column 1 reports correlations for the full sample of countries, while 
columns 2 and 3 report the correlations estimates for democratic and non-democratic 
samples, respectively. The estimates reveal that both the level of income and the size of 
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population are positively correlated with emission levels, while the correlation between 
emission levels, youth and openness is negative. From these figures it seems that both 
income and population levels have an adverse impact on air quality. Conversely, the 
environmental impact of youth and openness appears to be beneficial. These estimates 
of correlation hold for both the full sample as well as the samples of democracies and 
non-democracies, though the magnitude of coefficients differs across political regimes, 
particularly for openness.  
 
Table 4.3: Correlation Matrix - CO2 
Variables Full Sample Democracy Dictatorship 
GDP 0.587 0.487 0.538 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pop 0.684 0.761 0.670 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Youth -0.561 -0.494 -0.511 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Open -0.228 -0.476 -0.083 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: The table shows simple correlations between CO2 emissions and explanatory variables (p-
values in parentheses). 
 
 
 
Table 4.4: Correlation Matrix - SO2 
Variables Full Sample Democracy Dictatorship 
GDP 0.345 0.272 0.308 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pop 0.672 0.733 0.642 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Youth -0.390 -0.295 -0.434 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Open -0.362 -0.554 -0.217 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: The table shows simple correlations between SO2 emissions and explanatory variables (p-values 
in parentheses). 
 
 
4.5.2. Estimation Results 
Benchmark Model 
 
The empirical findings from the baseline model, as shown in Equation (1), are given in 
Panel A of Table 4.5. Models 1 and 2 display the empirical estimates of the driving 
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forces of CO2 and SO2 emissions, respectively. Panel B of the table reports diagnostic 
tests. The AR(2) test rules out second-order serial correlation of the residual terms. 
Further, the Hansen test does not reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between the 
instruments and the residuals. Therefore, I am confident that the GMM estimator is 
yielding consistent estimates. 
 
The estimated coefficient of per capita GDP is positive and statistically significant, 
while the estimate of the square of per capita GDP is negative and statistically 
significant for CO2. These findings are in line with the literature on the EKC and 
suggest that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the level of income and 
emission levels.  
 
Table 4.5: System GMM Estimates on the Determinants of CO2 and SO2 -  
Full Sample 
Panel A: Estimation Results 
  
Model 1 (CO2) Model 2 (SO2) 
,i tGDP  0.318*** (0.101) 0.324*** (0.117) 
2
,i tGDP  -0.015*** (0.005) -0.018*** (0.007) 
,i tPop  0.081*** (0.018) 0.029** (0.014)    
,i tYouth  0.025 (0.027)    0.056 (0.035)    
,i tOpen  0.096*** (0.023) 0.051** (0.023)    
, 1i tE −  0.944*** (0.015) 0.983*** (0.012) 
Trend  -0.003*** (0.001) -0.002*** (0.001) 
Constant  -2.696*** (0.586)  -2.071*** (0.599) 
Panel B: Diagnostic Tests 
AR(2) 0.448 0.932 
Hansen test 0.141 0.128 
Observations 5222 4047 
Countries 
  138   116 
Instruments 
    35     53 
Notes: The table shows the main determinants of emission levels. Panel A reports the estimates 
obtained from robust two-step system GMM estimations. The figures given in parentheses are 
standard errors which are asymptotically robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation within panels. Model 1 estimates the determinants of CO2. Model 2 estimates the 
determinants of SO2. Panel B reports the p-values of the Hansen test and the Arellano and Bond test. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
As expected, the results from Model 1 indicate that the level of emissions is positively 
and statistically significantly related to the size of population. This suggests that the 
higher the level of population, the higher the level of emissions. This result is consistent 
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with the findings of Dietz and Rosa (1997), Shi (2003) and Fan et al. (2006), who also 
document a positive relationship between emission levels and population size. The 
coefficient associated with population, approximately 0.08, is well below 1. This 
finding strongly rejects the hypothesis of unitary elasticity of population which is 
implicit in regressions where the dependent variable is emissions per capita.  
   
The results given in Table 4.5 also provide evidence of a significant relationship 
between CO2 emissions and trade openness. Specifically, the estimated coefficient of 
trade openness is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that rising levels of 
international trade have adverse effects on air quality. This result agree with the 
empirical works of Heil and Selden (2001), Managi (2004) and Cole and Elliott (2004), 
who also find a positive impact of trade openness on CO2 emissions levels. I also find 
that the share of population aged below 15 is positively associated with CO2 emissions. 
One possible explanation is that youth have relative high propensity of consumption in 
energy intensive sectors. However, the coefficient fails to achieve the standard levels of 
significance. This finding is in line with York et al. (2003) and Cole and Neumayer 
(2004) who show that age structure affects neither the level of CO2 nor SO2 emissions.  
 
The results also indicate that there is high persistence in emission levels as the 
coefficient of one-period lagged emissions is positive and statistically significant.12 
These results agree with Li and Reuveny (2006) and Managi et al. (2009) who also find 
evidence of inertia in emissions. In line with empirical works such as Grossman and 
Krueger (1993) and Farzin and Bond (2006), the results show that the coefficient of 
time trend is negative and statistically significant. Such a downward trend might reflect 
rising environmental awareness and technological progress which has been made to 
curb emissions on a worldwide scale.     
 
Turning to SO2 emissions, Model 2 shows that the sign and statistical significance of the 
explanatory variables are similar to those obtained in Model 1. Specifically, both 
population and openness have a positive and statistically significant impact on SO2 
                                                            
12
 One might question the validity of the baseline results as the estimate of the lagged of dependent 
variables is close to one, particularly in case of Model 2. However, this is not the case as I applied system 
GMM estimator which effectively accounts for persistence in dependent variable. For further ensuring the 
validity of the estimates, I have run a Fisher-type panel unit root test. The test does not provide any 
significant evidence of the existence of unit root problems in the underlying series.  
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emissions while the impact of youth is statistically insignificant. The main difference 
between CO2 and SO2 concerns the tipping point of the EKC. Specifically, the estimated 
income turning point is higher for CO2 (10.6) than for SO2 (9). This finding is consistent 
with Cavlovic et al. (2000) and Managi et al. (2009) who also show that the peak of 
CO2 emissions occurs at relatively higher level of incomes compared to SO2 
emissions.13    
 
Do the Determinants of Emissions have Political Regime-Dependent Effects?  
 
In this subsection, I proceed to assess whether the impact of the underlying explanatory 
variables on emission levels vary across democratic and non-democratic regimes. The 
results are given in Table 4.6. In Model 1, the dependent variable is CO2, while, in 
Model 2, the dependent variable is SO2.   
 
The results from the diagnostic tests provided in Panel B of Table 4.6 detect no 
statistical problems with the estimator. Specifically, the estimates of J-test provide 
evidence that the orthogonality condition is satisfied. Further, the Arellano-Bond test 
shows that the residuals exhibit no second-order serial correlation.  
 
To check whether the estimated coefficients are statistically different across the two 
political regimes I have run a Wald-type test. The test statistic (p-value) for CO2 is 2.16 
(0.062), and for SO2 is 2.75 (0.022).  Thus, the null hypothesis of equality of 
coefficients can be rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis of the underlying 
estimates being statistically different across democracies and non-democracies (detailed 
results are shown in Appendix in Table C.3). 
 
The results of Model 1 indicate that the level of per capita GDP has a positive and 
statistically significant impact on emission levels across both political regimes. This 
implies that an increase in the level of per capita GDP causes increases in levels of 
emission regardless of whether the economy has democratic or non-democratic 
institutions. As can be seen from the table, the negative coefficient of the square term of 
per capita GDP is statistically significant for democracies whereas the corresponding 
                                                            
13
 The turning points are the points where the first derivative of the estimated model with respect to per 
capita GDP is equal to 0.   
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coefficient for dictatorships fail to achieve any conventional level of statistical 
significance. 14 This means that the relationship between emission levels and GDP has a 
turning point only in democracies, approximately at 11 (in log terms).  
 
Table 4.6: System GMM Estimates on the Determinants of CO2 and SO2 - 
Differential Effects across Political Regimes 
Panel A: Estimation Results 
  
Model 1 (CO2) Model 2 (SO2) 
, ,
D
i t i tPR GDP⋅  0.528** (0.203)    0.291** (0.120)    
, ,
N
i t i tPR GDP⋅  0.481** (0.241)    0.409** (0.163)    
2
, ,
D
i t i tPR GDP⋅  -0.024** (0.011) -0.015** (0.007) 
2
, ,
D
i t i tPR GDP⋅  -0.021 (0.015)    -0.023** (0.010) 
, ,
D
i t i tPR Pop⋅  0.117*** (0.032) 0.037*** (0.013) 
, ,
N
i t i tPR Pop⋅  0.123*** (0.044) 0.027** (0.013)    
, ,
D
i t i tPR Youth⋅  0.023 (0.058)    0.091 (0.068)    
, ,
N
i t i tPR Youth⋅  0.014 (0.099)    0.012 (0.057)    
, ,
D
i t i tPR Open⋅  0.074** (0.031)    0.039* (0.023)    
, ,
N
i t i tPR Open⋅  0.110*** (0.032) 0.041** (0.019)    
, 1i tE −  0.911*** (0.025) 0.979*** (0.010) 
Trend  -0.003*** (0.001) -0.002*** (0.001) 
Constant -3.961*** (1.141)  -2.229*** (0.659)  
Panel B: Diagnostic Tests 
AR(2) 0.442 0.927 
Hansen test 0.207 0.577 
Observations 5222 4047 
Countries 
  138   116 
Instruments 
    95     74 
Notes: The table shows the main determinants of emission levels conditional to the political regime, 
i.e. Democracy ( )
,
D
i t
PR  and Dictatorship ( )
,
N
i t
PR . Panel A reports the estimates obtained from robust 
two-step system GMM estimations. The figures given in parentheses are standard errors which are 
asymptotically robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within panels. 
Model 1 shows the estimates for CO2 emissions and Model 2 shows the estimates for SO2 emissions. 
Panel B reports the p-values of the Hansen test and the Arellano and Bond test. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
One potential explanation behind the lack of evidence for an EKC in non-democracies 
is that democracies promote stronger multilateral environmental cooperation than non 
democracies (Neumayer, 2002). This is especially important for curbing CO2 emissions 
due to their nature of global externality. However, the number of year-observations 
                                                            
14
 It is interesting to note that there are two dictatorships (year-observations) with per capita GDP above 
11, namely Qatar and Brunei. However, the turning point of the EKC for dictatorship is slightly higher, 
approximately 11.45. Above this level there are only two year-observations, namely Qatar-2006 and 
Qatar-2007. 
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above the turning points is extremely small and regards Luxembourg only. Thus, the 
estimate cannot be taken as reliable evidence in favour of an EKC for CO2 emissions. 
As regards non-democracies the coefficient of the per capita GDP squared term is not 
statistically significant.   
 
One difference worth noting is that the turning point for SO2 is lower for non-
democracies than for democracies (8.9 and 9.7, respectively). As for the remaining 
coefficients, both signs and statistical significance are similar across political regimes. 
Thus, in terms of economic significance, the results so far provide little evidence for a 
differential impact of the driving forces across political regimes. 
 
Do the Differential Effects across Political Regimes Differ across Income Levels?    
 
In this section, I investigate whether the differential effects of the underlying 
determinants of emissions across political regimes vary with the level of income. The 
results are shown in Table 4.7.15 The sign and statistical significance of per capita GDP 
and its square terms remain unchanged.  
 
Because of the presence of interactions with per capita GDP, the estimates of elasticity 
of emission levels with respect to population, youth and openness depend on income 
levels. Consequently, the elasticity cannot be measured directly by observing only the 
magnitude of the corresponding coefficient. However, it is possible to calculate the 
elasticity by taking the partial derivative of Equation (3) with respect to a specific 
underlying explanatory variable. This allows us to assess the sensitivity of emissions 
with respect to population, youth and openness at different percentiles of income (per 
capita GDP). Tables 4.8 and 4.9 present the elasticity of CO2 and SO2 emissions, 
respectively. For visual analysis of the sensitivity of the CO2 and SO2 emissions, the 
estimates given in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 are plotted in Figures 4.1 to 4.6 (in Appendix). 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
15
 The Wald-type test rejects the null hypothesis that estimated coefficients are not statistically significant 
different across the two political regimes. Results are shown in Table C.3 (Appendix). 
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Population  
 
Model 1 in Table 4.7 shows that the positive impact of increasing levels of population 
on CO2 emissions weakens as a country achieves higher levels of income regardless of 
the political regime. These estimates implies that the adverse impact of population on 
air quality is likely to be less severe in economies that have high levels of per capita 
GDP as compared to those that have lower levels of income. This finding provides 
evidence supporting the Boserupian perspective that population growth prompts 
technological advances which counterbalance the adverse effect of increasing levels of 
population on the environment. Further, this result is in line with the empirical evidence 
in Shi (2003) and Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2007) who indicate a weaker impact of 
population on CO2 in high income countries as compared to relatively poorer countries. 
Interestingly, the elasticity of SO2 with respect to population turns from positive to 
negative at and above the 70th percentile of income in both political regimes (Table 4.9 
and Figure 4.4). This means that at relatively high income levels, further increases in 
population size are associated with lower levels of SO2 emissions. 
 
As regards the differential impact across democracies and dictatorships, the results show 
that the sensitivity of CO2 emission levels to population size is approximately the same 
across political regimes at relatively low income levels (Table 4.8 and Figure 4.1). On 
the other hand, emission levels are more sensitive to population size in democracies 
than in non-democracies at higher levels of income. These figures mean that rising 
levels of population are less harmful in terms of CO2 emissions for dictatorships as 
compared to democracies at high income percentiles. As for SO2, the elasticity of 
emissions in absolute terms is higher in the case of non-democracy throughout the range 
of income (Table 4.9 and Figure 4.4). According to the sign of elasticity, the results 
reveal that a growth in population size is more detrimental under dictatorship than under 
democracies in the range of relatively low income levels. Conversely, at higher income 
levels, rising levels of population turn out to be more “beneficial” for dictatorship as 
compared to democracies.  
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Table 4.7: System GMM Estimates on the Determinants of CO2 and SO2 - 
Differential Effects across Political Regimes Conditional on Income Levels 
Panel A: Estimation Results 
  
Model 1 (CO2) Model 2 (SO2) 
, ,
D
i t i tPR GDP⋅  1.843** (0.756)    2.686** (1.163)    
, ,
N
i t i tPR GDP⋅  1.749** (0.796)    2.810*** (1.031) 
2
, ,
D
i t i tPR GDP⋅  -0.045** (0.021)    -0.073** (0.035) 
2
, ,
D
i t i tPR GDP⋅  -0.020 (0.024)    -0.069*** (0.024) 
, ,
D
i t i tPR Pop⋅  0.281*** (0.090)    0.292** (0.116)    
, ,
N
i t i tPR Pop⋅  0.339** (0.141)    0.511*** (0.186) 
, ,
D
i t i tPR Youth⋅  1.036 (0.739)    1.686 (1.069)    
, ,
N
i t i tPR Youth⋅  1.196 (0.921)    0.991 (1.134)    
, ,
D
i t i tPR Open⋅  0.591*** (0.222)    0.611** (0.275)    
, ,
N
i t i tPR Open⋅  0.573** (0.240)    0.565** (0.255)    
, , ,
D
i t i t i tPR GDP Pop⋅ ⋅  -0.020** (0.009)    -0.030** (0.013) 
, , ,
N
i t i t i tPR GDP Pop⋅ ⋅  -0.032** (0.016)    -0.061*** (0.023) 
, , ,
D
i t i t i tPR GDP Youth⋅ ⋅  -0.123 (0.083)    -0.183 (0.122)    
, , ,
D
i t i t i tPR GDP Youth⋅ ⋅  -0.149 (0.104)    -0.115 (0.131)    
, , ,
D
i t i t i tPR GDP Open⋅ ⋅  -0.062** (0.025)    -0.070** (0.031) 
, , ,
D
i t i t i tPR GDP Open⋅ ⋅  -0.061** (0.029)    -0.069** (0.032) 
, 1i tE −  0.916*** (0.025)    0.970*** (0.019) 
Trend  
-0.002*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)    
Constant  
-13.414*** (5.100) -18.506** (7.515)  
Panel B: Diagnostic Tests 
AR(2) 0.438 0.922 
Hansen test 0.341 0.591 
Observations 5222 4047 
Countries 
  138   116 
Instruments 
  129     75 
Notes: The table shows the main determinants of emission levels conditional to the political regime 
and the level of income ( )
,i tGDP . Panel A reports the estimates obtained from robust two-step 
system GMM estimations. The figures given in parentheses are standard errors which are 
asymptotically robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within panels. 
Model 1 shows the estimates for CO2 emissions and Model 2 shows the estimates for SO2 emissions. 
Panel B reports the p-values of the Hansen test and the Arellano and Bond test. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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There are no straight theoretical reasons which could account for such a differential 
effects across political regimes. It could be argued that such difference in sensitivity is 
driven by an income difference between political regimes. After all, a relatively rich 
(poor) democracy has a higher income level than a relatively rich (poor) dictatorship. 
However, the findings suggest that the income level works as a mitigating factor of the 
adverse impact of population. If the results are simply the artefact of income differences 
between political regimes, then the adverse (beneficial) effect of increasing levels of 
population should be generally weaker (stronger) in democracies than in dictatorships. 
However, the results show that the opposite is true.  
 
Youth  
 
As can be seen from Table 4.7, the sign of the coefficient related to youth is positive, 
yet the interaction term with per capita GDP is negative. This suggests that the change 
in CO2 emissions following a change in the share of young population would be bigger 
in poorer countries than in rich countries, regardless of political regime. Yet, the 
coefficients of both youth and its interaction with per capita GDP are statistically 
insignificant. 
 
These findings provide little support for intergenerational environmental altruism 
whereby parents start to pursue their desire to preserve the environment for the young 
generations as a society achieves sufficiently high living standards. These results hold 
for both political regimes, which suggest that there is no differential impact across 
democracies and dictatorships.  
 
Openness 
 
The estimate involving per capita GDP interacted with the proxy of trade openness 
shows that the positive effect of openness on CO2 emissions decreases as the level of 
income increases (Table 4.7). This observation is robust across both political regimes. 
The negative sign of the interaction term can be considered as evidence supporting the 
PPH. That is, tighter environmental standards and relatively strong preference about 
environment quality at higher income levels might have prompted the migration of dirty 
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industries from relatively richer countries to their trading partners that are poor 
economically.  
 
In such a scenario, it is obvious to expect that the adverse environmental impact, 
particularly air pollution, of trade openness would be more manifest in countries having 
relatively lower levels of income.  This result is also in line with previous findings of 
pollution heaven effects (Lucas et al., 1992; Mani and Wheeler, 1998; and Cole and 
Elliot, 2003). The estimates of elasticity related to trade openness show that the 
elasticity of CO2 emissions change its sign, turning positive to negative at and above the 
60th  percentile for democracies (Table 4.8 and Figure 4.3). I also observe that, contrary 
to CO2 emissions, the sensitivity of SO2 to openness turns out to be negative at 
relatively high income levels, regardless of the political regime (Table 4.9 and Figure 
4.6).  
 
As regards the differential impact across political regime, the elasticities show that 
pollution heaven effects are stronger for democracies as compared to non-democracies. 
This result has potentially important implications for the debate on the impact of 
democracy on environmental quality. Specifically, the beneficial impact of democracy 
on environmental quality found by previous studies might be partially driven by 
pollution heaven effects. In other words, the curbing effect on emissions associated with 
higher degrees of democracy could mask the migration of dirty production toward 
developing countries with weak environmental regulations. This suggests that 
democratic regimes, presumably, provide only partial solutions to environmental 
problems, leaving them largely untouched on a global scale. 
 
4.5.3. Robustness Check 
 
In this section I check whether the statistical estimates are driven by any specific 
observation. As shown by Dietz and Rosa (1997), regressions analyses of air pollution 
could be strongly influenced by the two most populated countries, namely China and 
India. Means and standard deviations for these countries are displayed in Table C.4 
(Appendix). As can been seen, the average of CO2, SO2  and population for these two 
countries are relatively high as compared to the averages shown in Tables 4.1-4.2. 
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Therefore I drop China and India from the panel and re-estimate Models 1-2 of Table 
4.7. The results are showed in Table C.5 in Appendix. The exclusion of these countries 
scarcely affects the findings. Specifically, the signs and statistical significance of the 
coefficients on population and openness, as well as their interactions with per capita 
GDP, are preserved.  
 
As an additional robustness check I drop the United States from the panel of countries. 
Being one of the most polluting countries in the world, one might expect that the US 
would affect the findings for democracies. Mean and standard deviation are presented in 
Table C.4. Table C.6 in Appendix illustrates the empirical estimations. Estimates are 
robust to the exclusion of the US with the exception of the proportion of population 
aged less than 15 for SO2 emissions (Model 2). Specifically, the coefficients of youth as 
well as its interaction with income levels are now both statistically significant at 5% for 
democracies. In line with previous results, I find that the sign of the overall impact of 
youth on SO2 emissions turns from positive to negative as the income level of a nation 
increases.1  
 
These findings provide some evidence in favour of intergenerational environmental 
altruism in democracies. This might be due to free flow of information and the work of 
environmental lobbies which strengthen parents’ determination to leave a better 
environment for their children. However, the impact of youth on CO2 emissions remains 
insignificant regardless of the political regime. One possible explanation for these 
asymmetric findings between air pollutants is that the adverse effects of CO2 on 
environment and human health are less visible as compared to those of SO2 (e.g. Managi 
et al., 2009).  
 
4.6.     Conclusions 
 
Over the last couple of decades, much theoretical work has been devoted to 
understanding the factors behind emissions of CO2 and SO2 across the globe. 
Empirically, several studies have documented that production levels, international trade 
activities, age structure, urbanization and economic growth are the most significant 
                                                            
1
 The income turning point for democracies is just below the 50th percentile (results not shown here).  
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determinants of the level of emissions. Further, some prior studies have also found that 
democracy plays an important role in affecting emissions. However, the existing 
literature does not explore whether the adverse (beneficial) effects of the driving forces 
are weaker (stronger) in democracies as compared to dictatorships. The main aim of this 
study is to investigate the differential effects on emission levels of per capita GDP, 
population size, the share of population aged less than 15 and trade openness, across 
democratic and non-democratic countries.      
 
The main findings from my empirical investigation show that the impact of population, 
youth and openness on emission levels varies across political regimes. As regards 
population, democracies do not appear to mitigate the adverse impact of an increasing 
number of people as compared to dictatorships.2 In fact, population pressures appear to 
be less problematic precisely in dictatorships. As regards openness, the results indicate 
that the adverse effects associated with higher shares of trade are generally weaker under 
democracies than under dictatorships.3 However, the negative sign of the interaction 
term between openness and per capita GDP suggests that such differential impact across 
political regimes reflects pollution heaven effects. Finally, my findings display that the 
share of young population has a significant impact on emissions levels of SO2 for 
democracies (when the US excluded). The negative sensitivity of SO2 to youth suggests 
that democracy promotes intergenerational altruism at relatively high levels of income. 
 
Taken together, the findings provide some interesting insights into the potential role 
played by the political regime in addressing environmental issues. The results on the 
impact of youth suggest that individuals in democracies are more concerned with the 
welfare of future generations then elites in non-democracies. The attributes of 
democratic institutions, such as civil rights and freedom of information and expression, 
probably underlie this difference across political regimes. On the other hand, other 
results cast some doubts on the capability of democracies to effectively address 
environmental problems. First, increasing levels of population seem generally less 
detrimental on air quality in dictatorships than in democracies. Second, contrary to the 
case of SO2, there is little evidence of intergenerational altruism for a global pollutant 
                                                            
2
 A weaker adverse impact means a stronger beneficial impact in the income range where the elasticity 
turns from positive to negative.  
3
 Like population, a weaker adverse impact of openness means a stronger beneficial impact where the 
elasticity turns to be negative.  
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such as CO2 emissions, regardless of the political regime. Third, the results on trade 
openness suggest that strong pollution abatements observed in relatively rich countries 
could be partially offset by pollution heaven effects and such effects are stronger under 
democracies. This last finding implies that the beneficial environmental impact of 
democracy found in previous studies might, in fact, partially reflect an externalization of 
environmental problems toward poor countries. 
 
Overall, these findings call for some caution about strong statements which emphasize 
the ability of democracy in solving environmental problems on a global scale. Most of 
the empirical evidence on such view comes from studies based on models which link a 
democracy variable directly to environmental output. In fact, to deliver better 
environmental outcomes democracy needs to have some kind of control over the 
environmental impact of other factors. It is likely that the relationship between 
democracy and environmental issues is more complex than empirical models so far have 
supposed. Further research with emphasis on the channels linking democracy to 
environmental pollution is needed to ascertain the impact of democracy on the 
environment.  
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4.7.     Appendix C 
 
Table C.1: Description of Variables 
Variable Description Source 
SO2 
 Carbon Dioxide emissions              
(Units: Gigagram).  
Smith et al. 2010 
Available at: http://ciera-air.org  
PR Political Regime Index                 (Dummy Variable) 
Cheibub et al. 2010 
Available at: 
https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/cheibub 
GDP Real GDP per capita                    (Constant Prices: Chain series) 
Penn World Table 6.3 
Open Sum of exports and imports of goods   
and services (% of GDP) 
CO2 
Carbon Dioxide emissions                
(Units: Kilotons).   World Bank  
Available at: 
http://www.esds.ac.uk/international/webs
ite 
Pop Population, total 
Youth Population aged 0-14 (% of total) 
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Table C.2: List of Countries 
Afghanistan Egypt Malawi South Africa 
Albania El Salvador Malaysia Spain 
Algeria Estonia Maldives Sri Lanka 
Argentina Fiji Mali Sudan 
Armenia Finland Malta Swaziland 
Australia France Mauritania Sweden 
Austria Gabon Mauritius Switzerland 
Bahrain Gambia Mexico Syria 
Bangladesh Ghana Moldova Tajikistan 
Barbados Greece Mongolia Tanzania 
Belgium Guatemala Morocco Thailand 
Belize Guyana Mozambique Togo 
Benin Haiti Namibia Tonga 
Bolivia Honduras Nepal Trinidad & Tobago 
Botswana Hungary Netherlands Tunisia 
Brazil Iceland New Zealand Turkey 
Brunei India Nicaragua Uganda 
Bulgaria Indonesia Niger Ukraine 
Burundi Iran Norway UAE 
Cambodia Iraq Pakistan  United Kingdom 
Cameroon Ireland Panama United States 
Canada Israel Papua New Guinea Uruguay 
Central African Rep. Italy Paraguay Venezuela 
Chile Jamaica Peru Vietnam 
China Japan Philippines Yemen 
Colombia Jordan Poland Zambia 
Congo Kazakhstan Portugal Zimbabwe 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Kenya Qatar   
Costa Rica Korea, South Romania   
Cote d'Ivoire Kuwait Russia   
Croatia Kyrgyzstan Rwanda   
Cuba Laos Saudi Arabia   
Cyprus Latvia Senegal   
Czech Republic Liberia Sierra Leone   
Denmark Libya Singapore   
Dominican Republic Lithuania Slovakia   
Ecuador Luxembourg Slovenia   
Notes: The table illustrates the sample of countries used in the empirical investigation. Data on SO2 
emissions are unavailable for 22 countries of the 138 countries listed. 
 
 
 
 
158 
 
Table C.3: Chow Test for Testing Equality of Coefficients 
across Political Regimes 
  
CO2 SO2 
Equation (2) 
F-test 2.16 2.75 
p-value 0.062 0.022 
Equation (3) 
F-test 2.08 3.19 
p-value 0.041 0.003 
Notes: The table reports the Chow tests results from Equations (2) and (3). The 
null hypothesis is that the estimated coefficients are not jointly statistically 
different across democracies and dictatorships. 
 
 
 
 
Table C.4: Summary Statistics for China, India and the US 
Variables Country 
CO2  Sample SO2  Sample 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
CO2 China 14.323 0.799     
  
India 13.040 0.784     
  
US 15.352 0.177     
SO2 China     9.424 0.578 
  India 
    7.690 0.675 
  US 
    9.977 0.248 
GDP China 7.376 0.654 7.316 0.599 
  India 7.107 0.378 7.069 0.338 
  US 10.216 0.289 10.195 0.278 
Pop China 20.729 0.211 20.717 0.208 
  India 20.415 0.283 20.396 0.275 
  US 19.283 0.145 19.272 0.139 
Youth China 3.458 0.208 3.476 0.194 
  India 3.642 0.073 3.649 0.065 
  US 3.172 0.138 3.178 0.137 
Open China 2.912 0.708 2.853 0.664 
  India 2.970 0.412 2.934 0.383 
  US 2.640 0.415 2.609 0.397 
Notes: The table illustrates the means and standard deviations of the variables under analysis for China, 
India and the US. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
159 
 
Table C.5: System GMM Estimates on the Determinants of CO2 and SO2 - 
China and India excluded 
Panel A: Estimation Results 
  
Model 1 (CO2) Model 2 (SO2) 
, ,
D
i t i tPR GDP⋅  2.321***(0.766) 2.196** (0.961)   
, ,
N
i t i tPR GDP⋅  2.164***(0.810) 2.282***(0.763)    
2
, ,
D
i t i tPR GDP⋅  -0.046**(0.022) -0.050*(0.030)   
2
, ,
D
i t i tPR GDP⋅  -0.025(0.026) -0.049*** (0.019)   
, ,
D
i t i tPR Pop⋅  0.417*** (0.128) 0.451*** (0.139)   
, ,
N
i t i tPR Pop⋅  0.501** (0.198) 0.264** (0.123)    
, ,
D
i t i tPR Youth⋅  1.009 (0.712) 0.767  (0.974)   
, ,
N
i t i tPR Youth⋅  1.277 (0.915) 1.569  (1.250)     
, ,
D
i t i tPR Open⋅  0.994*** (0.294) 0.594*** (0.209) 
, ,
N
i t i tPR Open⋅  0.673** (0.290) 0.684** (0.331)    
, , ,
D
i t i t i tPR GDP Pop⋅ ⋅  -0.035** (0.014) -0.046*** (0.014)   
, , ,
N
i t i t i tPR GDP Pop⋅ ⋅  -0.049** (0.023) -0.031** (0.014)   
, , ,
D
i t i t i tPR GDP Youth⋅ ⋅  -0.128 (0.081) -0.082  (0.110)      
, , ,
D
i t i t i tPR GDP Youth⋅ ⋅  -0.147 (0.104) -0.165 (0.135)      
, , ,
D
i t i t i tPR GDP Open⋅ ⋅  -0.110***(0.034) -0.068***(0.023)    
, , ,
D
i t i t i tPR GDP Open⋅ ⋅  -0.073** (0.036) -0.083** (0.041)    
, 1i tE −  0.893*** (0.032) 0.973*** (0.018)  
Trend  -0.002* (0.001) -0.000  (0.001)    
Constant -17.071*** (5.147) -16.163** (6.191)     
Panel B: Diagnostic Tests 
AR(2) 0.458 0.929 
Hansen test 0.211 0.560 
Observations 5132 3963 
Countries 
  136   114 
Instruments 
  126     75 
Notes: The table shows the main determinants of emission levels conditional to the political regime 
and the level of income. Panel A reports the estimates obtained from robust two-step system GMM 
estimations. The figures given in parentheses are standard errors which are asymptotically robust to 
the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within panels. Model 1 shows the estimates 
for CO2 emissions and Model 2 shows the estimates for SO2 emissions. Panel B reports the p-values 
of the Hansen test and the Arellano and Bond test. China and India are excluded from the sample. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table C.6: System GMM Estimates on the Determinants of CO2 and SO2 - 
the US excluded 
Panel A: Estimation Results 
  
Model 1 (CO2) Model2 (SO2) 
, ,
D
i t i tPR GDP⋅  1.968** (0.839) 2.798*** (0.896)  
, ,
N
i t i tPR GDP⋅  
  1.854** (0.904) 2.913*** (0.791)   
2
, ,
D
i t i tPR GDP⋅  -0.048** (0.024) -0.076** (0.029)    
2
, ,
D
i t i tPR GDP⋅  -0.022 (0.027) -0.069*** (0.021)  
, ,
D
i t i tPR Pop⋅  0.285*** (0.096) 0.309*** (0.108)    
, ,
N
i t i tPR Pop⋅  0.371*** (0.139) 0.494*** (0.138)    
, ,
D
i t i tPR Youth⋅  1.176 (0.843) 1.815**  (0.885)  
, ,
N
i t i tPR Youth⋅  1.238 (1.075) 1.333   (0.938)    
, ,
D
i t i tPR Open⋅  0.580** (0.239) 0.576*** (0.214)   
, ,
N
i t i tPR Open⋅  0.567** (0.246) 0.530**  (0.250)    
, , ,
D
i t i t i tPR GDP Pop⋅ ⋅  -0.021** (0.010) -0.032*** (0.011)    
, , ,
N
i t i t i tPR GDP Pop⋅ ⋅  -0.036** (0.016) -0.059*** (0.017)   
, , ,
D
i t i t i tPR GDP Youth⋅ ⋅  
-0.140 (0.094) -0.196**  (0.098)    
, , ,
D
i t i t i tPR GDP Youth⋅ ⋅  -0.154 (0.124) -0.159 (0.109)      
, , ,
D
i t i t i tPR GDP Open⋅ ⋅  -0.061** (0.027) -0.065*** (0.024)  
, , ,
D
i t i t i tPR GDP Open⋅ ⋅  -0.061** (0.029) -0.064** (0.031)    
, 1i tE −  0.916*** (0.026) 0.973*** (0.019)   
Trend  
-0.002** (0.001) -0.001  (0.001)    
Constant 
-14.169** (5.677) -19.293*** (5.730) 
Panel B: Diagnostic Tests 
AR(2) 0.441 0.920 
Hansen test 0.249 0.553 
Observations 5177 4005 
Countries 
  137   115 
Instruments 
  129     77 
Notes: The table shows the main determinants of emission levels conditional to the political regime 
and the level of income. Panel A reports the estimates obtained from robust two-step system GMM 
estimations. The figures given in parentheses are standard errors which are asymptotically robust to 
the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within panels. Model 1 shows the estimates 
for CO2 emissions and Model 2 shows the estimates for SO2 emissions. Panel B reports the p-values 
of the Hansen test and the Arellano and Bond test. The United States are excluded from the sample. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Figure 4.1: Elasticity of CO2 with respect to Population across Income 
Percentiles 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Elasticity of CO2 with respect to Youth across Income 
Percentiles 
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Figure 4.3: Elasticity of CO2 with respect to Openness across Income 
Percentiles 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Elasticity of SO2 with respect to Population across Income 
Percentiles 
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Figure 4.5: Elasticity of SO2 with respect to Youth across Income 
Percentiles 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Elasticity of SO2 with respect to Openness across Income Percentiles
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Chapter 5 : Conclusion 
 
This thesis has explored the theme revolving on the relationship between growth, 
poverty and air pollution, on the one hand, and a specific set of institutions, on the other 
hand. Economic growth, alleviation of poverty and environmental quality, all sound as 
attractive targets to be achieved. Similarly, the institutions under analysis have some 
inherently desirable characteristics which make them a target by their own. Specifically, 
the one person/one vote principle entails, at least in theory, an egalitarian partition of the 
political power, thereby making democratic institutions the embodiment of political 
equity. The amelioration of information and transition costs, which characterizes an 
efficient financial sector, makes financial development a crucial factor for an efficient 
allocation of resources. Given these inherent aspects of equity and efficiency, it is 
fundamental to assess whether there is a trade-off between the institution and another 
desirable target, or, on the contrary, whether the institution is conducive to the 
achievement of that target. A third possibility is that the institution neither promotes nor 
hampers the accomplishment of the target, in which case it is simply “neutral”. 
 
Based on this, the current thesis has explored three themes: (i) the relationship between 
income inequality and growth conditional on the political regime; (ii) the impact of 
financial development on poverty; (iii) the differential effects of the factors underling 
CO2 and SO2 emissions across democracies and non-democracies. Specifically, Chapter 
Two assesses the differential impact of inequality on growth across political regimes by 
using new and more reliable dataset on inequality as well as modern methodological 
tools. Further, it adopts an empirical model which allows the impact of income 
inequality on growth to vary with the level of income. In Chapter Three, I assess the 
relationship between poverty and financial development using two measures of absolute 
poverty as well as a measure of relative poverty while overcoming some of the 
methodological problems encountered in previous studies. I also use different proxies of 
financial development which gauges two different dimension of financial development, 
i.e. the size of the financial sector and the efficiency/liquidity with which the financial 
sector performs its functions. In Chapter Four I quantify the impact of the main factors 
underlying CO2 and SO2 emissions, namely the level of income, population size, the 
proportion of population aged less than 15 and trade openness. After assessing the 
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effects of these variables for the full sample of countries, I explore whether these effects 
differ across political regimes, namely democracies vis-à-vis dictatorships. 
 
The empirical results are summarized separately for each chapter in the following 
sections. Policy implications, limitations and scope for future research are illustrated in 
the final two sections. 
 
Chapter 2: The Impact of Income Inequality on Growth: A Sensitiveness Analysis 
across Different Political Regimes 
  
This chapter contributes to yield a better grasp of the relationship between inequality 
and growth by studying the effect of inequality on growth across different political 
regimes in the light of more reliable dataset on inequality, sophisticated methodological 
tools and a flexible functional form linking inequality to growth. The results show that 
the effects of income inequality on growth are negative and statistically significant 
regardless of the type of political regime. However, when the interaction term between 
the Gini index and per capita GDP is included in the set of regressors, the results show 
that while the overall impact of inequality on growth is negative for relatively low 
levels of income, it turns out to be positive at relatively high levels of income. As for 
the differential effect across political regime, the estimates obtained from employing the 
flexible functional form reveals that the effect of inequality on growth varies with 
income levels differently for democracies and dictatorships. Specifically, as far as 
relatively low-income countries are concerned, the results show that the overall impact 
of inequality on growth, which is of negative sign, is weaker under democracies than 
under dictatorships. On the other hand, the estimates display that the overall impact of 
inequality in rich countries, which is of positive sign, is stronger under dictatorships 
than under democracies.  
 
A different attitude of political regimes toward redistributional issues coupled with 
credit market imperfections provides a potential explanation for such findings.  
Contrary to the predictions of the political economic model, redistribution has the 
potential to improve efficiency when markets do not work perfectly. In addition, social 
safety platforms might foster growth rate to the extent that they function as a tool to buy 
social peace. Thus the alleged vulnerability of democracy to pressures for redistribution 
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might turn to be a virtue rather than a weakness. Specifically, by redistributing 
resources from rich to poor households democratic regimes are capable of mitigating the 
adverse impact of inequality on growth which prevails at relatively low income levels. 
On the other hand, redistribution does not sort out similar benefits in high-income 
countries because credit market imperfections and social unrest there are much less 
serious than in poor countries. Persistent increasing level of social expenditure in rich 
countries could even yield losses in efficiency. This provides one possible explanation 
of why the positive impact of inequality on growth, which manifests at higher levels of 
income, is stronger under dictatorships than under democracies. 
 
Chapter 3: Absolute Poverty, Relative Poverty and Financial Development  
 
In this Chapter I have contributed to the small but increasing strand of literature on the 
linkage between financial development and poverty by using indices of both absolute 
and relative poverty while attempting to address some of the methodological difficulties 
which are present in previous studies. My results show that the impact of financial 
development on poverty alleviation is statistically significant when the amount of liquid 
liabilities and the value of credit to the private sector is used as proxy of financial 
development and poverty is measured either by the headcount index or the poverty gap 
at the $ 2 a day poverty line (absolute poverty). The results are robust to the poverty line 
of $ 1.25 per day. On the other hand, the findings yield no evidence for a significant 
impact of financial development on the income share of the poorest 20% of the 
population (relative poverty), whatever the proxy for financial development. The results 
also show that the commercial-central bank ratio has no significant effects on poverty 
reduction, regardless of the measure of poverty. Similarly, both stock market 
capitalization and turnover ratio do not appear to significantly affect the incidence of 
poverty. 
 
These results provide some evidence that improvements in the financial system, 
measured in terms of a deepening in the banking sector, mitigate the liquidity 
constraints which prevent poor households from undertaking their investment projects. 
Thus, in line with previous empirical studies, my results corroborate a beneficial impact 
of financial development in terms of lower levels of absolute poverty. Specifically, an 
increase in the value of liquid liabilities and in the availability of credit granted by 
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financial intermediaries to the private sector is followed by a reduction of the number of 
households living under the poverty lines of $ 2 and $ 1.25 per day. Moreover, the 
estimates concerning the poverty gap tells that financial development also moderates the 
“depth” of poverty, which means that the household living below the poverty line 
becomes less poor. On the other hand, weak evidence for a significant impact of 
financial development on the income share of the poorest 20% of population shows that 
financial development does not favour disproportionately the poorest. Finally, my 
empirical results reveal that neither the development of stock market nor the extent to 
which credit is being allocated by commercial banks relatively to central banks has any 
effect on the poor, whatever the measure of poverty. 
 
Chapter 4: Determinants of CO2 and SO2 Emissions: Empirical Evidence for Different 
Political Regimes 
 
In this Chapter I have contributed to the literature on the democracy-environment nexus 
by assessing whether the impact of the driving forces underlying CO2 and SO2 
emissions is heterogeneous across democracies and non-democracies. In so doing I also 
used a set of interaction terms to assess whether differences across political regimes 
vary with the level of income. The empirical results from the full sample are in line with 
previous studies. Specifically, increasing levels of population and openness lead to 
higher emissions, while the impact of youth is statistically insignificant. The 
relationship between per capita GDP and emissions appear to be inverted U shaped. 
When I move to political regime, I observe that the effects of per capita GDP, 
population size, youth and trade openness are similar across democracies and non-
democracies. The only difference relies on the relationship between per capita GDP and 
CO2 emissions, which is inverted U shaped for democracies, while it is linear for 
dictatorships. Sizeable differences across political regimes emerge, however, when the 
effects of the underlying determinants of air pollution are interacted with the level of 
income. Specifically, the estimates display that the adverse impact of increasing levels 
of population on air quality is generally less strong under dictatorships than under 
democracies. Conversely, the adverse impact of greater trade openness is stronger under 
dictatorships than under democracies. Finally, the impact of youth on SO2 emissions 
turns to be statistically significant for democracies only while it remains insignificant 
for CO2, regardless of the type of political regime.  
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The results on the impact of youth suggest that individuals in democracies are more 
concerned with the welfare of future generations then the ruling elites in non-
democracies. Such more intense concern is likely to be the outcome of civil rights, 
freedom of information and social movement mobilizations which are all important 
attributes of democratic institutions. However, unlike SO2, there is no evidence of 
intergenerational altruism for CO2, regardless of the political regime. One explanation 
for this is that the adverse impact of CO2 on the environment is harder to perceive as 
compared to SO2 emissions. The sign and the statistical significance of the interaction 
term between openness and per capita GDP provide evidence in favour of the pollution 
heaven hypothesis. Interestingly, the pollution heaven effects are stronger (in absolute 
values) for democracies than for dictatorships. This finding suggests that previous 
empirical studies on the environmental impact of political institutions might have given 
an overly optimistic view of the effect of democracy on environmental quality. As 
regards for the differential impact of population across political regimes, the estimates 
indicate that population pressures generally appear to be less problematic in 
dictatorships. I have no good theoretical explanation which could account for such 
finding. 
 
Discussion and Policy Implications 
 
Looking at the findings obtained in the current thesis, one can infer that the institutions 
do not trade off with any of the respective targets under analysis. This means that a 
country can enjoy the benefit from creating (or maintaining) a desirable political or 
economic institution without paying any cost in terms of the specific target under study. 
Specifically, the promotion of political freedoms does not seem to come at the cost of a 
lower growth rate neither democratic institutions appear to entail higher levels of CO2 
and SO2 emissions, as compared to their nondemocratic counterparts. Similarly, the 
promotion of a financial system which effectively mitigates information and transition 
costs does not seems to exacerbate poverty. Having made clear that the institutions 
under analysis entail no apparent costs, it is important to assess whether these 
institutions accommodate the achievement of a specific target or, alternatively, they are 
simply irrelevant (“neutral”). 
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Let us start from the role played by democracy in the relationship between inequality 
and economic growth. There is a largely shared view, known as the “Lee thesis”, which 
advocates restraints on political freedoms as the necessary price that poor countries have 
to pay in order to embark their economy along a path of fast economic growth. This 
view is well exposed in Moyo’s New York Times Bestsellers Dead Aid: “In a perfect 
world what poor countries at the lowest rungs of economic development need is not a 
multi-party democracy, but in fact a decisive benevolent dictator to push through the 
reforms required to get the economy moving” (2009, p. 42). The policy implications 
from my empirical findings are clearly in stark contrast with this view. Indeed, my 
results show that democracies, far from being a hindrance to a process of sustained 
growth, are in fact economically valuable precisely in relatively poor economies. By 
lowering the income of the decisive voter, a process of democratization would boost 
redistributive policies, which in turn will lead the economy to grow faster, even if they 
are financed through distortionary taxes. In fact, not only the incentive to invest by the 
poor, but also the incentive by the rich – who bear the main burden of taxation - will 
ultimately increase in a Keynesian context. The high propensity of consumption of the 
poor will indeed expand the level of the aggregate demand along with the level of 
production, thereby boosting the level of investment (the “acceleration” principle). To 
sum up, the self-interest of the median voter might paradoxically lead a democratic 
country to growth faster as compared to an autocracy whose leader fails to acknowledge 
the necessity of a platform of social spending as a remedy for market imperfections and 
social conflict. Hence, at least in poor countries, democratic institutions would provide a 
“win-win” strategy as far as the economic growth rate is concerned. 
 
Next, let us discuss some insights underlying the analysis of the relationship between 
financial development and poverty alleviation. As already explained, in presence of 
financial market constraints the economic possibilities of an individual are strictly 
determined by her parental wealth, not by her inherent skills. Individuals who are 
unable to provide the required collateral remain poor, regardless of their talents. If 
financial development effectively mitigates credit constraints, then policies which 
promote financial development would prove to be a better alternative to non-lump sum 
redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor, such as public-expenditure projects 
financed by progressive taxation (Beck et al., 2007). By implementing appropriate 
financial policies, the policy maker could prompt the investments by the poor without 
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worrying about the incentive to invest by the rich. My findings suggest that policies 
which deepen the banking sector are indeed likely to lower absolute poverty. On the 
other hand, the results also show that financial development does not appear to lower 
relative poverty, that is, it does not favour disproportionately the poorest 20% of the 
population. Rather, the poorest seem to benefit from financial development as much as 
anyone else. Therefore, whether financial development is a win-win strategy depends on 
the definition of poverty. To the extent that the policy maker aims at narrowing the 
income gap between the poor and the richer, it is unlikely that financial policies could 
replace fiscal policies entirely. A combination of the two types of policies probably 
provides a better recipe to tackle poverty. For example, an increase in public 
expenditure for education accompanied with a moderate liberalization of banking 
interest rate could lower the counting of people living the poverty line and at the same 
time increase the income share of the poorest fraction of the populations.  
 
Finally, let us make some comments about the role played by democracy in shaping 
environmental output. As explained in the literature review, previous empirical works 
generally provide evidence in favour of beneficial impact of democratic institutions on 
environmental quality. Such empirical evidence supports the arguments in favour of 
democracy, fairly resumed in the former US presidential candidate’s phrase “I have 
therefore come to believe that an essential prerequisite for saving the environment is the 
spread of democratic government to more nations of the world” (Gore, 1992, p. 179). In 
this view, political liberalization is a valuable tool in tackling the environmental issue. 
My empirical analysis provides mixed results in this regard. Empirical estimations yield 
evidence of an intergenerational environmental altruism in democracy. This suggests 
that free flow of information, accountability of the political class, independence of the 
media and other features of democratic institutions are likely to raise public awareness 
about environmental issues. However, other findings somehow dampen the enthusiasm 
about the capability of democracy to effectively tackle environmental issues. First, 
evidence of intergenerational environmental altruism in democracy has been found only 
for a local pollutant, SO2 emissions, not for a global pollutant, CO2 emissions. In 
addition, pollution heaven effects appear to be stronger in democracies, meaning that 
more stringent environmental regulations have the effect of relocating pollution-
intensive industries to other (poorer) countries. These two finding somehow give credit 
to the sceptical view, expressed in Paehlke’s words: “while economy and environment 
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are now global in character, democracy functions on only national and local decision 
levels” (1996, p. 28). Thus, whether democratization provide a win-win strategy in 
terms of environment is not easy to say. Addressing environmental problems on a 
global scale requires an international institution endowed with the political authority to 
enforce a common environmental policy. Without some kind of international authority, 
it seems to me, democracies are unlikely to effectively tackle environmental problems 
by themselves. On the other hand, by rising public awareness, democracy might make 
the single nations more willing to comply with environmental policies.  
 
Limitations and future research 
 
It is important to acknowledge that the empirical evidence presented here is subject to 
several limitations some of which have been already discussed. One limitation with 
Chapter Two and Four lies in their empirical design. It is well known that democracies 
are richer than dictatorships. This implies that the results obtained here are partially 
driven by differences in income levels across political regimes. This is problematic as it 
is not possible to disentangle such an effect from a “democracy” effect. One way to 
overcome this limitation is to carry natural policy experiments by focusing, for 
example, on a sub-sample of countries which changed political regimes and assess 
whether the relationship between the main variables of interest have changed aftermath 
of a democratization. This is a promising area for future research.  
 
An additional limitation with Chapter Two is concerned with the hypothesis of a 
different sensitivity of the policy-maker toward public pressure for redistribution across 
political regimes.  Specifically, in line with the endogenous redistribution model, I have 
assumed that redistributive policies are more likely to be carried in democracies than in 
dictatorships. Although this assumption is reasonable, it has to be nonetheless 
acknowledged that there is no reason to believe that dictatorships are systematically less 
involved in social spending as compared to democracies. After all, it is not surprising 
that a populist regime could pay more attention to redistributional issues than a 
democracy with a long history of right-wing ruling parties. Thus, in a subsequent work 
it would be interesting to compare the different categories of public expenditure, such as 
military and education expenditure, across democracy and dictatorships to assess the 
extent to which the political regime shapes the composition of public expenditure.   
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A further limitation is concerned with the measurement of financial development. The 
proxies used in the empirical analysis reflect mainly the depth of the financial sector. 
Specifically, the empirical findings suggest that a deepening in the financial sector, as 
proxied by liquid liabilities and private credit, is conducive to a lower level of (absolute) 
poverty. It would have been preferable to use indices which directly gauge how well the 
financial system performs functions, such as risk amelioration, saving mobilization and 
capital allocation. In fact, finding a proxy which captures more closely the development 
of financial system is a potential area for future research in itself. In addition, showing 
that financial development is pro-poor is not the end of the story. First, financial 
development might be achieved by difference means, such as interest rate liberalization 
and the 1:4 license employed in India. Second, financial development could sometime 
even be achieved by some kinds of financial restrictions, such as reserve and liquidity 
requirements (Arestis et al., 2002). Therefore, additional empirical research is needed to 
shed light on the policies to be implemented in order to effectively foster financial 
development.  
 
An additional limitation is concerned with the high-frequency of observations which 
ignore long run effects. This is especially true in Chapter Four. The empirical model 
here specifies current yearly levels of CO2 and SO2 emissions as a function of current 
yearly levels of the explanatory variables. Thus, in order to play any significant role in 
the preservation of the environment, democracies should have an immediate effect on 
the impact of the driving forces underlying emissions. However, it could be argued that 
the main effects of democracy might need time before they manifest. In order to capture 
a long-run impact, it would be interesting to consider the country’s experience with 
democracy. This could be an interesting area to be investigated in future research. One 
final comment about the democracy-environment nexus is worth making. In Chapter 
Four I have assessed the role of democracy in environmental issues using a set of 
interaction term between driving forces and dummies for the political regime.  
Additional insights in such matter could be gained by assessing the extent to which 
democracy itself affect the driving forces.  Future work which sheds light on the indirect 
effects of political regime is a promising line of research for a better understanding of 
the role played by democracy in environmental issues.  
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